IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA 
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
APPEAL CASE NO.: A438/2016
DATE: 22/09/2017
In the matter between:
LEBOGANG CHIKA                                                                                                                                                                                     APPELLANT
and
THE STATE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
VAN DER WESTHUIZEN, AJ
[1] The appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of murder in the High Court, Pretoria, was duly convicted by Dama, AJ, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The appellant, with leave of the court a quo, appeals against the sentence of life imprisonment.
[2] It will suffice to summarise the events that led to the conviction and sentencing of the appellant. The appellant was one of three accused.
[3] The appellant was imprisoned on a charge of assault with the intention to cause grievous bodily harm. During June 2013, the appellant was released from prison. Shortly after his aforesaid release, he was approached by the third accused to arrange for the murder of her husband.   The third accused offered the appellant an amount of R10
000.00 for murdering her husband. He accepted the task, and solicited the services of the second accused to assist him in completing the task laid upon him by the third accused. In respect of the aforementioned task, the latter on occasion met with the appellant at his home to discuss the relevant details. On enquiry from his relatives. and in particular from his mother, he stated that the purpose of the third accused's visits were to encourage him to be intimate with her at her home. On the eve of the commission of the said crime, the third accused took the appellant and the second accused to a guesthouse close to her house. from where they could easily access her property to commit the heinous crime. When the deceased exited from his house, the appellant attacked the deceased from behind with a knife and his accomplice attacked from the front. The deceased died from the wounds inflicted upon him during the attack. The appellant was arrested a few days after the murder.
[4] Prior to his initial incarceration on the charge of assault with the   intention to cause grievous bodily harm, the appellant assisted his father who had conducted the business of mechanical repairs to vehicles. His father taught him the skill of mechanic and paid him for his assistance in that regard.
[5] The appellant on the issue of sentence, initially and through his attorney. placed his personal circumstances before the court. The appellant   was   content   to have the important   and relevant   issues in respect of sentence addressed from the bar. Only after being prodded by the court a quo was the appellant’s attorney instructed to lead the appellant's evidence under oath.
[6] It is trite that a court of appeal will only interfere with a sentence imposed upon an appellant if it is held that: no reasonable man ought to have imposed such a sentence; the sentence is totally out of proportion to the gravity of the offence; the sentence evokes a feeling of shock or outrage; the sentence is grossly excessive or insufficient; the trial judge had not exercised his discretion properly; it is in the interest of justice to alter the sentence.[1]
[7] In terms of the provisions of section 51(1) of Act 105 of 1997, the court is empowered to sentence an accused convicted of murder to life imprisonment.     However, the court is entitled to   deviate   from   such sentence if there are substantial and compelling circumstances justifying a lesser sentence. In S v Malgas, supra , the Supreme Court of Appeal succinctly dealt with the issues constituting substantial and compelling circumstances and provided guidelines in approaching minimum sentences.
[8] On   behalf   of   the   appellant   it   was   submitted,   with   reference   to   S   v Blignaut,[2] that the following cumulatively constituted substantial and compelling circumstances:
(a)             The appellant was relatively young when he committed the heinous crime;
(b)             He co-operated with the police;
(c)             He pleaded guilty;
(d)             He was remorseful;
(e)             He was not paid by accused three for committing the murder;
(f)             He spent two years in custody awaiting trial.
[9] In DPP, KWAZULU-NATAL v NGCOBO[3] it was held that youthfulness by itself cannot be a mitigating factor. The appellant did not seem to demonstrate immaturity. Furthermore, the appellant had already embarked upon a career of violence prior to him committing the murder. The appellant's incarceration for assault with the intention to cause grievous bodily harm did not deter him from embarking on a more serious and violent trail, namely that of contract killing, shortly after being released. His apparent youthfulness fades into insignificance.
[10] The alleged factors of co-operating with the police and pleading guilty as constituting mitigating factors, in the proper context, run hollow. It was clear to the appellant that he was caught out and that his relatives were lined up as witnesses who would testify against him. His alleged co-operation and plea of guilty was no more than a mere ploy to gain a lenient sentence.
[11] The appellant's alleged remorse in the correct context is mere lip service. The appellant was initially content to have his personal circumstances, and alleged remorse, argued from the bar. When it became clear that more weight would be placed on such     evidence when under oath, and after being prodded by the court a quo, only then did   the   appellant   offer   to   testify   under   oath   to that effect. The appellant's remorse is no more than regret for being found out.[4]
[12] The submission that the appellant was not paid for his heinous crime constituting a mitigating factor, defies all logic. How non-payment for the commission of the contract killing constitutes a mitigating factor is not explained, nor understood.
[13] The converse of the foregoing is to be considered when determining whether the court a quo misdirected itself on the issue of the cumulative effect of the aforemenitoned alleged mitigating factors, namely:
(a)             It was a contract killing, an offence of greed, where the appellant   was not unemployed as he could easily have returned to his father's   business   of mechanic;
(b)             The offence was predetermined over a period of time, where the appellant had ample time to reconsider the request. The appellant was certainly not compelled to accede to the request;
(c)             The deceased was unarmed and could   not resist   the   attack. The deceased was attacked in the sanctity of his home environment;
(d)             The appellant was ready to commit a murder, irrespective of the circumstances, and had no hesitation to take the life of a person who posed no threat to him, nor being compelled to do so in the particular circumstances.
[14] In my view, and for the foregoing, it has not been shown that the court a quo had misdirected itself in any respect that would require this court to interfere with the sentence imposed upon the appellant.
[15] I would dismiss the appeal against sentence.
_________________________
C J VAN DER WESTHUIZEN
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
I agree and it is so ordered.
_________________________
N RANCHOD
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
I agree.
_________________________
TM MAUMELA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
On behalf of Applicant:                 Ms MB   Moloi (Attorney) 
Instructed by:                                               Pretoria Justice Centre
  
On behalf of Respondent:       S D Ngobeni
Instructed by:                                             Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng Division,
Pretoria

[1] S v Fhetani 2007(2) SACR 590 (SCA); see also S v Kibido 1998(2) SACR 213 (SCA), S v Barnard 2004(1)   SACR 191 (SCA),   S v Ma/gas 2001(1)   SACR   469 (SCA)

[2] 2008 (1) SACR 78 (SCA)

[3] 2009(2) SACR 361 (SCA) at para [18]

[4] Matyityi 2011(1) SACR   40 (SCA)