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282/85/AV

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (APPELLATE DIVISION)

In the matter between:

PROTECTIVE MINING AND INDUSTRIAL
EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS (PTY) LIMITED
formerly
HAMPO SYSTEMS (PTY) LIMITED Appellant

and"

AUDIOLENS (CAPE)(PTY) LIMITED Respondent

CORAM: CORBETT, HOEXTER, GROSSKOPF,NESTADT, JJA et NICHOLAS, AJA

HEARD: 23 February 1987

DELIVERED: 30 March 1987

JUDGMENT GROSSKOPF, JA

This is an appeal from a judgment by SCHOCK J in

the . ',

2
the Cape Provincial Division, reported sub nom. Hampo
Systems (Pty) Ltd v Audiolens (Cape)(Pty) Ltd 1985(4) SA

257 (C). Subsequent to the hearing in the Court a quo
the appellant changed its name from Hampo Systems (Proprietary)

Limited to Protective Mining and Industrial Equipment Systems

Proprietary) Limited,and this latter name has accordingly

been substituted on the record. At the commencement of the -hearing on appeal the appellant applied for, and was granted, condonation of the late provision of security for costs.

I turn now to the relevant facts in this appeal. They are briefly as follows.

A Japanese company,Asahi Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha (hereinafter called Asahi),is the manufacturer of,

inter

3
inter alia, photographic and optical products, which are sold under the name Pentax in many parts of the world, in-cluding South Africa. Asahi is the proprietor in the Republic of South Africa of the trade mark "Pentax" regis-tered pursuant to the Trade Marks Act, No 62 of 1963, in
Part A,class 9,of the register, in respect of "photo-

graphic, cinematographic, optical, measuring and surveying machines, apparatus and instruments; parts, fittings and accessories for all the aforegoing goods". The marketing, distribution, export and licensing arm of Asahi is a wholly owned subsidiary called Asahi Optical Corporation. The latter company appointed the appellant as the exclusive distributor in South Africa and certain adjacent territories

of

⁴

of all single-lens reflex cameras, lenses, photographic accessories, binoculars and telescopes manufactured by Asahi, and sold under the trade mark Pentax. In the argu-ment on appeal nothing turned on the difference between the two Asahi companies, and in what follows I shall treat them as a single entity. The appellant's exclusive distri-

butorship commenced in 1956 and has continued ever since.

When proceedings were instituted in the present matter a distributorship agreement of 19 October 1981 was in force, but prior to the hearing in the Court a quo this had been superseded by one dated 25 September 1984. Both these agreements were placed before the Court.

Towards the end of 1982 the appellant became aware that the respondent, a Cape Town company selling inter alia

cameras

5

cameras and other optical equipment by retail, was importing or about to import and sell Pentax-brand products in South Africa. This import, it transpired later, was of genuine Asahi products purchased in Hong Kong. These articles could be sold profitably by the respondent at prices lower than those charged in the retail trade for similar articles im-

ported by the appellant. On 4 November 1982 the appellant

and Asahi wrote a letter of demand through their attorneys to the respondent. This letter is quoted fully in the judgment of the Court a quo at pp. 259 to 260 of the report, and need not be repeated herein. Briefly, it sets out the relation-ship between Asahi and the appellant; refers to the "conside-rable reputation" of the mark Pentax; stresses the measures taken by

Asahi
6
Asahi and the appellant to safeguard and promote this re-
putation; and records that the importation or sale by the

respondent of Pentax-branded products was unauthorised.

Paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the letter then read as follows:

"11. Inasmuch as the use of the trade mark is

unauthorised, this constitutes an infringe-ment of the rights of our client's afore-mentioned trade mark, particularly in the light of s 44(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act.
12. Now that the rights of our clients have
been drawn to your attention, we would
like to mention that a repetition by you
will constitute an infringement of our
client's rights.
13. May we, therefore, have your assurance that
you will not import or sell 'Pentax'
branded goods into South Africa. You are,
of course, perfectly free to obtain the
goods from the authorised dealer in South
Africa."

By letter dated 15 November 1982 the respondent, through its

attorneys

7
attorneys, declined to give the assurance requested in para-graph 13 quoted above. This letter is quoted at pp. 260-1 of the reported judgment of the Court a quo. As appears from the letter, the respondent's attitude was that it had "obtained the Pentax cameras through a legitimate and re-liable source" and that "the articles concerned (were) genuine Bentax cameras, manufactured by your client in Japan". The respondent could not see how the relationship between Asahi and the appellant, and the measures taken to protect the reputation of the trade mark, were of any concern to the respondent. It had"legitimately obtained the articles for re-sale, and (would) proceed to re-sell them accordingly". The respondent denied that in doing so it would in any way be infringing Asahi's trade mark.

Almost

8

Almost a year later, on 22 October 1983, Mr. B Bacon,
a partner in the firm of attorneys acting for the appellant, purchased a Pentax ME Super camera from the respondent. It is common cause that this camera had not been supplied by the appellant but had been imported by the respondent from Hong Kong as explained above. The salesman was Mr. H. Wertheim, a director of the respondent, who deposed to the opposing affidavit in this matter. I shall at a later stage have to deal in greater detail with what passed between Mr. Bacon and Mr. Wertheim.

Thereafter, by Notice of Motion dated 3 April 1984, the appellant (not joined by Asahi) applied for various or-ders against the respondent substantially in the terms set out at p. 258 of the judgment a guo. The relevant claims

for

9

for present purposes were those for orders interdicting the
respondent from unlawfully competing with the appellant in
two respects, viz., first, by selling foreign products under
the trade mark Pentax; and, second, by informing purchasers
that such foreign products were warranted against defects and
that such warranty would be honoured by the appellant or its

agents or distributors. The Court a quo dismissed the ap-

plication with costs, and, with its leave, the matter now

comes on appeal before us.

On appeal, the appellant's contentions in support of

the above-mentioned claims were succinctly formulated as fol-

lows in its heads of argument:

"That the Respondent is misrepresenting to the public that the Appellant will honour a
guarantee ....

10

guarantee in respect of the product sold by

it (the Respondent) and is thereby passing-

off its business as being connected in the

course of trade with the business of the

Appellant;

and

That the Respondent is unlawfully competing

with the Appellant by infringing ASAHI's

trade mark PENTAX."

I propose dealing with these contentions in turn.

The first cause of action relied upon by the appellant

is based on the factual allegation that the respondent is mis-

representing to the public that the appellant will honour a

guarantee in respect of Asahi products sold by the respondent.

On this basis the applicant contends that it is entitled

to a final interdict prohibiting a repetition of the mis-

representation. The legal ground for this claim is

said in the above-quoted passage to be passing-off, but in

argument
11

argument before us Mr. Plewman, who appeared for the appel-lant, submitted that a more satisfactory ground would be the general law of unlawful competition. Before it becomes necessary to enter into these legal questions I must how-ever first determine what the relevant facts are.
It is common cause that all Pentax cameras enjoy a twelve months' warranty against defective material or work- manship. It is, however, not always easy to determine the exact document in which this warranty is embodied. It ap-pears that all products in the Pentax range, whether distri-buted by the appellant or not, are accompanied by operating manuals which contain Asahi's so-called "warranty policy". This warranty policy commences wíth the sentence:

"All

12

"All Pentax cameras purchased through authorized bona fide photographic dis-tribution channels are guaranteed against defects of material or workmanship for a period of twelve months from date of purchase."

The warránty policy then continues by defining the ambit of
the guarantee. Thereafter, under the heading "Procedure
during 12-month warranty period", it reads:

"Any Pentax which proves defective during the 12-month warranty period should be re-turned to the dealer from whom you pur-chased the eguipment or to the manufac-turer. If there is no representative of the manufacturer in your country, send the equipment to the manufacturer, with postage prepaid."

Later it continues:

"To prove the date of your purchase when required, please keep the receipts or
bills

13

bills covering the purchase of your equip-

ment for at least a year. Before sending

your equipment for servicing, please make

sure that you are sending it to the manu-

facturer's authorized representatives or

their accredited repair shops, unless you

are sending it directly to the manufacturer."

The warranty policy concludes with the following sentences:

"This warranty policy does not apply to Pentax products purchased in the U.S.A., U.K. , or Canada. The local warranty policies available from Pentax distributors in those countries supersede this warranty policy."

On the face of it, this warranty policy applies to all

sold through authorized channels Pentax cameras, and would therefore cover cameras sold

by the appellant. It is therefore not surprising that, in

terms of the 1981 distributorship agreement, the appellant

undertook the following obligation (clause 2(d)(iv)):

"In accordance with the warranty policy

and
14

and procedure detailed in the operating manual for the Products, HAMPO warrants the Products against material and work-manship defects and performs the servicing of the Products. HAMPO, being a member Distributor of the Pentax International Warranty Service Organization, agrees to service the Products, whether in-warranty or out-of-warranty, originally, sold out-side the Territory in accordance with the provisions of the Organization. HAMPO shall render in-warranty services free of

charge, and out-of-warranty services at

fair and reasonable prices."

It would thus seem that clause 2(d)(iv) of the distributor-
ship agreement imposed only an obligation to honour the war-
ranty contained in the operating. manual. However, in his
founding affidavit Mr. P Carpenter, the appellant's managing
director, stated that all Pentax equipment sold by the appel-

lant was, in terms of the exclusive distributorship agreement,

sold

15

sold together with an additional international guarantee
reading as follows:

"The above-mentioned equipment is guaran-teed against material or workmanship defect for 12 months after date of purchase. In case of need, free in-warranty service shall be rendered by any one of the autho-rized service stations listed in this guarantee card, according to the warranty

policy and procedure explained in the operating manual for your Pentax, pro-vided the equipment has not been abused, altered, operated contrary to instructions, or repaired by unauthorized repair shops. This international guarantee supersedes part of the warranty policy and procedure limiting the in-warranty service only in the country of original purchase or by Asahi Optical Corporation."

It is not clear to me whether, and if so, to what

extent, this warranty differs from that contained in the operating manual, or whether it is intended to replace it.

But the matter does not end there. The

appellant ....

16

appellant also includes a further guarantee document with

all Pentax equipment sold by it. This is in the form of a

document with an attached (or accompanying) "Camera Guaran-

tee Card", which contains particulars of the article sold,

the names of the dealer and purchaser, and the date of the

sale. Although Mr. Carpenter refers to this document as

the appellant's "own guarantee", the only contractual term
in it is the following:

"YOUR PENTAX PRODUCT WILL NOT BE GUARANTEED unless this reply paid registration card is completed and mailed within 14 days of date of purchase, which will entitle you to 1 YEARS GUARANTEE."

This seems to comprise a restriction rather than an

extension of the guarantee.

The

17

The combined effect of these documents is by no
means clear, but I do not consider it necessary to attempt to

interpret them. What seems important for present purposes

is not what I think the documents mean, but how the parties

viewed them at the relevant time before proceedings were in-

stituted. In the letter of 4 November 1982, the appellant's :

attorneys had this to say about the guarantee:

"5. In particular, we refer to the guarantee

which is sold with every 'Pentax' camera
throughout the world. Part of the South
African company's obligations relate to
the fact that they are to honour the
conditions and terms of the guarantee
in connection with any 'Pentax' product
which has been sold, irrespective of
whether that sale occurred in South
Africa, or not.

6. It should, therefore, be specifically re-

corded that our clients are responsible for ensuring that guarantees are met and adhered to."

Although

18

Although this is not ideally clear, it does suggest
that the appellant and Asahi (on whose combined behalf the
letter was written) were of the view that the appellant could
be saddled with responsibility in terms of the warranty in
respect of cameras sold by the respondent. The respondent's
attorneys' reply (in their aforementioned letter) was:

"Regarding the guarantee obligations, a

material reason for our client purchasing the camera for resale,was the guarantee which came with the article and our client assumes that the guarantee obligations will be met by your clients or their agents, as warranted in the guarantee."

The appellant apparently did not respond to this let-

ter prior to the institution of proceedings. This correspond-

ence accordingly suggests that both parties were ad idem,

when
19

when these letters were written, that the appellant would honour the warranty in respect of cameras sold by the respon-dent. In view of the content of the relevant guarantee do-cuments which I have discussed above, and particularly clause 2(d)(iv) of the distributorship agreement, this attitude is quite understandable.

It is against this background that the appellant's

evidence concerning misrepresentations to the public about

the warranty should be considered. The only instance of

misrepresentation relied upon was that allegedly made to Mr.

Bacon when he bought a Pentax camera from Mr. Wertheim in

October 1983, to which I referred above. Mr. Bacon deposed

on affidavit to what passed between him and Mr. Wertheim.

In his affidavit Mr. Wertheim, although not remembering the

incident, questioned the likelihood of some of Mr. Bacon's

assertions. In reply

Mr

20

and confirmed Mr. Bacon submitted a memorandum dictated by him on 24

October 1983 (i.e. two days after the sale) in which he had

set out the circumstances of the sale. His initial affi-

davit had been prepared from this memorandum. The memo-

randum clearly provides the more reliable account of the
transaction. It records that Mr. Bacon first made

enquiries about the purchase of a Pentax camera at the re-

spondent's shop on Priday evening, 21 October 1983. The

next morning he returned. After some discussion about

the Pentax ME Super, the conversation proceeded as follows

(it will be recalled that "the salesman" was Mr. Wertheim):

"I then told the salesman that my ex-perience in Cape Town had always been that service was extremely difficult to ob-tain. He said that the main agents for

Pentax

21

Pentax had been the same for the last

20 years and were a company called

Hampo. I told him that I was familiar

with the company because, at least until

recently, they had the agency for the

Dictaphone brand of dictating machines.

He then said that the camera has a one

year international guarantee. I asked

him what that meant. He said that what

he meant by an international guarantee

was one that would be honoured overseas.

Without being prompted, he said that there

used to be a local guarantee. This, how-

ever, no longer existed. I asked him

to confirm how long the guarantee lasted.

He said that it was a one year guarantee."

Mr. Bacon recorded that he then "started fiddling in the box
that the camera came out of" and found various documents.

He then continued:

"I asked the salesman whether there was a guarantee card that I had to fill in. He said no. Again without being prompted

he

22

he said that he would give me a cash sales slip. I could present this and the camera at any time within one year at any shop which sold Pentax cameras and this would enable me to make use of the guarantee. The cash sales slip I have designated BB7 on the reverse. It is noted that on the front of this the salesman has written 'one years full guarantee'."

The first question to be answered in the light of the evidence is whether Mr. Wertheim represented to Mr. Bacon in this conversation that the appellant would honour a guarantee in respect of the camera sold by the respondent. If this question is answered in the affirmatiye the further question will arise whether, regard being had to the relevant docu-ments discussed above, such representation was false.

The learned judge a quo dealt in the following terms

with

23
with the question whether Mr. Wertheim made the alleged re-
presentation (at p. 262 B-C):

"...on the papers applicant has not, in
my judgment, proved that respondent made
any such representation. At most respon-
dent represented to Bacon that the cameras

were guaranteed for a year but it did not-
aver that it would be applicant who would
honour the guarantee. I do not think that

the mere fact that respondent's represen- tative said that applicant was the main

agent for Pentax cameras implied any such representation. What is most significant is that the one thing respondent's repre- sentative is not alleged to have said is that applicant would honour the guarantee."

Mr. Plewman argued that, although there was no ex-press representation that the appellant would honour the guarantee, such a representation could be implied from the first two sentences of the above passage from the memorandum,

read
24

read with the subsequent discussion about an "international guarantee". Now it must be noted that the appellant's name was expressly mentioned only in relation to service generally. The suggestion that the appellant could be expected to pro-vide "service" does not appear to have been in any way false -- there is no reason to suppose that the appellant would have

refused to repair or service any Pentax camera because

of its origin. Regarding the guarantee, Mr. Wertheim is alleged to have said only that there was a one year interna- tiónal guarantee - "one that would be honoured overseas" -but no "local guarantee". The suggestion here seems to be that the guarantee was only enforceable overseas and would not be honoured in South Africa (if so, neither the appellant

nor

25 nor the respondent would have been bound to honour it). This could hardly have be.en what Mr. Wertheim meant, however, and the intehdëd purpose of the remarks eludes me. Then he stated that the guarantee could be exercised "at any shop which sold Pentax cameras" - presumably within and outside the Republic. It is difficult to reconcile this with what had preceded it.

The general impression which I gain is that the

conversation, if fully and correctly recorded, was disjointed, confusing and inconclusive. One must bear in mind that the whole purpose of Mr. Bacon's visit was to obtain evidence concerning the sale by the respondent of Pentax cameras. If the appellant wanted to determine whether it was being

represented

26

represented as the party responsible for honouring the guarantee, one wonders why Mr. Bacon did not ask a specific guestion in this regard. He did not however do so, and in the result the Court is asked to imply a representation from material which is far from clear.

By reason of the aforegoing it seems, at best for the appellant, uncertain whether the representation upon which.it relies can be implied from the conversation between Mr. Bacon and Mr. Wertheim.

On behalf of the appellant it was contended that there was a likelihood that Mr. Wertheim would have made the re-presentation in question, because, as I have shown, the re-spondent believed that the appellant would in fact be required

to
27

to honour the guarantee. The existence of this belief seems, however, to be a double-edged weapon. On the one hand it would tend to give credence to evidence that the alleged representation was made. Little, if any, weight can, however, be attached to this consideration where the undisputed evidence does not with any clarity show the making of the alleged representation.

On the other hand, the belief held by the respondent that the appellant would honour the guarantee tends to work against the appellant's case in the following way. It will be recalled that the belief was tenable in the light of the provisions of clause 2(d)(iv) of the 1981 distributor-ship agreement, which I have quoted above. The 1984 Agree-

ment
28

ment is, however, completely different. In terms of clause 7.01 of the latter agreement the appellant is required only to "warrant the Products to its customers against defect in material and workmanship" in accordance with the warranty in the operating manual (emphasis added). Accordingly the respondent can no longer assume that the appellant would honour warranties in respect of cameras sold by the respon- dent, and the respondent's case on the papers is that it has made arrangements with a photographic repair business in Cape Town to enable the respondent itself to honour the guarantee. In these circumstances there is no reason to think that the respondent would in future falsely represent to its customers that the appellant would honour the warranty.

I

29

I consider therefore that the appellant has not shown either that the respondent made the alleged representation to Mr. Bacon or that it is likely to make such a representation to its customers in future. I need therefore not consider whether such a representation would have been false. I also need not consider whether the making of such a misrepresenta-
tion, if proved, would have amounted to passing-off in ac-

cordance with the principles discussed in recent English cases | such as H P Bulmer Limited and Showerings Limited v J Bollinger SA& Another (1978) RPC 79 and Erven Wamink B V v J Townend and Sons (Hull) Limited (1979) FSR 397 upon which the appellant relies, or would have amounted to unlawful competition under our law. Nor is it necessary to consider whether the extension of the principles

of

30

of passing-off which is reflected in the above-mentioned English cases accords with the South African law on the subject.

The second cause of action relied upon by the appellant is that respondent is unlawfully competing with the appellant by infringing Asahi's trade mark Pentax. It should
be stressed at the outset that the appellant is neither the

proprietor nor a registered user of the trade mark, and it does not claim any right to restrain the infringement of the trade mark as. such, i.e. simply because there is an in-fringement. Its case is that the infringement of Asahi's trade mark by the respondent does not only constitute a wrong against Asahi, but also amounts to unlawful competition actionable at the suit of the appellant. Two questions

consequently

31
consequently arise ïn this branch of the appeal, viz., whether the respondent has been guilty of infringing Asahi's trade mark, and, if so, whether this constitutes unlawful competition vis-á-vis the appellant.
I deal first with the question of trade mark infringe-ment. The appellant contends that the respondent has com-mitted an infringement of the trade mark pursuant-to section — 44(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, no. 62 of 1963. This sec-tion lays down that the rights acquired by registration of a trade mark shall be infringed by "unauthorized use" of a mark "as a trade mark". The expressions "unauthorized use" and "use as a trade mark" are, however, by no means self-explana-tory. In my view they can only be properly understood in

the

31 A the light of the historical development of this branch of the law, to which I now turn.

In Policansky Bros Ltd v L & H Policansky 1935 AD

89 at p. 97 WESSELS CJ said the following: |

law "The Roman-Dutch was well acquainted with

the general principle that a person cannot,

by imitating the name, marks or devices

of another who had acquired a reputation

for his goods, filch the former's trade

(Ned. Advies Boek, vol. 1. adv. 68, p.161).

This class of tort had not reached, by the

end of the eighteenth century, the im-

portance that it has today."

Later

32

later, he said (at p. 98):

"As our Roman-Dutch authorities do not deal with the various aspects of passing-off actions that modern conditions have evoked, we in South Africa have followed the principles enunciated by the English and American courts where such principles are not in conflict with either our com-mon law or our statute law."

WESSELS CJ was talking here about the law of passing-
off in which the law of trade marks had its origin. I

should add that our statute law concerning trade marks has

also followed English patterns, so that it is appropriate to

commence this historical introduction with a summary of the

English law on the subject. My main source in this regard

is the speech of LORD DIPLOCK in the case of the G E Trade

Mack (1973) RPC 297 (HL)("the G E case").

The use by manufacturers of distinctive marks upon

goods which they have made is of very ancient origin, but

legal

33

legal recognition of trade marks as a species of incorpo-real property was first accorded by the Court of Chancery in the first half of the nineteenth century. The right of property in a trade mark had special characteristics. One, which it shared with patents and with copyright, was that it was a monopoly, that is to say, it was a right to restrain other persons from using the mark. To be capable of being the subject-matter of property a trade mark had to be dis-tinctive, that is to say, it had to be recognisable by a purchaser of goods to which it was affixed as indicating that they were of the same origin as other goods which bore the same mark and whose guality had engendered goodwill. Property in a trade mark could therefore only be acquired

by

34

by public use of it as such by the proprietor and was lost
by disuse.

I have stated above that the right in a trade mark
was a right to restrain other persons from using the mark.
What types of use could be thus restrained at common law?
The answer to this question appears from the following dis-

cússion by LORD CRANWORTH in Farina v Silverlock (1857 ) 26 -

LJ (NS) Eq. 11. LORD CRANWORTH was dealing with "the

right to have a particular trade-mark to designate a com-

modity" (ibid., p. 12). The right, he said, was of this

nature:-

"It is not properly described as a copy-rlght, because it is no right at all, un-less it is a right which can be said to
exist
35

exist only, and to be tested only by its violation. The right is a right on the part of any person designating his wares or commodities by a particular trade-mark, as it is called, to prevent anybody else from selling wares, which are not those manufactured by the plaintiff, with that trade-mark, in order to mislead the public, and so incidentally to injure the person who is owner of the trade-mark.

... I apprehend the law is perfectly clear, that anybody, who has acquired a

particular mode of designating his parti-

cular manufacture, has a right to say, not that other persons shall not sell exactly the same article, better or worse, or looking exactly like

it
36

it, but that they shall not so sell it as to steal the plaintiff's trade-mark, and make purchasers believe it is the manufacture of somebody else."

(ibid., pp. 12-13).

The first legislation on trade marks in England was
the Registration of Trade Marks Act,1875. The purpose of
this Act was to remedy certain defects in the common law,
described by LORD DIPLOCK as follows (in the G E case at p.

327 lines 7 to 15):

"The principal defects in the law of trade marks as it had developed by 1875 were: first, that in any action which he brought for infringement of his trade mark the proprietor had to prove his title to the mark afresh by adducing evidence of his public use of it; and, secondly, that there was no easy way in which a trader who wished to adopt a particular mark to distinguish

his

37

his own products could find out whether its use would infringe proprietary rights in that mark already vested in some other trader by virtue of his public use of it. The evident purpose of the Act of 1875 was to provide a practical remedy for these de-fects without changing the main characte-ristics of trade marks at common law."

The Act of 1875 made provision for the registration
of trade marks in respect of particular goods or classes of
goods (secs land 2). Pursuant to sec 3, the registration

of a person as proprietor of a trade mark "shall be prima

facie evidence of his right to the exclusive use of such

trade-mark"; and after the expiration of five years, would

be "conclusive evidence of his right to the exclusive use

of such trade-mark" (subject to irrelevant exceptions).

Section 1 laid down that in future a person would not be

entitled

38

entitled to institute any proceedings to prevent the in-fringement of a trade mark unless and until the mark was registered in pursuance of the Act. However, the Act did not lay down what constituted infringement otherwise than by inference from the provision that the próprietor had the right to the exclusive use of the mark.

The question whether the Act of 1875 had altered the

pertinently law as set out in Farina v Silverlock (supra) first arose in

1929 in the case of Champagne Heidsieck et Cie Monopole Societe

Anonyme v Buxton (1930) 1 Ch 330. At that stage the Act of

1875 had been superseded by the Patent, Designs and Trade

Marks Act of 1883, which in turn had been superseded by the

Trade Marks Act of 1905. The last mentioned two statutes

were also considered in the Champagne Heidsieck

case

39

case, but, for reasons which will appear later, the court's decision turned on the effect of the 1875 Act.
I propose dealing with the Champagne Heidsieck case at some length since it is important for the purposes of this appeal. The facts were briefly as follows. The plaintiffs were producers of champagne in France. They prepared a special type of champagne with a view to its sale on the English market, and another type of sweeter quality for the French market. Both types were sold under the same label which was registered as a trade mark in England. The wine destined for the French market had the additional word "Brut" printed on the label, and there were other minor differences between the contents of the labels and the general

get-up

40

get-up of the bottles. The plaintiff wished to prevent the

sale of the "Brut" wine in England. Such wines were never-
theless imported and sold by the defendant. The plaintiff

instituted action claiming, inter alia, an injunction to re-

strain the defendant from infringing its registered trade mark.

The plaintiff's case was that, although the common J

law was correctly-set out in Farina v Silverlock (supra),the

Act of 1875 had changed the nature and effect of a trade mark.

This argument is reflected as follows in the judgment of

CLAUSON J at p. 338:

"It was, however, contended that the effect of s. 3 of the Act of 1875 (which énacted that the registration of a trade mark, prima facie, gave the registered proprietor the
right
41

right to the exclusive use of such trade
mark) was, not merely to give that pro-
prietor by virtue of registration a
statutory title in respect of his
mark to the same rights which, before the
Act, he could have obtained only by proving

that the mark had become his trade mark
but had the further effect of vesting in

the owner of a trade mark the right to

object to any person selling or dealing

with goods produced by the owner of the

trade mark with the trade mark affixed,

except on such terms and subject to such

conditions as to resale, price, area of

market, and so forth, as the owner of the

trade mark might choose to impose. It

was, in effect, suggested that, whereas

before 1875 a trade mark, if established

as a trade mark, was a badge of the origin

of the goods,the effect of s. 3 of the

Act of 1875 was to make a registered

trade mark a badge of control, carrying

with it the right in the owner of a

registered trade mark to full control'

over his goods, into whosesoever hands

they might come, except in so far as he

might expressly or by implication have

released this right of control."

This

42

This contention was rejected in the following words

(pp. 338-9):

"I do not so read the section. Nor am I
aware that, until the present case, any
such construction of the section or of
corresponding sections in subsequent Acts
has been adopted by any tribunal; or indeed that, until very recent times, any such

construction has been propounded to any tribunal. It would be astonishing, if in an Act to establish a register of trade marks, such a remarkable extension of the rights of owners of trade marks were intended to be enacted by the use of such terms as appear in the section. The section appears to me to mean that the proprietor of a registered trade mark is to have the right exclusively to use such trade mark in the sense of preventing others from selling wares which are not his marked with the trade mark. I do not believe that the . legislature intended to say, or can fairly be held to have said, that the registration of a trade mark had the wide consequences suggested by the plaintiffs." (emphasis added)

CLAUSON

43 CLAUSON J concluded by holding (at p. 341)

"... that the use of a mark by the defen-dant which is relied on as an infringement. must be a use upon goods which are not the genuine goods, i.e., those upon which the plaintiffs' mark is properly used, for any one may use the plaintiffs' mark on the plaintiffs' goods, since that cannot cáuse the deception which is the test of in-fringement."

I return now to the legislative history. The Act
of 1875 was amended in 1876 and 1877. These amendments are
not relevant for present purposes. In 1883, as noted above,

it was superseded by the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks

Act. This Act also effected no change which is material for

present purposes. Section 76 of the 1883 Act merely re-

peated s. 3 of the 1875 Act with variations which do not

affect the present issue.

The

44

The next relevant statute was the Trade Marks Act of 1905. This statute deflned "trade mark" as "a mark used or proposed to be used upon or in connexion with goods for the purpose of indicating that they are the goods of the proprietor of such trade mark by virtue of manufacture, selection, certification, dealing with, or offering for sale".

The basic rights of the proprietor of a trade mark

were defined in terms which did not differ materially from those of the previous Acts. Thus sec. 39 provided, subject to immaterial qualifications, that "the registration of a person as proprietor of a trade mark shall, if

valid

45

valid, give such person the exclusive right to the use
of such trade mark upon or in connection with the goods in
respect of which it is registered ...".

The 1905 Act was considered in the Heidsieck case

(supra) at p. 339,to determine whether the plaintiff's

case could be supported by reference to it. CLAUSON J said:

"It was, indeed, at first suggested that
this remarkable alteration in the law (i.e.,
the alteration contended for by the plain-
tiff - see the above quotation from p. 338)
took place when s. 39 of the Act of 1905 was enacted, but a comparison of the language of that section with s. 3 of the Act of
1875 led at once to a recognition of the fact that, if the change in the law did take place, it must have taken place in 1875 and not in 1905. Indeed, in my view,
if there had been any possible doubt as
to the construction of s. 3 of the Act of
1875, the doubt must necessarily vanish when
the Act of 1905, which supersedes that
of

46

of 1875 and the intermediate Acts, is examined. In the Act of 1905 the word 'trade mark' is defined as a mark used upon goods for the purpose of indicating that they are the goods of the pro-prietor of the mark, and reading this definition into s. 39 it appears to me quite clear that the exclusive right to use the mark conferred on the registered proprietor by that section is the right

to use the mark as a trade mark - i.e.,

as indicating that the goods upon which

it is placed are his goods and to ex- clude others from selling under the mark wares which are not his. " (emphasis added)

The final English statute to which I intend to refer
is the Trade Marks Act of 1938, which superseded the 1905 Act.
The 1938 Act not only broadened the definition of "trade mark"

(sec. 68(1)) but introduced in sec. 4(1) elaborate provisions
regarding infringement. See Shalom Investments (Pty) Ltd

and
47

and Others v Dan River Mills Incorporated 1971(1) SA 689
(A) ("The Dan River case") at 701 H in fin. The effect of
these changes was considered in Bismag Ld. v Amblins
(Chemists) Ld. (1940) 57 RPC 209, which is discussed in the
Dan River case at p. 702. Among these changes was

a substantial expansion of the rights of proprietors of trade marks. The purpose of this was to remedy defi-ciencies in the law which had been exposed by the judgment in the case of Irving's Yeast-Vite Limited v Horsenail (1934) 51 RPC 110 (HL). As I shall show later,this judgment also gave rise to changes in the South African legislation. However, the manner in which this problem was dealt with in Britain differed entirely from that adopted by the South African

legislature

48

legislature. It would accordingly serve little purpose to
consider the effect of the 1938 British Act on the principles
enunciated in the Champagne Heidsieck case. I would only
note in passing that the decision in the Champagne Heidsieck
case was still regarded as good law in 1979 in Revlon Inc.
and Others v Cripps & Lee Ltd and Others (1980) FSR 85 (CA)
at p. 108 (BUCKLEY LJ, with whom BRIDGE LJ concurred) and

pp. 113-4 (TEMPLEMAN LJ).

I turn now to the law of trade marks in the Netherlands

and South Africa. In the passage which I have quoted from

the judgment in Policansky Bros. Ltd. v L H Policansky (supra)

van den Berg's WESSELS CJ referred to an opinion quoted in Ned. Advijs Boek

vol. 1, adv. 68, p. 161. The facts in that opinion were

that one Pieter Meffert was a "Caartemaker" (apparently a

manufacturer
48 A manufacturer of playing cards - see van Zurck, Codex Batavus, sub voc. Wapenen, para 4 note 1, which refers to the same case) who, during his lifetime, printed certain "teekens,
merken en namen" on his cards and their covers. After his death his

widow ..

49

widow and heirs continued the business, and also continued

using the same "teekens, merken en namen" on the cards pro-

duced by them. Other manufacturers of cards then commenced

using the same distinctive words and marks on their own

cards. The advice given to Meffert's widow and heirs was

that it was impermissible to use such names, marks and signs-

as another person had previously used and was still using

on similar articles, if the infringing use would enure to the

loss or disadvantage of the first inventor or user of the

names, marks or signs. The death of Meffert had not altered

this situation, since his widow and heirs, so they were ad-

vised, were entitled to the benefit of the names, marks and

signs which the deceased had used in his lifetime. This

opinion
50 opinion was given on 15 January 1667. The widow and heirs instituted proceedings and on 1 February 1667 an infringer was ordered by the schepenen of The Hague to pay "een amende van 60 ponden" and furthermore "om in het toekomende naar te laten het drukken ende gebruyken van sodanige teekens, merken ende namen,op haare Caarten, als Pieter Meffert,zoo lang voor haar eerst heeft gevonden ende gebruykt welke hem en zyne Erfgenamen alleen toekomen" . The ground for this decision was stated to be "ratione falsi commissi utendo signis et nomine Petri Meffert in suis mercibus".

The jurists who gave the above opinion relied mainly on a passage from the Tractatus de Insigniis et Armis by Bartolus (1314-1357). The full passage reads as follows:

"... pone

51

"... pone fabrum quendam esse doctissimum, qui in gladiis, et aliis suis operibus facit certa signa, ex quibus opus ipsius magistri esse cognoscitur, et per hoc tales merces melius venduntur, et avidius emuntur, tunc puto quod si alius faceret tale signum, possit prohiberi quia ex hoc populus lederetur, acciperetur enim opus unius pro opere alterius."

These authorities leave no doubt that in our com-
mon law a trade mark served the same purpose as in England,
viz. to identify the goods of the trade mark owner and to

distinguish them from the goods of others. A trade mark was considered to be infringed if it was used on goods which were not those of the person whom we would call the trade mark proprietor. This was regarded as a form of deception where-by the goods of the infringer were passed off for the goods of the trade mark proprietor, and was punishable under the crimen falsi (see also Voet, Commentaries, 48.10.6; v. Zurck, op cit, sub voc

Falsiteit

52

Falsiteit, para 10; Garen, para 1; Messen, para 5; Papieren, para 2; Thee, para 1; and also Carpzovius, Praxis Rer. Crim. 2.93.89 and 90. It should be noted, however, that many of these passages refer to specific enactments on trade marks in respect of particular articles.) .

In our case law there appear to be few reported

cases of trade mark infringement prior to the enactment of— trade marks legislation. The most important one is Rose & Co. v Miller (1891) 4 SAR 123. In that case the plaintiffs were the manufacturers "of a certain limejuice cordial well known upon the market". The defendant, Miller of Johannesburg, made limejuice and sold it in bottles of Rose & Co. and in others similar in shape, and labelled these with an almost

exact
53 exact imitation of plaintiif's label. Rose & Co. claimed a perpetual interdict prohibiting such conduct. On behalf of the defendant it was argued that "there is no protection in this country for trade marks". KOTZe CJ (with whom DE KORTE J concurred) did not agree. His iudgment reads (at p. 125):

"I am of the opinion that Rose & Co. have
an exclusive right to the use of a certain label for the sale of 'Limejuice Cordial', and that Miller has infringed such right by imitating the label of Rose & Co. in such a way that the public may easily be deceived thereby to the damage and incon-venience of Messrs. Rose & Co. To allow such a practice is to countenance a fraud both on Rose &. Co. and the public. It is a case of injuria or infringement of right. A perpetual interdict must be granted a-gainst Miller, with costs."

Although no authorities were quoted in the judgment,

the

54
the report (printed in 1908) contains a footnote mentioning
Roman-Dutch authorities on the subject of trade marks. These
appear to have been derived from an anonymous note in the
Cape Law Journal of 1892 (9 CLJ 127) and include the autho-
rities which I have discussed above. See also Mills v Salmond
( 1863) 4 Searle 230.

The pre-Union trade mark legislation in South Africa closely followed the British Act of 1875. The first statute was the Trade Marks Registration Act, no 22 of 1877, of the Cape Colony. According to the preamble, the object of this enactment was to "establish in this Colony a register of trade marks". Such register was to be kept by the Registrar of Deeds. Section 3 of this Act copied section 3 of the British

Act

55

Act of 1875, i.e., it laid down that registration of a trade mark provided, at first, prima facie evidence of the pro-prietor's right to the exclusive use of the trade mark, and, after five years, conclusive evidence of this right.' Although the Act was amended on a few occasions, none of the
amendments bears on the present enquiry.

In Natal, Law 4 of 1885 was enacted "to establish a register of trade marks in Natal" (see the long title). In that Colony the register of trade marks was kept by the Registrar of the Supreme Court. Section 16 of the Act cor-responded to section 3 of the British Act and section 3 of the Cape Act (save for an apparent misprint: the section laid

down ...

56

down that after five years, registration would be conclusive
evidence of the proprietor's "right to the exclusive right"

(sic - instead of "use") of a trade mark).

In the Orange Free State trade marks were governed
by Chapter CXIII of the Wetboek, entitled "De Wet over het
Registreeren van Handelsmerken". Here again the Registrar

of Deeds was charged with keeping the register. Sec 3 of

the statute was, for present purposes, a direct translation of

sec 3 of the British Act and its colonial counterparts. The

amendment of this statute by Law no 13 of 1893 is irrelevant

for present purposes.

The first legislation in the Transvaal was Law 6 of

1892, the long title of which indicated that it contained

"bepalingen op de handels- en fabrieksmerken in deze Republiek".

Section

57

Section 1 laid down that a person or firm "die zich het recht wil verzekeren tot uitsluitend gebruik van een merk, hetwelk ter onderscheiding zijner handels- of fabriekswaren van die van andere, op de waren zelve of op hare verpakking word _ _' geplaatst",should have such mark registered with the State Attorney. Although the formulation of this section

differed somewhat from the corresponding provisions in the

other territories, it was substantially to the same effect. Thus it stated in terms that the purpose of registration was

to ensure the proprietor's right of exclusive use of the mark

incidentally, a right which KOTZé CJ had the year before recognized also

under the common law in the case of Rose & Co. (supra). The

Transvaal Law 6 of 1892 was repealed by Proclamation 23 of

1902, which copied the British Act of 1875. Sec. 11 of the

Proclamation

58

Broclamation was, for present purposes, identical to sec. 3 of the British Act of 1875. and the corresponding sections of the other pre-Union statutes to which I have referred. The subsequent amendment of the proclamation by Ordinance no 3 of 1904 does not affect the issue.

These pre-Union statutes continued in force until
repealed by the Patents, Designs, Trade Marks and Copyright
Act, no 9 of 1916, of the Union of South Africa.

Before I turn to this Act, it will be convenient to summarize what the relevant legal position was before its promulgation. At common law, both here and in England, a trade mark served to indicate the origin of goods in the proprietor of the trade mark, and infringement occurred when

the

59

the trade mark was used in respect of goods which were not
those of the proprietor of the trade mark. There is nothing
in our common law or that of England to suggest that the pro-
prietor of a trade mark was entitled by virtue of trade mark
law to control the sale or distribution of his goods which he
had marked with his trade mark.

The British Act of 1875 introduced a system of regis

tration of trade marks. The purpose of the Act, according to the G E case (supra), was to make it easier for the pro-prietor of a trade mark to prove his ownership, and to enable interested persons to find out whether a particular trade mark was in use and by whom. Its purpose was not to change the main characteristics of trade marks at common law. And

in

60 in the Champagne Heidsieck case (supra) the Court held that the proprietor's "exclusive right" of which the 1875 Act spoke, was the right which had existed at common law to prevent others from selling wares which were not his marked with his trade mark.

In the Dan River case (supra, at p. 700 H to 701 A) this Court expressed doubt whether the Champagne Heidsieck

case could be regarded as "settled law" in England. I do

not think that there is room for doubt any longer. The

by the Court of Appeal Champagne Heidsieck case has been expressly:approved in the

Revlon case (supra) as I have indicated. Moreover, the House

of Lords has, in the G E case (supra), affirmed that the 1875

Act served only a limited purpose, and was not intended to

change

61

change the main characteristics of trade marks. And the principle that a trade mark is essentially a "badge of origin" has been con-firmed also in other contexts. See, eg., Aristoc Ld. v Rysta Ld. (1945) 62 RPC 65 at p. 82 lines 26 to 37. See also Esquire Electronics Ltd v Executive Video 1986(2) SA
576 (A)at p.587 E-F. The correctness of the Champagne

Heidsieck case has been accepted by leading textbook authors -see, e.g., Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, 12th

ed., para 14-29; and Halbury's Laws of England, 4th ed., vol

48, para 94 which refers to "the self-evident principle that there should be no infringement by use on the 'genuine goods'". It may be as well also to remember 'that' the Champagne Heid-

sieck case was by no means an isolated one. Although

there was no previoue case directly in point, the judgment

in the Champagne Heidsieck

case

62

case followed the general trend of English law as repre-sented by the authorities quoted in the judgment at pp. 340-1, viz., Singer Manufacturing Co. v Loog (1880) 18 Ch D 395 at 412; Edwards v Dennis (1885) 30 Ch. D 454 at 478 and Bow v Hart (1905) 1 KB 592 at 593 and 594 (questions put during argument by ROMER L.J.).

The authority of the Champagne Heidsieck case ac- cording to the law of England, must therefore, in my view, be accepted. Moreover, the reasoning and conclusion of CLAÚSON J seem to me, with respect, lucid and convincing. In South Africa the common law and pre-Union statute law did not differ in any material respect from that of England. I consider, therefore, that the judgment in the Champagne

Heidsieck

63
Heidsieck case also correctly reflects the law in all the provinces of the Union of South Africa prior to the pro-mulgation of Act 9 of 1916.

The South African Act of 1916 followed British models in many respects. Thus the definition of a trade mark in sec. 98 of the Act of 1916 is practically iden-tical to that in the 1905 British Act which I have quoted above, and which was considered in the Champagne Heidsieck case (supra) in a passage which I have also quoted. Con-cerning the rights of the proprietor, the South African Act followed the 1905 British Act and previous legislation by providing that registration would be prima facie evidence of the proprietor's right to the exclusive use of the trade mark,

and

64
and, after a period (in this case seven years), conclusive
evidence of such right (sec 123).Where the Act broke new
ground was by making specific provision for infringement.

This was done in sec. 125 which originally read as follows

(in so far as relevant for present purposes):

"The rights acquired by registration of a trade mark shall be deemed to be infringed

by the use, in respect of the goods in

respect of which it is registered, of a mark substantially identical with the trade mark or so nearly resembling it as tó be likely to deceive."

It will be convenient to defer discussion of this provision until I have completed my survey of the relevant ' legislation.

The next statute to be dealt with requires some ex-

planation ......

65

planation, but has no direct bearing on the present issue. This

was the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Amendment Act, no

19 of 1947, which introduced the concept of a"registered user"

of a trade mark. For this purpose it inserted, inter alia,

a new sec. 131 bis into the 1916 Act. In terms of sec. 131

bis (2) the expression "permitted use" was defined, broadly,

as the use of a trade mark by a registered user. The defi-

nition of infringement in sec. 125 was correspondingly amended

by inserting the expression "(other than permitted use)" so

that the section read:

"...shall be infringed by use, (other than permitted use) ..."

"Permitted use" thus had a technical meaning, but I

should emphasize that consent was always a good defence to

an

66

an action for infringement, i.e., it was a good defence to show that the act which was alleged to constitute infringe-ment, was done with the consent of the trade mark proprietor. This was not stated in the various statutes, but followed from the general principle of law expressed in the maxim volenti non fit iniuria. (See Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, 12 th ed., para 15-44; Webster and Page, South African Law of Trade Marks, 3rd ed., p. 271; Halsbury's Laws of England 4th ed., vol. 48, para 94). Since we are not concerned in this appeal with registered users, the amend-ment in 1947 takes the matter no further.

Before coming to the 1963 Trade Marks Act I have to

mention the English case of Irving's Yeast-Vite Limited v F.A.

Horsenail (1934) 51 RPC 110 (HL) to which I made passing re-

ference earlier in this judgment. In that case the defendant

had used the plaintiff's registered trade mark Yeast-Vite by

stating that the defendant's product was "a substitute for

'Yeast-Vite'". This

was

67
was held by the House of Lords not to be an infringement

under the 1905 British Act because the mark was not used as a trade
mark, i.e., it was not used upon or in connection with goods

for the purpose of indicating that they were the goods of the

proprietor of the trade mark. This decision showed that a

trade mark proprietor needed protection not only where his
mark was unlawfully used as a trade mark, but also where it

was used for other purposes such as comparison.

To meet this need the South African Trade Marks Act

no 62 of 1963, provided a new extended definition of infringe-

ment. Sec 44 (1), as originally promulgated, read as fol-

lows(in so far as relevant):

"... the rights acquired by registration of a trade mark shall be deemëd to be infringed by -

(a) .

68

(a) unauthorized use as a trade mark upon or in

relation to goods in respect of
which the trade mark is registered, of the

identical trade mark or of a trade mark so nearly

resembling it as to be likely to deceive or
cause confusion; or

(b) unauthorized use in the course of trade,

whether as a trade mark or not, of the iden-
tical trade mark or of a trade mark so nearly re-sembling it as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion, if such use is in relation
to or in connection with goods for which the trade mark is registered and is likely to cause injury or prejudice to the proprietor of the trade mark."

It seems clear that sub-sec. (b) was inspired by the

Yeast-Vite case, and served to extend the concept of in-

fringement beyond the mere use of the mark as a trade mark.

The effect of sub-sec. (b) in its original formulation was,

however, that trade mark infringement could be committed in

this extended sense by the use of a mark "whether

as
69

as a trade mark or not". Unlawful use of a mark as a trade
mark could thus fall under either sub-sec. (a) or (b). See
the Dan River case (supra) at pp. 703 C - 704 A. After the

decision in the Dan River case, and presumably as a result

thereof, the section was amended by Act 46 of 1971 to make it

clear that sub-sec. (a) applied to the use of a trade mark as

a trade mark, and sub-sec. (b) only to use otherwise than as

a trade mark. The section then read as follows (I quote it

in full because it is the relevant text for purposes of the

present appeal):

"...the rights acquired by registration of a trade mark shall be infringed by -(a) unauthorized use as a trade mark in relation to goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered, of

a

70

a mark so nearly resembling it as to be like- ly to deceive or cause confusion; or (b) unauthorized use in the course of trade, otherwise than as a trade mark, of a mark so nearly resembling it as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion, if such use is in relation to or in connection with goods

or services for which the trad'e mark is
registered and is likely to cause injury or prejudice to the proprietor of the trade mark."

In passing it should be noted that the reference to
the "identical mark" was also removed by Act 46 of 1971 from
sub-secs. (a) and (b). Mr. Hodes, who appeared for the re-
spondent in the present case, contended that, as a result of

this deletion, unlawful use of the identical trade mark (as

distinct from use of a colourable imitation) would no longer

constitute infringement. In order not to extend an already

long
71 long judgment I would say only that I agree entirely with the
following passage from the judgment of this Court in Berman
Brothers (Pty) Ltd v Sodastream Ltd & Another 1986(3) SA
209 (A) at p 232 H to 233 A:

"Originally s 44 (1) spoke of:

'the unauthorized use ... of the identical

trade mark or of a trade mark so nearly
resembling ...

This was the wording in paras (a) and (b). For some reason, obscure tome, the words 'of the identical trade mark or' were de-leted in both paragraphs by s 21(a) of Act 46 of 1971. Presumably it was thought that if the mark used by the infringer was the identical mark it would necessarily be a mark so nearly resembling as to be likely to deceive or confuse. Obviously it was never the intention to exclude from the ambit of infringement the use of the iden-tical mark (cf remarks of Chowles and Webster The South African Law of Trade Marks 2nd ed at 98). I think that this amendment

is

72

is an unfortunate one and not conducive

to clarity; and I would hope that when the

Act is again amended the deleted words be

restored. At all events, the unauthorized

use of the identical mark must, in my view,

be regarded as falling under s 44(l).(a)."

I cannot accept Mr Hodes's contention that this passage L ,.
was wrong and should be reconsidered.

I revert now to the distinction between use of a mark as a trade mark, and use of a mark otherwise than as a trade mark. "Trade mark" is defined in sec. 2 of the 1963 Act as: .

:.... a mark used or proposed to

be used in relation to goods or services for the purpose of -
(a) indicating a connection in the course of trade between the goods or services and

some person having the right, either as pro-prietor or as a registered user, to use the

mark

73

mark, whether with or without any indi-

cation of the identity of that person; and

(b) distinguishing the goods or services

in relation to which the mark is used or

proposed to be used, from the same kind

of goods or services connected in the

course of trade with any other person."

In the present case it is clear that the mark Pentax
was placed on the cameras in guestion for the purpose of

indicating a connection between the cameras and the proprietor

of the mark, Asahi, and to distinguish these cameras from

those connected in the course of trade with any other per-

son. The respondent, on the face of it, is by selling

cameras bearing the mark Pentax using the

mark for the same purpose , i.e., of indicating a connection

between the cameras and Asahi, and distinguishing them from

cameras
74
cameras manufactured by others. This appears to be the
literal meaning of sub-sec.(l). I return later to certain
contentions adduced in this respect. So as not to inter-
rupt my chain of reasoning I would emphasize at this stage
that the type of use with which we are here concerned is
use "as a trade mark". Even if it were held that use of a

trade mark on "genuine goods" could not amount to infringe-

ment, such use would still, as a matter of language, be use

as a trade mark, and could not constitute use "otherwise than

as a trade mark". We are accordingly dealing with the use

to which reference is made in sub-sec. (a), and not with 'the

extended type of infringement dealt with in sub-sec. (b).

In short, the question before us is whether the concept of

infringing use of a trade mark as a trade mark has been ex-

tended in South African legislation beyond that described in

the Champagne Heidsieck case (supra).

The

75

The most noticeable changes in the South African legislation were, for present purposes, the following. The 1916 Act, while retaining the provisions recognizing the pro-prietor's exclusive right to the use of the trade mark, added a provision deeming the use of the mark (or a colourable imitation thereof) to be an infringement. The Act of 1963

went further by deleting reference to the proprietor's ex-clusive right altogether, and limiting itself to defining infringement as unauthorized use of the mark (or a colourable imitation thereof) as a trade mark. These changes do not appear to be of significance - the legislature has continued to use expressions which have been current in this branch of the law for a long time to express substantially the same

concepts
76 concepts. Even before the British Act of 1875 it was recog-nized that the right of a trade mark proprietor was essentially a right to prevent "anybody else from selling wares, which are not those manufactured by the plaintiff, with that trade mark". (Vide the passage quoted from Farina v Silverlock (supra). This position remained unchanged after the British

Act of 1905, as appears from the italicized portion of the above quotation from the Champagne Heidsieck case (supra), at pp. 338-9, where the proprietor's right of exclusive use is defined as "the right ... of preventing others from sel-ling wares which are not his marked with the trade mark." Notionally it does not therefore seem to matter whether the trade mark proprietor's right is described as the right to

the

77

the exclusive use of the mark as a trade mark, or whether it is described as the right to prevent others from using it as a trade mark. It has also been recognized in our case law that the trade mark proprietor's exclusive right to the
use of the trade mark is still implicit in the 1963 Act, al-though explicit reference to it has been deleted. See the

Dan River case (supra)at p. 706 D and John Craig (Pty) Ltd v Dupa Clothing Industries (Pty) Ltd 1977(3) SA 144 (T) at p. 150 B.

The essential question then remains: what is meant by the words "use" of a mark "as a trade mark" in the context of sec. 44(1)(a) of the Act? In their full and literal meaning it seems to me, the words "use as a trade mark" would

be

78
be wide enough to cover the facts of the present case. As I have indicated above, a trader who advertises and sells goods marked with their trade marks clearly, in my view, makes use of the trade mark as a trade mark. On a literal meaning of the words used in sec.(l)(a) of the Act, this use (if unauthorized, a matter to which I return later) would

then constitute an infringement even if the trade marked goods

emanated from, and were marked by,or with the consent of, the trade mark proprietor himself. If this were its correct interpretation, the 1963 Act(or, possibly, the 1916 Act) would have effected a dramatic change in principles of trade mark law which had been long established in this country and

in

79

in England. And, what is more, it would have effected
such a change by using language which is not notionally dis-
tinguishable from that found in earlier legislation, both
here and in England; and which had been interpreted to em-
body only the traditional concept of infringement.

The onlý substantial change in sec. 44(1)(a) was the

introduction of the word "unauthorized". This change also

must be seen in its historical context, which I repeat

briefly. It will be recalled that, according to common

law, the consent of the trade mark proprietor was a good

defence to an action for infringement, and earlier legisla-

tion took this for granted, making no specific provision

for it. When the concept of a "registered user" was intro-

duced

80

duced into the 1916 Act, "permitted use", being use by a registered user, was excluded from conduct which would other-wise have constituted an infringement. This did not, how-ever, derogate from the defence of consent. In the 1963 Act use by a registered user was expressly dealt with in sec 48 (see particularly sub-sec. (2)) and there was no need to make provision for it in sec. 44. One must therefore accept that the word "unauthorized" in sec. 44(1)(a) was not intended to cater specifically for use by a registered user, although

it might cover it. Why then was it introduced? In argu-

ment the following suggestion was made. Use of a trade mark

in terms of sec. 44(1)(a) included, so it was said, use by a

trader who sold genuine goods with the trade mark properly

affixed
81 affixed to it. The word "unauthorized" then serves to mitigate the unwelcome results that would ensue if such use were prima facie to be regarded as an infringement, by recognizing that, if the proprietor authorized such use, no infringement would result. Indeed, it was argued, by in- ferring implied authorization on the part of the proprietor

in various circumstances, many anomalies would be avoided

which would otherwise flow from the recognition of this ex-tended view of infringing use,(cf.Webster and Page, op cit, at p. 274).

In my view this argument cannot prevail. The word "unauthorized" in its ordinary meaning does not add anything to what was the common law, except that it might affect the

onus

82
onus of proving authorization or lack thereof. Whatever the kind of use might be which would prima facie amount to in-fringement, authorization would serve to render it lawful. , The introduction of the word "unauthorized" can, therefore, throw no light on what the conduct is which would be unlawful in the absence of authorization, except possibly in one type-of case. This would be where there are two or more possible types of conduct which could be covered by the prohibition in the section, but for some reason there is only one which is capable of authorization. If this were so, the use of the word "unauthorized" might suggest that the prohibition related to the conduct which was capable of authorization ra-ther than to conduct which was not so capable. This situation

does

83
does not, however, obtain in the present case. It is true that at one stage there was a view current that the granting of permission to another to use (otherwise than as a registered user) a trade mark on his goods would vitiate the trade mark on the grounds that public deception would result. Even if this were correct, of course, the fact that permission

had been granted would nevertheless still have been a good de-

fence to an action for infringement, and the reference to "unauthorized" in sec. 44(1)(a) would not be a dead letter. However, the law was clarified in the case of the "Bostitch" Trade Mark (1963) RPC 183 (Ch.), from which it appears that the test whether the proprietor of a trade mark has affected its validity by authorizing its use by another person is the

following

84

following, whether or not such other person is a registered

user (p. 197 lines 11-13):

"The test ... is ... this:

has he authorized such use of the mark as to deprive it of its very existence, namely, as a mark which should distinguish his goods from the goods of the makers."

If this is good law (and it has been accepted as correct in

England - see Webster and Page (supra), at p. 225, Kerly's

Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (supra) para 13.24) there

would be greater scope for the word "unauthorized" in sec.

44(1)(a).

To sum up, there does not appear to be any obvious

reason

85 reason why the word "unauthorized" was introduced in sec. 44 (l)(a) (see also the Dan River case (supra) at p. 705 E-P) but whatever the reason may be, its introduction does not create any redundancy or absurdity, nor, in my view, does it throw any light on the meaning of the rest of the section. And the consideration that one might, by an interpretation or

application of the word "unauthorized" remove some of the

anomalies which would follow from the interpretation of sec. 44 (l)(a) espoused by the appellant, would fall away if an inter-

pretation consonant with the judgment in the Champagne Heidsieck case were

accepted

since this interpretation would not give rise to the anomalies

in the first place. Moreover, if the legislature's purpose

had been to change the very nature of trade mark infringement

by

86

by sec. 44(1)(a), the legislature would hardly have done so by introducing the word "unauthorized", which on the face of it does no more than express a well established rule of law.
The appellant placed some reliance on the Dan River case (supra), and I must now deal with it. In that case the respondent was a textile manufacturer in the United States of America. It sold its materials in many parts of the world to manufacturers. When doing so it also provided tags and labels bearing the "Dan River" trade mark for use in connection with garments made from Dan River materials. This trade mark was registered both in respect of materials and in respect of garments. In South Africa, Dan River

materials

87

materials were sold to only two wholesale merchants and only selected manufacturers were allowed to obtain Dan River fabrics. The appellants, who were not on the re-spondent's selected list of manufacturers, managed to obtain Dan River fabrics and labels. They then manufactured gar-ments from the Dan River materials and sold them with the . Dan River labels sewn into them. It was clear that the re- spondent had not agreed to this, but, in fact was strongly opposed thereto. The question was whether this was an in-fringement of sec. 44(1) of the 1963 Act. In its judgment (at pp. 703-4) this Court stressed that sec. 44(1) of the 1963 Act had deliberately departed from the earlier view as exemplified by the Yeast-Vite case (supra), that there could be no infringement unless the infringer used the mark "as

a
88

a trade mark".. The legislature consequently designedly |

distinguished, in relation to infringement, between use

"as a trade mark" and other uses. This distinction was reflected in secs. 44(1)(a) and 44(1)(b) and was "underscored by the specific inclusion in the latter section of the ex-pression 'whether as a trade mark or not " (p. 704 A). This

expression, it will be recalled, no longer appears in the
Act. Sec. 44(1)(b) now applies to use "otherwise than as a trade mark".
To return to the judgment in the Dan River case: the Court then proceeded to consider whether the respondent had established infringement pursuant to se. 44(1)(b) of the Act. For this purpose it was unnecessary to decide whether
the

89
the appellants had used the mark as a trade mark or not, since sub-sec. (b) would have applied in any event. The Court held that infringement pursuant to sub-sec. (b) had been established.

For present purposes the importance of the Dan River case lay in the finding that use of a mark as a trade mark fell under sec. 44(1)(b) (as it then read) even if this entailed a , departure from the law as laid down in the Champagne Heidsieck case (supra). The Court was influenced in reaching this conclusion by the circumstances that sec. 44(1)(b) was designedly introduced to widen the concept of trade mark in-fringement, and that it applied to use whether as a trade mark or not. The latter is no longer true: use of a mark

as

90

as a trade mark can now be an infringement only under sec. 44(1)(a) which is no wider than the previous enactments which it superseded. It follows that the Dan River case (supra) is not applicable to the Act as it is now worded.

To sum up although the expression "use as a trade mark" is, in its ordinary meaning, wide enough to cover the sale of genuine goods marked with the trade mark of the pro- prietor, this expression had a well-established meaning in the common law and in earlier legislation in the context of infringement, viz., to connote only use in respect of goods other than what have been called genuine goods. If it had been the intention of the legislature to change the essential nature of trade mark infringement in this respect,

it
91 it would no doubt have used explicit language in this regard, as was, indeed, done in the extension of trade mark protectión by sub-sec. 44(1)(b). And I do not think the introduction of the word "unauthorized" could have effected such a change.

It is a well established principle of construction that in construing a statutory provision the object should be to ascertain from the language employed the intention which the _ legislature meant to express. See Ebrahim v Minister of the Interior 1977(1) SA 665 (A) at 677-8, and authorities there cited. In ascertaining this intention, regard is to be had both to the language of the enactment and to the context, using this word in a wide sense (ibid). See also Jaga v Dönges N O & Another; Bhana v Dönges N 0 and Another 1950(4)

SA

92

SA 653 (AD) at pp. 662 G - 664 H). However, it has often been laid down that, where the language of a statute is unambiguous, and its meaning is clear, the Court may only depart from such meaning "if it would lead to absurdity so glaring that it could never have been contemplated by the ' ' legislature, or where it would lead to a result contrary to the intention of the legislature, as shown by-the context or by such other considerations as the Court is justified in taking into account". (Ibid., Venter v R 1907 TS 910 at 914, Shenker v The Master & Another 1936 AD 136 at p. 142). Among the factors which the Court is justified in taking into account are "the matter of statute, its apparent scope and pur-pose" (Jaga v Donges (supra) and the history ,of the statute,

with ,

93

with particular reference to the presumption against any furhter alteration of current law than that clearly con-veyed by the statute under consideration (Rose's Car Hire (Pty) Ltd v Grant 1948(2) SA 466 (A) at pp. 471-2; President
Insurance Co Ltd v Yu Kwam 1963(3) SA 766 (A) at p. 781 B-C;

Estate Agents Board v Lek 1979(3) SA 1048 at p. 1062 D-H; G.E. case (supra), at p. 325 line 24-31).

Applying these principles I have no doubt that, in view of the historical background, the intention of the legislature was that the expression "use as a trade mark" in sec. 44(1)(a) of the Act should be interpreted to exclude usé in respect of so-called genuine goods. This means that in a case like the present, the

seller

94

seller of goods is not infringing the manufacturer's trade
mark for the simple reason that the seller's conduct is
not covered by sec. 44(1)(a). The lawfulness of the sel-

ler's conduct consequently does not depend on any implied

authority by the trade mark proprietor as was argued on behalf. of the appellant.

The conclusion reached above concerning the ambit of sec.

44(l)(a) accords with that reached by various other courts in this. country. Apart from the Court a quo in the present matter, substantially the same view was expressed by O'DONOVAN J in Sodastream Ltd & Another v Berman Brothers (Pty) Ltd 1984(4) SA 425 (T) at p. 429 F-I (this point was left open in the judgment on appeal - vide Berman Brothers v Sodastream Ltd and Another (supra) at p. 233 C-D) and by PAGE J in the

unreported
94 A unreported decision of Frank & Hirsch (Pty) Ltd v Roopanand Brothers (D&C) delivered on 21 March 1986, a judgment which I found very helpful. The judgment in Sony Kabushiki Kaisha and Another v Television Radio Centre (Pty) Ltd, TPD, unre-ported, delivered 20 September 1985, suggests a contrary view. To the extent to which it differs from what I have said I think it was wrongly decided.

There

95

There are a few arguments that I must still deal with.
Mr. Hodes, on behalf of the respondent, contended that use of

a mark as a trade mark necessarily entailed

"... an association with the goods in the course of their production and preparation for the marKet."

Consequently, he arqued, the sale of trade marked goods by a

trader after the goods had reached the market could not a-

mount to use as a trade mark. For this proposition he re-

lied on the above-quoted words, which may be found in the

speech of LORD MACMILLAN in Aristoc Ld. v Rysta Ld (1945) 62

RPC 65 (HL) at 79-80, and which were quoted with approval

by NICHOLAS AJA in Esquire Electronics Ltd v Executive Video

1986(2) SA 576 (A) at 587 F-H. These words must however be

read
96 read secundum materiam suam. In neither case did the Court consider the question whether a trade mark is "used" by a trader who sells goods with the mark affixed. The Aristoc case was concerned wi.th a mark which was affixed to the ar-ticles by the person who repaired them after they had reached the hands of the ultimate consumer. such a mark was held not to be a trade mark. And the passage in question was quoted in the Esquire Electronics case (supra) as an illus-tration of the proposition that a trade mark is a "badge of origin". These cases, and the proposition stated in them-are consequently not in point for present purposes.

Then he contended - on the authority of Wistyn Enter-prises (Pty) Ltd v Levi Strauss & Co. & Another 1986(4) SA

796

97
796 (T) - that to the extent that the mark is being used as a trade mark when the goods are resold, such use is not use by the seller of the goods, but is continued use by the pro-prietor of the mark. Wistyn's case is no authority for counsel's submission. In brief, the case dealt with the situation where an overseas manufacturer is the registered proprietor of a South African trade mark, but does not itself trade in this country, and goods manufactured and marked by the overseas manufacturer are imported into South Africa by a middleman and retailed here.

The question which arose was whether in these circum-stances there was bona fide use of the trade mark by the proprietor so as to avoid expungement in terms of sec. 36(1) (b) of the Act. The Court held that there was. Assuming

that
97 A

that the proprietor does use the trade mark in these circumstances, this would npt mean that the dealer who sells the marked articles is not also using the mark. There is nothing anomalous in recognizing that different persons may

concurrently
98
concurrently úse the same mark in different ways.
This concludes my consideration of the contention that the respondent committed an infringement of Asahi's trade mark by selling cameras marked with the mark Pentax. For the reasons I have given I consider that the sale of the "genuine goods", properly marked by or on behalf of Asahi with its mark, does not constitute an infringement of the trade mark. Before leaving the topic, I must, however, , emphasize two matters. The first is that the articles (in this case, cameras) which were sold were in exactly the same condition as they were when the trade mark was affixed. I do not express any view on what the position would have been if the articles had been altered, damaged, changed or had

depreciated

99

depreciated after the affixing of the trade mark and before their sale by the respondent.
The second point that I would emphasize is that in the present case it was the proprietor of the trade mark in South Africa,Asahi, which itself had affixed the trade mark to the cameras, or caused it to be affixed. The cameras. which the respondent sold in this country were accordingly cameras to which the South African trade mark proprietor had applied the mark, and in that sense were "genuine goods". The result would not necessarily be the same if the mark had been applied by a person who was not the proprietor of the mark in South Africa, such as a foreign licensee (cf. Castrol Limited v Automotive Oil Supplies Limited (1983) RPC 315).

I
100
I also expsess no view on the rights of a registered user
in this context.

In view of my conclusion that the respondent has not

been guilty of trade mark infringement vis-a-vis Asahi it

is not necessary to decide whether, if such infringement had

been shown, this would in the circumstances have amounted to unlawful competition with the appellant.
The result then is that I agree with the finding of the Court a quo. The appeal is dismissed with costs in-cluding the costs of two counsel.

E M GROSSKOPF, JA CORBETT, JA

HOEXTER, JA NESTADT, JA Concur

NICHOLAS, AJA

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