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Diniso v S (CA14/22) [2023] ZANWHC 11 (7 February 2023)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG

CASE NO: CA14/22

Reportable: YES / NO

Circulate to Judges: YES / NO

Circulate to Magistrates: YES / NO

Circulate to Regional Magistrates: YES / NO

In the matter between:

PHILA DINISO APPELLANT

AND

THE STATE RESPONDENT

Coram: Petersen J & Reddy AJ

Date heard: 02 December 2022

Date handed down: 07 February 2023

ORDER

(i) The appeal against sentence is upheld.

(ii) The sentence imposed by Acting Regional Magistrate, Mr Foso, vitiated by a failure of justice is replaced with the following sentence, imposed on appeal, with due regard to the evidence presented in mitigation and aggravation of sentence:

"The accused is sentenced to:

"1. Life imprisonment.

2. The sentence is antedated to 23 June 2021.

3. In terms of section 103(1) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, the accused shall remain unfit to possess a firearm.

4. The name of the appellant is to be included in the National Register for Sex Offenders. "

(iii) A copy of this judgment must be forwarded by the Registrar of this Court, to the Magistrates' Commission, for consideration of disciplinary action against Acting Regional Magistrate, Mr Foso.

(iv) A copy of this judgment must also be forwarded by the Registrar of this Court, to the Acting Regional Court President, North West Division to take steps to avoid a repetition of what has transpired in this matter and other sensitive gender based violence matters presently presided over by Mr Foso.

JUDGMENT

THE COURT

Introduction

[1] The appellant, duly represented, was charged in the Regional Court Klerksdorp, before Acting Regional Magistrate, Mr Foso, with one count of contravening the provisions of section 3, 50, 56(1) 56A, 58, 59 and 61 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 ("SORMA"). The charge was further read with section 51 (1) and Schedule 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 as amended ("the Cl.-AA") and section 120 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. The appellant pleaded guilty and submitted a statement drafted in terms of section 112(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act ("the CPA"), which was accepted by the prosecution. On the strength of the admissions made by the appellant, he was convicted.

[2] On 23 June 2021, in the absence of finding substantial and compelling circumstances warranting a deviation from the prescribed sentence, the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The appellant was further declared unfit to possess a firearm in terms of section 103(1) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000. Additional ancillary orders were made. In terms of section 50(2) of SORMA, it was ordered that the appellant's particulars be entered into the National Register of Sex Offenders. In terms of section 120(4) of the Children's Court Act 38 of 2005, the appellant was found unsuitable to work with children, with his particulars to be included in Part B of the Child Protection Register.

[3] The appeal lies only against the sentence of life imprisonment pursuant to the right to an automatic appeal in terms of section 309(1) of the CPA.

The appellant's plea of guilty in terms of section 112(2) of the CPA

[4] The appellant pleaded guilty to the charge proffered against him. To appreciate the appeal against sentence, it would be apposite to repeat the facts on which the plea of guilty as based. In the statement prepared in terms of section 112(2) of the CPA, the appellant set out the facts on which his plea of guilty was based, as follows:

"2.

2.1 I confirm that my legal representative explained to me the seriousness of the offence on which I plead guilty to. I further confirm that the provisions of section 51(1) and Schedule 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 were explained to me.

2.2 I further confirm that I am aware that the Court are (sic) bound by the said provisions and upon conviction to sentence me to Life Imprisonment unless the Court is of the view that substantial and compelling circumstances exist to deviate from the minimum sentence of Life Imprisonment.

2.3 I was in no way forced or coerced to tender a plea of guilty on the charge preferred against me and plead guilty on the count out of my own free will.

3.1 On 29 November 2020 1 was at my sister's place of residence at House Number [....] Ext 1 J [....]. I reside with my sister, D [....] D [....] 1, her husband and their two minor children.

3.2 I shared a bedroom with the two minor children and slept on a mattress on the floor next to the children's bed. During the night of the incident one of the minor children AD, the complainant in this case, woke up to urinate.

3.3 I was still awake at that stage and called the complainant to where I was laying on the mattress. I then instructed the complainant to undress and I applied Vaseline to her private part.

3.4 I then pulled down my underwear and started to penetrate her vaginally with my penis.

4.1 I confirm that I am guilty of contravening the provisions of section 3 (rape) read with sections 1, 56(1), 57 to 61 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 32 of 2007 as amended. Further read with sections 94, 256 and 261 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Further read with section 51(1) and Schedule 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 as amended. Further read with section 120 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005.

4.2 On or about 29 November 2020 and at or near House Number [....], Extension 1, J [....], in the Regional Division of North West I did unlawfully and intentionally commit an act of sexual penetration with the complainant to wit, AD, a minor child born on 14 March 2011, by penetrating her vaginally with my penis.

5.1 I confirm that the complainant was examined by a Forensic Nurse, Khutlang Letheno on 30 November 2020 and that a Medico-Legio report (J88) was completed by Mr Khutlang Letheno on the same day. The contents of the said report is admitted and I have no objection if the said report forms part of the record.

6.1 I have remorse for my actions and deeply regret my conduct."

The approach to sentence on appeal

[5] In S v De Jager 1965 (2) SA 616 (A) at 629, Holmes JA stated as follows regarding the discretion of a court of appeal to interfere with the sentence imposed by a lower court:

"It would appear to be sufficiently recognized that a Court of appeal does not have a general discretion to ameliorate the sentences of trial Coutts. The matter is governed by principle. It is the trial Court which hosts the discretion, and a Court of appeal cannot interfere unless the discretion was not judicially exercised. that is to sav unless the sentence is vitiated by an irregularity or misdirection or is so severe that no reasonable court could have imposed it. In this latter regard on accepted test is whether the sentence induces a sense of shock that is to say if there is a striking disparity between the sentence passed and that which the Court of appeal would have imposed. It should therefore be recognized that appellant jurisdiction to interfere with punishment is not discretionary butt on the contrary: is very limited. "

(our emphasis)

[6] In S v Malgas 2001 (2) SA 1222 Marais JA said the following:

"[12] ...A court excising appellant jurisdiction cannot, in the absence of material misdirection by the trial court, approach the question of sentence as if it were the trial court and then substitute the sentence arrived at by it simply because it prefers it. To do so would be to usurp the sentencing discretion of the trial court. Where material misdirection by the trial court vitiates its exercise of that discretion, an appellant court is of course entitled to consider the question of sentence afresh. In doing so. it assesses sentence as if it were a court of first instance and the sentence imposed by the trial court has no relevance. As it is said, an appellant court is large. However, even in the absence of material misdirection, an appellant court may yet be justified in interfering with the sentence imposed by the trial court. It may do so when the disparity between the sentence of the trial court and the sentence which the appellant court would have imposed had it been the trial court is so marked that it can properly be described as "shocking", "startling" or "disturbingly inappropriate. ..

(our emphasis)

[7] The approach adopted to an appeal against sentence in the authorities as aforesaid has been endorsed by the Constitutional Court in S v Bogaards 2013 (1) SACR 1 (CC), where the following is stated:

"[14] Ordinarily, sentence is within the discretion of the trial court An appellate court's power to interfere with sentence imposed by courts below is circumscribed. It can only do so where there has been an irreqularitv that results in a failure of iustice: the court below misdirected itself to such an extent that its decision on sentence is vitiated or the sentence is so disproportionate or shocking that no reasonable court could have imposed it. A court of appeal can also impose a different sentence when it sets aside a conviction in relation to one charge and convicts the accused of another. "

(our emphasis)

Grounds of appeal

[8] The appellant challenges the sentence of the court a quo on the following grounds:

(i) The Learned Regional Magistrate found that there were no compelling and substantial circumstances present: the appellant humbly submits that his age and the fact that he is a first offender on a count of rape may be taken into account as comprising possible compelling and substantial circumstances. At the time of sentencing the appellant was 44 years of age.

(ii) The Appellant humbly submits that the term of life imprisonment over emphasizes the public interest and negates the personal circumstances of the appellant.

(iii) It is out of proportion to the totality of the accepted facts in this matter.

(iv) The sentence handed down by the Learned Magistrate leaves no room for the Appellant to be rehabilitated and reintegrated back into society and over emphasizes the retribution element of sentencing."

[9] The only basis on which the appellant appeals the sentence of life imprisonment is on an argument that his age and being a first offender on a charge of rape, cumulatively considered, constitutes substantial and compelling circumstances. A reading of the record, however, evinces a grave sense of unease when regard is had to the conduct of the Acting Regional Magistrate during the course of the sentencing proceedings.Whilst there is no attack against the conduct of the Acting Regional Magistrate as one of the grounds of appeal, it is relevant to the fairness of the trial and impacts on the sentence process as a whole. It is to this aspect that we now turn, which may vitiate the entire sentence proceedings.

The conduct of the regional court magistrate

[10] The record before us is regrettably replete with exchanges between the Acting Regional Magistrate, the appellant and the appellant's attorney of record, which casts serious doubt of the impartiality on the Acting Regional Magistrate. The record exposes discourteous treatment towards the appellant and the use of crude expletives, which ultimately contaminated the sentence proceedings. There is no underscoring the conviction of the appellant of a serious and heinous crime, but that certainly did not enjoin the Acting Regional Magistrate to allow the decorum of the sentence proceedings to retrogress.

[11] The following exchanges demonstrating impatient and discourteous conduct on the part of the Acting Regional Magistrate, which ultimately descended into crude and unbecoming language being employed by the Acting Regional Magistrate prior to the handing down of sentence, is relevant:

During the course of the appellant's evidence in mitigation of sentence

"COURT: You know, you know what excuse my tone. That the two of you in confidence Your Attorney is trying to lead you to say something that the two of you in confidence where you were spoke about it and, and, and you know Mr Neethling has been around. He will not just go through this exercise if, if, if there was nothing that he wants to, to, to have on record and here you are going left and right not listening to him. What is that that you wanted the sister let me sommer ask you straight Mr Neethling. MR NEETHLING: Yes.

COURT: Because I do not see you winning with this gentleman. What. what is it that you had in confidence you wanted to.

MR NEETHLING: Your Worship yes he, he wanted the sister here to, to ask for forgiveness. That is the long and short of it so.

COURT: You, you requested that the, the, the, the, the your sister the mother of the victim be present today. She is present. You are called into the box because you wanted to say to her. You. --- I am sorry.

You ask for forgiveness but vou are telling us a long history here. It is not that l. I do not want to hear about it but you are frustrating everyone. Sorry. Your

Worship... Yes it was very wrong.

COURT: Yes it is very wrong..

COURT: l, I thought somewhere somehow I will be able to hear from you what got into you? This is your niece, your sister's child and only 9 years old. What, what made you do it? What even made you even think of applying Vaseline on that small vagina? What made you to, to do this things? I am trying to understand? .

During address in mitigation of sentence

COURT: Imagine. He is even going to get Vaseline. He, he is smearing this. this little girl with a Vaseline.

COURT: And in the box they wait for the other female probably to qrow up a little bit. they do not just qo for it when it is that small.

Mr Neethling: Yes.

COURT: Even the animals do not do it.

MR NEETHLING: It seems the accused has, has shown remorse Your Worship. COURT: l, l, I hear you. This is what you want me to l, I have heard him, I have heard him, I heard him saying he is sorry. Mr Neethling you and me we have daughters.

MR NE-ETHLING: Yes, we have, we have.

COURT: You know at 9 years with the one hand she will not escape. Now imaqine this accused takinq the Vaseline knowinq his dick will not be able to qo in. He needs lubricate. he takes Vaseline. On that if that is the mother those children should be small built at that staqe of 9. if that is the mother. Imaqine him holdinq that child down. pushinq his penis in. The Vaseline first, holdinq this child. pushinq it in.

MR NEETHLING: Yes Your Worship that that is why I started and say it is, it is unimaginable but we cannot just look at, at the crime Your Worship.

COURT: Yes.

MR NEETHLING: It is my submission that the fact that he is a first offender. Not only is he a first offender but other circumstances. He immediately accepted responsibility for his actions. It is not going to change anything to the 9 year old, she is scarred for life Your Worship.

COURT: Exactly.

MR NEETHLING: But at least the accused manned up. He wanted the sister here. He wanted to apologise. He gave the background. He made a mistake Your Worship.

COURT: The children loved him.

MR NEETHI-ING: They loved him. He made a mistake. He said I made a mistake. COURT: This, this is, this he can, he cannot call this a mistake.

MR NEETHLING: Your Worship let us say he, he took the responsibility Ifor his actions [intervenes].

COURT: Yes he pleaded guilty, he pleaded guilty.

MR NEETHLING: Let us go on trial and see.

COURT: He pleaded guilty, he saved this 9 year old from telling us the story.

MR NEETHI-ING: [Intervenes] please the Court Your Worship.

COURT: Did he use a condom?

MR NEE-THLING: He did not Your Worship.

COURT: How come the mother found out or how come this case was reported? MR NEETHI-ING: Your Worship I think the, the, if I am not mistaken the, the mother came into the, to the bedroom the following morning and she, the child was not laying where the child was supposed to lay and then there was a suspicion Your Worship. Yes.

COURT: So it was only one round? Well it will not make a difference in terms of the, the conviction because.

MR NEETHLING: Yes no.

COURT: The fact that child is just one.

MR NEE-THI-ING: [Intervenes]

COURT: 9 year old its 51(1) but when he was done did he not return the child back? He continued the whole niqht?

MR NEETHI-ING: No I do not think so Your Worship. No, no and also not according to, to the statement of the child Your Worship. COURT: Okay he iust forgot to return the child back.

MR NEETHLING: [INTERVENES]

COURT: On top of the bed.

MR NEETHLING: Your Worship or they, they fell, they fell, fell asleep. I do not know. But l, I am asking this Honourable Court to consider [indistinct] with the fact that he is a, a first offender but he has taken responsibility for his actions and he has shown mercy, not, not mercy Your Worship remorse... "

[12] The Acting Regional Magistrate's conduct during evidence and address in mitigation of sentence ultimately culminated in many misplaced sentiments expressed during his judgment on sentence, which did not accord with the facts on which the appellant based his plea of guilty and on which he was ultimately, convicted. The following extract from the judgment on sentence demonstrates this:

But if one looks at how the offence was committed this children were sleeping in the same bedroom with the accused person. He waited for the complainant, the victim in this matter to go urinate and when the child returns here he is with the child, he even has a Vaseline.

He smeared the child with a Vaseline in order to have his penis sliding into this small child. A child of about 9 years who is his sister's child. This things are not speaking good of him. The complainant being young a girl unable to defend herself from the accused. I am even startinq to think that this situation could have been like a sitting duck. a time bomb. And it is unfortunate that it. it did happen. Now one start to think whether we not seeinq the picture here? That the offence could have been premeditated because he was sleepinq with the children every day..."

The role and duties of judicial officers

[13] In terms of section 165 of the Constitution the judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts. Section 165(2) of the Constitution provides that "The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice." A Magistrate's Court is given constitutional recognition as part of the hierarchy of courts. Section 165(2) of the Constitution speaks to the accountability of judicial officers. The accountability of judicial officers extends to all those who fall under the protection and umbrella of the Constitution. Judicial officers are subservient to the Constitution and the law. The constitutional injunction of accountability must be executed without fear, favour or prejudice.

[14] In Van Rooyen and Others v The State and Others (General Council of the Bar of South Africa intervening) 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC) at page 268C-269C, the Constitutional Court provided the following interpretation of section 165:

"[18] The Constitution thus not only recognizes that courts are independent and impartial, but also provides important institutional protection for courts. The provisions of section 165, forming part of the Constitution that is the supreme law, apply to all courts and judicial officers, including magistrates' courts and magistrates. These provisions bind the Judiciary and the government and are enforceable by the Superior Courts, including this Court. It is in this context that the issues raised in the present matter must be decided.

[19] In De Lange v Smuts NO and Others, Ackerman J referred to the views of the Canadian Supreme Coutt in The Queen in Right of Canada v Beauregard, Valente v The Queen and R v Genereux on the question of what constitutes an independent and impartial court, describing them as being 'instructive'. In this context, he mentioned the following summary of the essence of judicial independence given by Dickson CJC in Beauregard's case:

Historically, the generally accepted core of the principle of judicial independence has been the complete liberty of individual Judges to hear and decide cases that come before them: no outsider- be it government pressure group, individual, or even another Judge-should interfere in fact attempt to interfere, with the way in which a Judge conducts his or her case and makes his or her decision. The core continues to be central to the principle of judicial independence.

[20] This requires •judicial officers to act independently and impartially in dealing with cases that come before them, and at institutional level it requires structures to protect courts and judicial officers against external interference.

(our emphasis)

[15] Judicial officers are the gate keepers of all rights entrenched in the Constitution. Judicial officers in the Lower Courts are at the coalface of justice. It is therefore imperative that they be seen to be impartial and independent. (Van Rooyen and Others supra at 271-272).

[16] The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct ("the Bangalore Principles") provide that:

"[a] Judge shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of the Judge's assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interference direct or indirect from any quarter or for any reason... Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made. A Judge shall ensure his or her conduct is above reproach in the view of a reasonable observer... The behaviour and conduct of a Judge must reaffirm the peoples' faith in the integrity of the •judicial . Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done... A Judge shall in his or her personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in the Judge's court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favouritism or partiality. "

(our emphasis)

[17] The Bangalore Principles are incorporated in the Regulations for Judicial Officers in the Lower Courts, 1993 in Schedule E titled "CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR MAGISTRATES IN TERMS OF SECTION 16(1) OF THE MAGISTRATES ACT, 1993 (ACT NO. 90 OF 1993) AND REGULATION 54A OF THE REGULATIONS FOR JUDICIAL OFFICERS IN THE LOWER COURTS, 1993". In the Preamble of the Code, the provisions of section 174(8) of the Constitution is re-iterated, which provides that:

.before judicial officers begin to perform their functions, they must take an oath, or affirm, in accordance with paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 2, that they "will uphold and protect the Constitution and the human rights entrenched in it, and will administer justice to all persons alike, without fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance with the Constitution and the law'.

[18] The following Articles in the Code are of particular relevance to the present appeal:

"Article 5: To act honourably

(1) A magistrate must always, and not only in the discharge of official duties, act honourably and in a manner befitting judicial office.

Article 7: Equality

A magistrate must at all times—

…

(b) in court and in chambers act courteously and respect the dignity of others; (c) in conducting judicial proceedings, give special attention to the right to equality before the law and the right of equal protection and benefit of the law; and (d) in the performance of judicial duties refrain from being biased or prejudiced.

Notes:

Note 7(i): These provisions are aimed at promoting courtesy and ensuring a deqree of decorum.

Article 9: Fair trial

A magistrate must—

(a) resolve disputes by making findings of fact and applying the appropriate law in a fair hearing, which includes the duty to —

(i) observe the letter and spirit of the audi alteram partem rule;

(ii) remain manifestly impartial; and

(iii) give adequate reasons for any decision;

(b) in conducting judicial proceedings— (i) maintain order; (ii) act in accordance with commonly accepted decorum; and (iii) remain patient and courteous to legal practitioners, parties and the public, and require them to act likewise;

[19] It should be clear that both independence and impartiality are fundamental principles in order to attain justice in a particular case. Justice, must be done to all individuals and at the same time, must inspire public confidence, in the administration of justice. Without the confidence of the public, the justice system will be devoid of respect, which is essential to the administration of justice. It is therefore critical to the effective and efficient administration of justice that courts are, perceived to be impartial and independent. (Van Rooyen and Others supra.)

[20] Sentence proceedings are part of the trial process. It is not an insulated enquiry independent of the trial. The decorum of the court must still be maintained throughout. Fair trial rights are inclusive of equality and fairness in the application of sentence principles. This fairness extends to the appellant and the State as represented by the public. The verdict of guilty on the appellant's plea of guilty, which rebuts the constitutional presumption of innocence, did not provide a licence to the Acting Regional Magistrate to impugn the dignity of the appellant. The appellant was still clothed with his human dignity notwithstanding a conviction on what clearly was a dreadful crime and this applies equally to the sentence proceedings. In S v Tyebela 1989 (2) SA 22 (AD) at 29 G-H the following was stated, in respect of the duty of a judicial officer to attain a fair trial:

"It is a fundamental principle of our law and, indeed, of any civilised society that an accused person is entitled to a fair trial... This necessarily presupposes that the judicial officer who tries him is fair and unbiased and conducts the trial in accordance with those rules and principles or the procedure which the law requires. "

[21] In President of The RSA v South African Rugby Football Union v SARFU [1999] ZACC 9; 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC) the Constitutional Court said the following in respect of bias or perceived bias on the part of a judicial officer:

"The question is whether a reasonable, objective and informed person would on the correct facts reasonably apprehend that the Judge has not or will not bring an impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case that is a mind open to persuasion by the evidence and the submissions of counsel. The reasonableness of the apprehension must be assessed in the light of the oath of office taken by Judges to administer justice without fear or favour: and their ability to carry out that oath by reason of their training and experience. It must be assumed that they can disabuse their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or predispositions.

They must take into account the fact that they have a duty to sit in any case in which they are not obliged to recuse themselves. At the same time, it must never be forgotten that an impartial judge is a fundamental prerequisite for a fair trial and a judicial officer should not hesitate to recuse herself or himself if there are reasonable grounds on the part of a litigant for apprehending that the judicial officer, for whatever reasons, was not or will not be impartial. "

(our emphasis)

[22] The Constitutional Court emphasized in S v Basson 2007 (1) SACR 566 (CC) at 590 that "the impartiality of a judicial officer is crucial to the administration of justice. So too is the perception of his or her impartiality. "

[23] In S v Le Grange and Others [2008] ZASCA 102; 2009 (1) SACR 125 (SCA) at 140e-f the following is stated on what constitutes a fair trial:

"A cornerstone of our legal system is the impartial adjudication of disputes which come before our courts and tribunals. What the law requires is not only that a judicial officer must conduct the trial open-mindedly: impartially and fairly: but that such conduct must be 'manifest to all those who are concerned in the trial and its outcome, especially the accused.

(our emphasis)

[24] As to the correct approach to sentence in rape matters, Nugent JA in S v Vilakazi 2009 (1) SACR 552 (SCA) at paragraph [21] stressed the important role played not only by prosecutors in matters predicated on sexual offences, but judicial officers too:

"[21] The prosecution of rape presents peculiar difficulties that always call for the greatest care to be taken, and even more so where the complainant is young. From prosecutors it calls for thoughtful preparation, patient and sensitive presentation of all the available evidence, and meticulous attention to detail. From judicial officers who try such cases it calls for accurate understanding and careful analysis of all the evidence. For it is in the nature of such cases that the available evidence is often scant and many prosecutions fail for that reason alone. In those circumstances each detail can be vitally important. From those who are called upon to sentence convicted offenders such cases call for considerable reflection. Custodial sentences are not merely numbers. And familiarity with the sentence of life imprisonment must never blunt one to the fact that its consequences are profound.

(our emphasis)

Discussion

[25] Against the backdrop of these trite legal principles, it was disingenuous of the Acting Regional Magistrate to reprise the oft quoted judgment in S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 866 paragraph A-B where the following was stated:

"A judicial officer should not approach punishment in a spirit of anger because, being human, that will make it difficult for him to achieve that delicate balance between the crime, the criminal and the interests of society which task and the objects of punishment demand of him. Nor should he strive after severity; nor on the other hand, surrender to misplaced pity while not flinching from firmness where firmness is called for. He should approach his task with a humane and compassionate understanding of human frailties and the pressures of a society which contributes to criminality. "

[26] A recital of case law is hollow if on the probabilities if there is a reasonable apprehension of bias. The sentiments expressed in Xaba v S (CA78/2019) 2022 (2) SACR 240 (NWM), where Hendricks JP (Petersen J) concurring, said the following are apposite in this regard:

"[9] The regional magistrate found that there are no substantial and compelling circumstances present in this matter that warrant imposing a lesser sentence than the prescribed sentence of life imprisonment. The grounds of appeal are that the regional magistrate erred in this regard and that life imprisonment 'over emphasizes the public interest and negates the personal circumstances of the appellant'. That s 51(1) read with sch 2 to the CLAA is applicable behoves no argument, in that in committing the rape, grievous bodily harm was inflicted on the complainant, who was stabbed with a knife in her thigh, arm and breast The following statement by the regional magistrate in passing judgment on sentence can, however, not be overlooked:

'Unfortunately, the complainant could not outrun you, you took her to what I may call a lion's den where you preyed on her by raping her. It is not that you just raped her in order to subdue her you inflicted serious injuries on her body. You were just callous when you rape her I assume she was bleeding and you did not care. Furthermore, if one looks at Exhibit E where you rape her besides her dignity being taken away that place is filthy you just drag her also there. I wonder how many people have been raped in that place. It could be that there are many it is only that you have been detected. ' [Sic.] [Emphasis added.]

[10] This in my_ view amounts to a gross misdirection on the part of the regional magistrate as it illustrates that his mind was clouded by the notion that this was not the first and only rape that the appellant perpetrated at the dilapidated house where the complainant was dragged against her will. There was no evidence presented to substantiate this unfortunate remark, which is akin to a finding: No previous conviction or convictions for rape were proven by the state. The appellant is in fact a first offender for purposes of sentence.

…

[13] As alluded to earlier this misdirection is material and it vitiates the entire sentencinq procedure. That beinq the case, the sentence ouqht to be set aside and this court is at liberty to impose a suitable sentence..

[27] The unbecoming conduct of the Acting Regional Magistrate during the sentence proceedings speaks for itself. The Acting Regional Magistrate traversed issues outside of the facts tendered in the plea of guilty, during address in mitigation and in his judgment on sentence. He was impatient with the appellant in respect of the evidence he sought to adduce in mitigation of sentence. He unfortunately blurred the lines between his duty as a judicial officer where impartiality is the norm and his personal life. He made reference to his personal life and that of the appellant's legal representative, by referencing the fact that they both had daughters. He used crude language, unbecoming of a judicial officer in describing the dastardly sexual violation of the victim. He sadly put his own spin on the act of preparation by the appellant preceding the rape, questioning it with contempt and elaborating on what he thought the appellant did in his judgment on sentence, in circumstances where this was not pertinently stated by the appellant in his plea of guilty. The following sentiments expressed by the Acting Regional Magistrate, questioning what the appellant said in his plea of guilty, which he accepted in convicting the appellant, constitutes a gross misdirection: "I am even starting to think that this situation could have been like a sitting duck a time bomb. And it is unfortunate that it it did happen. Now one start to think whether we not seeing the picture here? That the offence could have been premeditated because he was sleeping with the children every day..."

[28] The bias and unbecoming conduct of the Acting Regional Magistrate as set out above falls squarely, within what is described, in Bogaards supra, as "an irreqularitv that results in a failure of justice" and vitiates the entire sentence proceedings.

[29] Seeing that the sentence proceedings before the Acting Regional Magistrate, have been found to be vitiated by irregularity and gross misdirection resulting in a failure of justice, we are at large to consider the question of sentence afresh, as if we were the court of first instance. That being the case, the sentence of the trial court has no relevance, having regard to the circumstances under which it was reached.

The imposition of sentence afresh

[30] The approach to sentencing endorsed in Malgas has mustered constitutional approval in S v Dodo 2001 (3) 382 (CC). At paragraph [25] of Malgas, the following was said:

"[25] What stands out quite clearly is that the courts are a good deal freer to depart from the prescribed sentences than has been supposed in some of the previously decided cases and it is they who are to judge whether or not the circumstances of a particular case are such as to justify a departure. However, in doing so, they are to respect and not pay lip service to, the legislature's view that the prescribed periods of imprisonment are to be taken to be ordinarily appropriate when crimes of the specified kind are committed. In summary-

A Section 51 has limited but not eliminated the court's discretion in imposing sentences in respect of offences referred to in Part 1 of Schedule 2(or imprisonment for other specified periods for offences listed in other parts of Schedule 2).

B Courts are required to approach the imposition of sentence conscious that the legislature has ordained life imprisonment (or the particular prescribed period of imprisonment) as the sentence that should ordinarily and in the absence of weighty justification be imposed for the listed crimes in the specifies circumstances.

C Unless there are, and can be seen to be, truly convincing reasons for a different response, the crimes in question are therefore required to elicit a severe, standardised and consistent response from the courts

D The specified sentences are not to be departed from lightly and for flimsy reasons. Speculative hypotheses, favourable to the offender, undue sympathy, aversion to imprisoning first offenders, personal doubts as to the efficacy of the policy underlying the legislation, and the marginal differences in the personal circumstances or degrees of participation between co-offenders are to be excluded.

E The legislature has however deliberately left it to the courts to decide whether the circumstances of a particular case call for a departure from the prescribed sentence. While the emphasis has shifted to the objective gravity of the type of crime and the need for effective sanctions against it, this does not mean that all other considerations are to be ignored.

F All factors (other than those set out in D above) traditionally taken into account in sentencing (whether are not they diminish moral guilt) thus continue to play a role; none is excluded at the outset from consideration in the sentencing framework.

G The ultimate impact of all the circumstances relevant to sentencing must be measured against the composite yardstick ("substantial and compelling") and must be such cumulatively justify a departure from the standardised response that the legislature has ordained.

H In applying the statutory provisions it is inappropriately constricting to use the concepts developed in dealing with appeals against sentence as the sole criterion.

I If the sentencing court on consideration of the circumstances of the particular case is satisfied that they render the prescribed sentence unjust in that it would be disproportionate to the crime, the criminal and the needs of society so that an injustice would be done by imposing that sentence, it is entitled to impose a lesser sentence.

J In doing so, account must be taken of the fact that crime of that particular kind has been singled out for severe punishment and that the sentence to be imposed in lieu of the prescribed sentence should be assessed paying due regard to the bench mark which the legislature has provided. '

[31] Notwithstanding the arduous duty that a sentencing court is seized with, the exercising of a sentencing discretion is aimed at the attainment of a balance. The balance is directed at three prominent factors, namely, the crime, the offender and the interests of the community. (See S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) at 540G-H). In S v RO and Another 2000 (2) SACR 248 (SCA) at paragraph [30] Heher JA stated the following in this regard:

"Sentencing is about achieving the right balance or in more high-flown terms, proportionality. The elements at play are the crime, the offender, the interests of society with different nuance, prevention, retribution, reformation and deterrence, invariably there are overlaps that render the process unscientific, even a proper exercise of a judicial function allows reasonable people to arrive at different conclusions. "

The personal circumstances of the appellant

[32] The appellant testified in mitigation of sentence and Mr Neethling his legal representative addressed the Acting Regional Magistrate in mitigation of sentence. The appellant testified that he was born on 10 February 1977. He would have been 44 years old at the time he was sentenced. He had a partner but they were not married. He has four (4) children aged 25 years, 19 years, 6 years and 5 years. The two younger children live with his partner in a Village in Embezo, in the Eastern Cape. He relocated to J [....] in the North West Province in July 2020 when his sister, the mother of the victim gave him transport money to relocate to live with her family, where the incident occurred. He was employed from the time he arrived in J [....] until his arrest. Whilst in the Eastern Cape he supported his two younger children by doing odd jobs. He advanced as far as Standard 7 (Grade 9) at school. He has no previous convictions and spent just over 6 months in custody before finalisation of the matter. He does not possess a firearm nor a firearm licence and had no objection to being declared unfit to possess a firearm.

[33] The appellant during his evidence wished to address his sister, the mother of the victim. He gave a detailed exposition of the family circumstances and the socio economic position of the family, and his sister's intervention in calling him from the Eastern Cape to the prospect of a better life. In very brief terms, when prodded on why he wanted his sister in court, he said the following in respect of the incident and the victim at different stages:

"ACCUSED: The reason why I wanted them to be here, all of them was to ask for forgiveness especially to my sister's child, my niece AD for what I did to her..

I am saying this directly to my sister that I am very sorry and I reqret everything and even on the day of my arrest on the 30 November when she asked me, asking what did I do I told her that I am the one who raped this child. I do not know what came into my mind. I have also asked her to tell AD my niece, my sister's child that I am sorry. Wherever I am going even if I will be given long term imprisonment they must know that I will forever love them and for her as well and I have to be punished for what I did because what I did was very wrong."

[34] The appellant is undoubtedly regretful but definitely not remorseful. The rationale behind the concept of remorse as dealt with in S v Seegers 1970 (2) SA 506 (A); S v D 1995 (1) SACR 259(A) at 261 a-c; S v Volkwyn 1995 (1) SACR 286 (A); S v Martin 1996 (2) SACR 378 (W) at 383 g-i•, and S v Mokoena 2009 (2) SACR 309 (SCA) at paragraph 9, is succinctly encapsulated in S v Matyityi 2011 (1) SACR 40 (SCA) at paragraph [13] where Ponnan JA stated as follows:

"There is moreover a chasm between regret and remorse. Many accused persons might well regret their conduct but that does not without more translate to genuine remorse. Remorse is a gnawing of the conscience for the plight of another. Thus genuine contrition can only come from an appreciation and acknowledgment of the extent of one's error. Whether the offender is sincerely remorseful and not simply feeling sorry for himself at having been caught is a factual question. It is to the surrounding actions of the accused rather than what he says in court that one should rather look. In order for the remorse to a valid consideration, the pertinence must be sincere and the accused must take the court fully into his or her confidence. Until and unless that happens the genuineness of the contrition alleged to have exist cannot be determined. After all, before a court can find an accused person to be genuinely remorseful, it needs to have an appreciation of inter alia: what motivated the accused to commit the deed, what has since provoked his or her change of heart; and whether he has a true appreciation of the consequences of those actions..

[35] The appellant's attempt at apologising to his sister and the victim, fell gravely shy of the salutary approach advocated in Matytyi. In the appellant's own words, he regrets his actions more than being remorseful for what he did. He failed to take the court a quo into his confidence to fully ventilate what motivated him to commit the deed, what provoked his change of heart and nothing in what he said demonstrates a true appreciation of what he did and the consequences of his actions.

[36] Nothing in the personal circumstances of the appellant stands out as substantial and compelling either individually or cumulatively to merit deviation from the mandated sentence of life imprisonment.

[37] The nine (9) year old victim was raped in the sanctity of her home, in her bedroom, which the appellant was allowed to share with her and her sibling. When she returned from answering a call of nature, the appellant, who was in a position of authority over her called her to his mattress on the floor, caused her to get undressed, applied Vaseline to her vagina and sexually violated her. That the offence itself and the circumstances thereof are reprehensible cannot be overemphasized. The sentiments expressed in S v Chapman 1997 (2) SACR (SCA) at 5A-D are apposite in this regard:

"Rape is a serious offence, constituting as it does a humiliating, degrading and brutal invasion of the privacy, the dignity and the person of the victim. The rights to dignity, to privacy and the integrity of every person are basic to the echoes of the Constitution and to any defensible civilization. Women in this country are entitled to the protection of these rights. They have a legitimate claim to walk peacefully on the streets, to enjoy their shopping and their entertainment, to go and come from work, and to enjoy the peace and tranquility of their homes without fear, the apprehension and the in security, which constantly diminishes the quality, and enjoyment of their lives. The courts are under a duty to send a clear message to the accused, to other potential rapists and to the community: We are determined to protect the quality, dignity and freedom of all women, and we shall show no mercy to those who seek to invade those rights"

[38] In DPP, North Gauteng v Thabethe 2011 (2) SACR 567 (SCA) 577 G-l, the Supreme Court of Appeal said the following in respect of the rape of women and children more than a decade ago, with the scourge not having dissipated to date:

"Rape of women and young children has become cancerous in our society. It is a crime, which threatens the very foundation of our nascent democracy, which is founded on protection and promotion of the values of human dignity, equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. It is such a serious crime that it evokes strong feelings of revulsion and outrage amongst all right thinking and self-respecting members of society. Our courts have an obligation in imposing sentences for such a crime, particularly where it involves young, innocent, defenseless and vulnerable girls, to impose the kind of sentences which reflect the natural outrage and revulsion felt by the law-abiding members of society. A failure to do so would regrettably have the effect of eroding the public confidence in the criminal justice system"

[39] In Mashigo and another v The State (20108/2014) [2015] ZASCA 65 (14 May 2015), albeit in the context of a rape matter, but equally apt to the present matter, Bosielo JA remarked at par [31]:

'It is sad and a bad reflection on our society that 21 years into our nascent democracy underpinned by a Bill of Rights, which places a premium on the right to equality (s 9) and the right to human dignity (s 10), we are still grappling with what has now morphed into a scourge to our nation...Needless to state that courts across the country are dealing with instances of...abuse of women and children on a daily basis. Our media in general is replete with gruesome stories of ..women and child abuse on a daily basis. "

[40] The interests of society must be afforded due consideration. The role of society should not however be elevated or over-emphasized in this process of proportionality. When the interests of society are considered it is not what society demands that should determine the sentence, but what the informed reasonable member of that community believes to be a sentence that would be just. (S v Mhlakaza and Another 1997 (1) SACR 515 (SCA) at 518). A sentence would accordingly, not necessarily represent what the majority in the community demands, but what serves the public interest and not the wrath of primitive society. (S v Makwanyane [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC) at paragraph [87]- [89]). In respect of society at large it is recognised, as was stated in R v Karg 1961 (1) SA 231 (A) at 236, that:

"It is not wrong that the natural indignation of interested persons and of the community at large should receive some recognition in the sentence that courts impose, and it is not irrelevant to bear in mind that if sentences for serious crimes are too lenient, the administration of justice may fall into disrepute and injured parties may feel inclined to take the law into their own hands".

[41] The imposition of sentence must be victim centred. In Matytyi, the Supreme Court of Appeal recognised the importance of a victim centred approach to sentence where it said the following at paragraph 16:

'An enlightened and just penal policy requires consideration of a broad range of sentencing options from which an appropriate option can be selected that best fits the unique circumstances of the case before court. To that should be added, it also needs to be victim-centred..

In South Africa victim empowerment is based on restorative justice. Restorative justice seeks to emphasise that a crime is more than the breaking of the law or offending against the state — it is an injury or wrong done to another person. The Service Charter for Victims of Crime in South Africa seeks to accommodate victims more effectively in the criminal justice system. As in any true participatory democracy its underlying philosophy is to give meaningful content to the rights of all citizens, particularly victims of sexual abuse, by reaffirming one of our founding democratic values namely human dignity. It enables us as well to vindicate our collective sense of humanity and humanness. The Charter seeks to give to victims the right to participate in and proffer information during the sentencing phase. The victim is thus afforded a more prominent role in the sentencing process by providing the court with a description of the physical and psychological harm suffered, as also the social and economic effect that the crime had and in future is likely to have. By giving the victim a voice the court will have an opportunity to truly recognise the wrong done to the individual victim..

[42] The mother of the victim verbalised to the prosecutor, who placed on record, that the victim was coping at school. The family unit as a whole was conflicted, as the rest of the family blamed her for the incident and the appellant's arrest and were no longer on speaking terms with her. Other than this cursory information, no victim impact statement or report was requested by the prosecutor to give the court better insight into the effect on the victim and the family unit as a whole.

[43] In the final analysis, the remarks in Matytyi in relation to minimum sentences are apposite:

'Despite certain limited successes there has been no real let-up in the crime pandemic that engulfs our country. The situation continues to be alarming. It follows that, to borrow from Malgas, it still is 'no longer business as usual'. And yet one notices all too frequently a willingness on the part of sentencing courts to deviate from the minimum sentences prescribed by the legislature for the flimsiest of reasons - reasons, as here, that do not survive scrutiny. As Malgas makes plain courts have a duty, despite any personal doubts about the efficacy of the policy or personal aversion to it, to implement those sentences. Our courts derive their power from the Constitution and like other arms of state owe their fealty to it. Our constitutional order can hardly survive if courts fail to properly patrol the boundaries of their own power by showing due deference to the legitimate domains of power of the other arms of state. Here parliament has spoken. It has ordained minimum sentences for certain specified offences. Courts are obliged to impose those sentences unless there are truly convincing reasons for departing from them. Courts are not free to subven the will of the legislature by resort to vague, ill-defined concepts such as 'relative youthfulness' or other equally vague and ill-founded hypotheses that appear to fit the particular sentencing officer's personal notion of fairness. Predictable outcomes, not outcomes based on the whim of an individual judicial officer, is foundational to the rule of law which lies at the heart of our constitutional order.

[44] In Maila v S (429/2022) [2023] ZASCA 3 (23 January 2023), a very recent decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal, which as with the present appeal, involves the rape of a 9 year old victim by her uncle, Mocumie JA dealt very decisively with the approach to rapes of this kind against the ever increasing tide of sexual offences. It is apposite to quote extensively from the judgment in the context of the present appeal, which bears analogous circumstances:

[1]Rape remains under-reported nationally, but there may be no rapes more hidden than those committed within families. Sexual violence victims 'often experience a profound sense of shame, stigma and violation'. These factors are compounded by attempts from family members of the victim or the perpetrator to influence the victims not to file charges or, if charges have been filed, to withdraw the case so that the families can resolve the problem amicably. Often the perpetrator offers to pay the medical costs for the victim's medical treatment, including psychological treatment, and even maintenance of the family in cases of indigent families.

Ad Sentence

[40] I now turn to the question of sentence. The trial court imposed the prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment. It is common cause that the provisions of s 51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (Act 105 of 1997) are applicable. Section 51 of Act 105 of 1997 provides:

'51. Discretionary minimum sentences for certain serious offences —

(1) Notwithstanding any other law, but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a regional court or a High Court shall sentence a person it has convicted of an offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 to imprisonment for life.

(3) (a) If any court referred to in subsection (1) or (2) is satisfied that substantial and compelling circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than the sentence prescribed in those subsections, it shall enter those circumstances on the record of the proceedings and must thereupon impose such lesser sentence. .

[41] Pan I of Schedule 2 of Act 105 of 1997 provides for offences including inter alia:

'Rape as contemplated in section 3 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and

Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007 —

(a)

(b) where the victim —

(i) is a person under the age of 18 years;

(iv) is or was in a domestic relationship, as defined in section 1 of the Domestic Violence Act, 1998, with the accused. '

[51] It must be noted that even without a psychological assessment, from repotted cases of rape based on literature and evidence of experts in court, rape has a devastating impact on anyone, let alone a child. Although the complainant seemed to be co in better at school individuals are impacted differently . The experts have noted certain features common in all rape cases: post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), including flashbacks, nightmares, severe anxiety, and uncontrollable thoughts. Depression, including prolonged sadness, feelings of hopelessness, unexplained crying, weight loss or gain, loss of energy or interest in activities previously enjoyed Suicidal thoughts or attempts. Dissociation, including not being able to focus on work or on schoolwork, as well as not feeling present in everyday situations.

[53] The trial court noted the following as aggravating circumstances: the appellant was the complainant's maternal uncle and in a position of trust — who is 'supposed to protect and love' the complainant and not abuse her. The trial court did not note specifically that the appellant took advantage of the presumably long absence of the mother and grandmother (as alluded to earlier to abuse the complainant. A factor ordinarily present in rapes committed within families or by those close to the families to commit these violent crimes, knowing well that the victims are left on their own at particular times of the day or on certain days.

[57] Rape of women and children is rampant in South Africa. It has reached alarming proportions despite the heavy sentences which courts impose. South Africa has one of the highest rape statistics in the world, even higher than some countries at war. The country's annual police crime statistics confirms this: in 2019/2020, there were 42 289 rapes reported as well as 7 749 sexual assaults. This translates into about 115 rapes per day.

[58] The appellant infringed the right to dignity and the right to bodily and psychological integrity of the complainant, which any democratic society (such as South Africa) which espouses these rights, including gender equality, should not countenance for the future of its children, their safety and physical and mental health. In S v Jansen, the court stated it thus:

'Rape of a child is an appalling and perverse abuse of male power. It strikes a blow at the very core of our claim to be a civilised society. The community is entitled to demand that those who perform such perverse acts of terror be adequately punished and that the punishment reflect the societal censure. It is utterly terrifying that we live in a society where children cannot play in the streets in any safety; where children are unable to grow up in the kind of climate which they should be able to demand in any decent society, namely in freedom and without fear. In short, our children must be able to develop their lives in an atmosphere which behoves any society which aspires to be an open and democratic one based on freedom, dignity and equality, the very touchstones of our Constitution.

[59] Taking into account Jansen. Malaas. Matyitvi. Vilakazi and a plethora of judgments which follow thereafter as well as regional and international protocols which bind South Africa to respond effectively to gender-based violence courts should not shy away from imposing the ultimate sentence in appropriate circumstances. such as in this case. With the onslaught of rape on children, destroying their lives forever, it cannot be 'business as usual'. Courts should. through consistent sentencing of offenders who commit gender-based violence against women and children. not retreat when duty calls to impose appropriate sentences. including prescribed minimum sentences. Reasons such as lack of physical injury, the inability of the perpetrator to control his sexual urges the complainant (a child) was spared some of the horrors associated with oral rape, which amount to the acceptance of the real rape myth. the accused was drunk and fell asleep after the rape, the complainant accepted gifts (in this case, sweets) are an affront to what the victims of gender-based violence in particular rape endure short and long term. And perpetuate the abuse of women and children by courts. When the Legislature has dealt some of the misogynistic myths a blow. courts should not be seen to resuscitate them by_ deviating from the prescribed sentences based on personal preferences of what is substantial and compelling and what is not. This will curb, if not ultimately eradicate. gender-based violence against women and children and promote what Thomas Stoddard calls 'culture shifting change'.

[60] The message must be clear and consistent that this onslaught will not be countenanced in anv democratic society which prides itself with values of respect for the diqnity and life of others. especially the most vulnerable in society: children. For these reasons, this Court is not at liberty to replace the sentence that the trial court imposed. For an uncle, who is the position of trust iust as a father. to rape his own niece is unconscionable and deserves no other censure than that imposed by the trial court: life imprisonment. The sentence is not disproportionate to the serious offence that the appellant committed on a 9-vear-old child, his niece. The sentence is. thus. justified in the circumstances."

[45] As indicated above there are no substantial and compelling circumstances in the personal circumstances of the offender. Having regard to the nature of the offence and the circumstances relevant thereto and the interest of society, nothing stands out as substantial and compelling to deviate from the mandated sentence.

[46] The appellant accordingly stands to be sentenced to life imprisonment. The ancillary orders in respect of his fitness to possess a firearm and including his name in the National Register for Sex Offenders should follow accordingly.

[47] A copy of this judgment must be brought to the attention of the Magistrates' Commission and the Acting Regional Court President, North West Division for, inter alia, consideration of disciplinary action against Acting Regional Magistrate, Mr Foso, and to avoid a repetition of what has transpired in this matter, in other sensitive gender based violence matters presently presided over by Mr Foso.

Order

[48] In the result, the following order is made:

(i) The appeal against sentence is upheld.

(ii) The sentence imposed by Acting Regional Magistrate, Mr Foso, vitiated by a failure of justice is replaced with the following sentence, imposed on appeal, with due regard to the evidence presented in mitigation and aggravation of sentence:

"The accused is sentenced to:

1 Life imprisonment.

2. The sentence is antedated to 23 June 2021.

3. In terms of section 103(1) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, the accused shall remain unfit to possess a firearm.

4. The name of the appellant is to be included in the National Register for Sex Offenders. "

(iii) A copy of this judgment must be forwarded by the Registrar of this Court, to the Magistrates' Commission, for consideration of disciplinary action against Acting Regional Magistrate, Mr Foso.

AH PETERSEN

JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG

I agree

A REDDY

ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH

NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG

Appearances:

For the Appellant: Mr O Modiba

Instructed by: Legal Aid South Africa

Mafikeng Justice Centre

No. 742 Dr. James Moroka Drive

MMABATHO

For the Respondent: Adv K Phetlhu

Instructed by: Director of Public Prosecutions

Megacity Building East Gallery

3139 Sekame Street

MMABATHO