---

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(BOPHUTHATSWANA PROVINCIAL DIVISION)

CASE NO. 1379/2007

In the matter between:

JOINTSHELF 1175 CC 1^ST APPLICANT

55 OTHERS 2^ND to 56^TH APPLICANTS

and

CLOSE-BY SECURITY CC 1^ST RESPONDENT

HANMAG 52 (PTY) LTD t/a COETZEE 2^ND RESPONDENT

PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT SERVICES 3^RD RESPONDENT

____________________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT

____________________________________________________________________________

MOGOENG JP.

INTRODUCTION

[1] This is essentially an application for an order restraining the first Respondent from denying any of the Applicants free access to the townhouses the particulars of which are set out in the papers. The background to this case is briefly set out below.

BACKGROUND

[2] The first Applicant, Jointshelf 1175 CC, is a duly registered close corporation.

[3] The second to fifty fifth Applicants are owners of units at Cashan Terrace, to which the first Respondent has denied them access. The fifty sixth Applicant is the body corporate of Cashan Terrace in terms of the Sectional Titles Scheme Cashan Terrace, which is the owner of and in control of the common property of such Sectional Title Scheme.

[4] The first Respondent is Close-by Security CC, whereas the second Respondent is Hanmag 52 (Pty) Ltd.

[5] The first Applicant is the developer of and the primary owner of the immovable property which is the subject-matter of contention in this matter. As stated above, the units were sold to the second to 56 Applicants.

[6] The first Applicant bought Erf 2163, Cashan Extension 20 Township and became the new owner thereof. It then concluded an agreement with the second Respondent in terms whereof the second Respondent would erect townhouses on both Erf 2163 and 2164, Cashan Heights at a total price of R22 963 972.80. I may hasten to add that, according to the first Applicant, it paid the second Respondent an amount in excess of the aforementioned.

[7] The second Respondent entered into an agreement with the first Respondent in terms of which the first Respondent would and did provide certain work generally related to steel works, including staircases, fencing, balustrades, electrical gates and carports, at the Cashan Terrace.

[8] A dispute arose between the first and the second Respondents about payment due to the first Respondent and the quality of work rendered by the first Respondent to the second Respondent. At the time, the first Respondent was in lawful possession of the units bought by, among others, the second to 56^th Applicants. Somehow, the second Respondent managed to dispossess the first Respondent of those units without following due process.

[9] As a result, the first Respondent approached this Court for relief. A final order was granted against the second Respondent in terms whereof the second Respondent was to restore possession ante omnia of the Cashan Terrace. Subsequent to the granting of the final order, the first Respondent prevented the first Applicant and a contractor (other than the second Respondent) from having access to the premises or any of the townhouses. The second to 56^th Applicants who have since bought the units have also been denied access to the premises by the first Respondent, for as long as it is not paid for the work done. This, according to the Applicants, is done in terms of the spoliation order.

[10] After the order had been granted against the second Respondent, the second Respondent abandoned the premises and the contract was cancelled.

[11] The first Respondent contends that it took lawful possession of the units when it rendered the services that it was asked by the second Respondent to render and never voluntarily or lawfully lost that possession. When the second Respondent dispossessed it of the units unlawfully, it took legal steps to protect its possession and has never lost it. The second Respondent is, according to the first Respondent, indebted to the first Respondent in the amount of R586 000.00. For as long as that money is not paid to the first Respondent, the first Respondent is not prepared to relinquish its possession of the units.

[12] Second to 56^th Applicants apparently bought the units from the first Applicant. When they wanted to take occupation of them, the first Respondent denied them access to the units on the basis that he has not been paid for the work done and that he had a Court order on the strength of which he has lawful possession of the units.

ISSUES

[13] Consequently, the Applicants launched an application on an urgent basis so that they might have unrestrained access to their property. The issues are, according to the Applicants, that:

a) The first Respondent relies on a right of lien, which cannot apply to the Applicants because the first Respondent did not conclude any agreement with any of the Applicants to render the services that it now wants to be paid for, nor were any of the Applicants enriched by the services rendered.

b) The first Respondent relies on a spoliation order which was made against the second Respondent but not against any of the Applicants.

First Respondent relies on its improvement lien which it contends applies to the owner(s). Because of the view I take of the matter, it will not be necessary to deal with all the issues raised. When technicalities are put aside and the real issue is considered, then the question really is whether or not the first Respondent has a right of lien over the property and whether that right is exercisable even against the Applicants, the first Applicant in particular.

THE LAW

[14] Franklin J found in Howes & Clover (Pty) Ltd v Ruskin and Others 1978 (1) SA 99 (WLD) that a sub-contractor who builds a dwelling or house at the request of the contractor enjoys a lien against the owner of the property. The best way to put this issue to rest, I believe, is to quote extensively from the judgment of Botha JA in Brooklyn House Furnishers Ltd v Knoetze & Sons 1970 (3) SA 264 (A) at 273H – 274A where the learned Judge observed that:

“Dat verryking van die eienaar ten koste van die besitter, wat die noodsaaklike of nuttige uitgawes aangegaan het, ʼn vereiste vir die totstandkoming van so ʼn restensiereg is, moet toegegee word. Dit is byna vanselfsprekend dat verryking van die eienaar deur die besteding van nuttige of noodsaaklike uitgawes aan die saak, ten koste is van die persoon wat die uitgawes aangegaan het, en na my oordeel is dit, met betrekking altans tot die bestaan, al dan nie, van so ʼn retensiereg, nie ter sake nie dat die uitgawes aangegaan is ingevolge ʼn geldige kontrak met ʼn derde teen vergoeding.”

His Lordship went on to observe that:

“Daarenteen is daar verskeie uitsprake waarin die Howe die bestaan van ʼn retensiereg teenoor die eienaar erken het ondanks die feit dat die verbeterings aan die saak of die beskerming daarvan geskied het as gevolg van die uitvoering van ʼn ooreenkoms tussen die besitter van die saak en ʼn ander persoon as die eienaar daarvan. (Sien bv. Savory v. Baldochi, 1907 T.S. 523; Ford v. Reed Bros., 1922 T.P.D. 266; Anderson & Co. v. Pienaar & Co., 1922 T.P.D. 435; Land Bank v. Mans, 1933 C.P.D. 16; United Building Society v. Smookler’s Trustees, supra).

Die benadering van die Howe in genoemde sake is in ooreenstemming met wat deur ons gemeenregtelike skrywers as vereiste vir die totstandkoming van ʼn bewaringsretensiereg, of ʼn retensiereg vir verbeterings, gestel word. Daarvolgens is enige besitter van iemand anders se saak, mits hy maar net nie op onregmatige wyse besit gekry het nie, soos by ʼn dief, wat die saak teen beskadiging bewaar of dit verbeter, geregtig op ʼn bewaringsretensiereg of ʼn retensiereg vir die verbeterings, om in besit of beheer van die saak te bly totdat hy vir sy noodsaaklike of nuttige uitgawes behoorlik verged is. (Sien bv. Hymes, Romeinsch Zakenrecht, 2de druk, op bl. 166–7; Dig. 5.3.38 en 12.6.14; Cod. 3.32.5; Donellus, De Jure Civili, 20.8.7; Voet, 6.1.31 en 36, en 20.2.28; Kersteman, s.v. ,,retentie”; Van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis, 1.4.37.1 en 6; Huber, H.R., 2.8.17, en Spurrier v. Coxwell, N.O., 1914 C.P.D. 83 op bl. 88). Nie een van die skrywers wat ek geraadpleeg het, ontsê ʼn besitter ʼn retensiereg teenoor die eienaar waar die verbeterings aan, of die bewaring van die saak, in die uitvoering van ʼn kontraktuele of ander verpligting teenoor ʼn ander persoon as die eienaar van die saak plaasgevind het nie. Die vraag word trouens deur nie een van hulle genoem nie.

So ʼn reeling sou in iedere geval onbillikheid in die hand kon werk. Gewoonlik sou die besitter, wat die saak verbeter of did teen beskadiging bewaar het uit hoofde van ʼn ooreenkoms wat hy met ʼn derde aangegaan het, vir die skuld wat uit die kontrak ontstaan, op ʼn retensiereg (,,debtor and creditor lien”) teenoor daardie derde persoon geregtig wees om besit van die saak te behou totdat hy volgens ooreenkoms betaal is. Het hy geen retensiereg teenoor die eienaar nie, en is hy verplig om die saak aan die eienaar af te gee sonder vergoeding vir sy noodsaaklike of nuttige uitgawes, verloor hy, tot sy nadeel (detrimento), sy retensiereg teenoor die derde persoon met wie hy gekontrakteer het, terwyl die eienaar verryk is. So ʼn reeling sou in stryd wees met die einste beginsel waarop retensieregte gefundeer is, nl. dat jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locuplentiorem. Dit sou dus, met betrekking tot die vraag of ʼn retensiereg teen die eienaar tot stand gekom het, nie verkeerd wees nie om te aanvaar dat, totdat die besitter deur òf die derde persoon behoorlik verged word, die verryking van die eienaar in werklikheid ten koste van die besitter is wat die saak verbeter of bewaar het. In iedere geval, ʼn besitter wat, ingevolge so ʼn ooreenkoms met ʼn derde, besit van die saak vir verterings of bewaring kry, kom nie op onregmatige wyse in besit daarvan nie, en bewaar of verbeter hy die saak ten voordele van die eienaar, voldoen hy aan al die vereistes vir die totstandkoming van ʼn retensiereg teen die eienaar.

(My emphasis)”

These principles are self-explanatory and none of these cases have, to my knowledge, been overturned.

APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS

[15] It is not disputed that the first Respondent worked on all the units over which it claims to be exercising its right of lien. None of the Applicants, the first Applicant in particular, can be heard to say that the work done by the first Respondent did not enhance the value of the Cashan Terrace. It has also not been demonstrated to be incorrect that the first Respondent’s labour is worth the R586 000.00 that the first Respondent claims and that it has not yet been paid by the second Respondent. And clearly, all the first Respondent wants is to be paid for services rendered.

[16] Considering all the facts before me, I am satisfied that useful and necessary expenses were incurred by the first Respondent on the property of the first Applicant. The first Applicant was accordingly enriched at the expense of the first Respondent. The improvements brought about by the first Respondent to the first Applicant’s property, entitles the first Respondent to exercise a right of retention or improvement lien over the property in question until the amount of R586 000.00 is paid to the first Respondent.

ORDER

[17] The application is, therefore, dismissed with costs.

__________________

M.T.R. MOGOENG

JUDGE PRESIDENT OF THE HIGH COURT

APPEARANCES

DATE OF HEARING : 06 SEPTEMBER 2007

DATE OF JUDGMENT : 27 SEPTEMBER 2007

COUNSEL FOR APPLICANTS : ADV D.M. LEATHERN

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS : ADV S.D. MARITZ

ATTORNEYS FOR APPLICANTS : BOTHA COETZER SMITH.

(Instructed by COUZYN HERTZOG & HORAK.)

ATTORNEYS FOR 1^ST RESPONDENT : SMIT STANTON INC.

(Instructed by D.J. GREYLING INC.)

---