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[1987] ZASCA 53
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S v Njilo (551/86) [1987] ZASCA 53 (26 May 1987)
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1987-05- 26
Case no 551/86
MC
Of SOUTH AFRICA
GRRALD ZINBONILE NJILO and
THE STATE
VIVIER JA.
Case No 551/86
MC
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (APPELLATE DIVISION)
In the matter between
GERALD ZINBONILE NJILO Appellant
- and -
THE STATE Respondent
Coram: HEFER, SMALBERGER et VIVIER JJA.
Heard: 22 May 1987. Delivered: 26 MAY 1987.
JUDGMENT
VIVIER JA :-
The appellant was convicted by LAW J and two
assessors /
2.
assessors in the Circuit Local Division for the Southern
District of
the Natal Provincial Division of murder and
of robbery with aggravating
circumstances. On the
charge of murder no extenuating circumstances
were
found and the appellant was sentenced to death. On
the charge of
robbery the appellant was sentenced to
7 years' imprisonment. With the leave
of the trial
Judge he appeals to this Court against the finding that
there
were no extenuating circumstances and the sentence
of death imposed upon
him.
The body of the deceased, a 74 year old
man, was discovered during the afternoon of 31 May 1986
in a sugar cane field near Umzinto next to the road between Umzinto and Shayamoya township
where /
3. where the deceased lived. He had been strangled with his own
belt which was tied tightly around his neck. His underpants, trousers,
shoes,
woollen cap and wrist watch which he was wearing when he left his home earlier
that day, were missing and he was dressed only
in a shirt and khaki jacket. A
post-mortem examination of the body revealed that the deceased had died of
strangulation. The pressure
applied by the belt had caused bleeding into the
muscles of the neck, bruising of the larynx and a fracture of the thyroid
bone.
At the time of his arrest a few days later, the appellant was wearing
some of the deceased's missing items of clothing. When brought
before a
magistrate in terms of sec 119 of Act 51 of 1977, and again in his evidence at
the trial,
he /
4. he admitted assaulting the deceased by hitting him on the throat
with his fist and leaving him lying unconscious at the scene where
the
deceased's body was later found. He also admitted taking the deceased's wrist
watch and the said items of clothing. According
to the record of the proceedings
in the magistrate's Court,the appellant there admitted that he had throttled the
deceased while
the latter was on the ground, but at the trial he denied that he
had said so in the magistrate's Court and he denied that he had
throttled the
deceased. He then gave the following version of what had happened between him
and the deceased. He said that at the
beginning of May 1986 the deceased
borrowed R20 from him, promising to pay him back the following week.
When /
5. When he asked for his money, the deceased denied owing him any
money. At about 11 am on the day in question, he went from Umzinto
to Shayamoya
to look for the deceased. He was told that the deceased was not at home. On his
way back, he met the deceased who was
going home. He asked the deceased for his
money but the latter refused to pay him. The deceased drew a stick and struck
him on the
side of the body. He punched the deceased on the chest and they
grappled. They fell to the ground and got up again. He punched the
deceased on
the throat. The deceased fell down and lay still. He picked up a plastic bag
containing clothing which the deceased had
been carrying as well as the
deceased's wrist watch
which /
6. which had landed on the ground, intending to keep the
deceased's belongings until such time as he had been paid his money.
The
appellant's version was rejected as false by the trial Court, which held that
the appellant attacked the deceased with the intention
of robbing him of his
possessions and that he deliberately killed him in order to avoid
identification. The trial Court found that
the appellant took the said items of
clothing from the deceased's body.
On behalf of the appellant two facts or
circumstances were relied upon as constituting exten= uating circumstances: that
he acted
under the influence
of /
7. of liquor and that there was an absence of premeditation. Both
these factors were raised at the trial. In its judgment on the question
of
extenuating circumstances, the trial Court referred in detail to the appellant's
evidence regarding the amount of liquor he had
consumed on the day in question,
and the effect this had on him. He said that he started drinking juba at about 5
am and continued
until about 11 am. He was in the company of other people and
could not say how much he drank himself. The liquor affected him to
the extent
that he could not remember certain things. That afternoon he fell asleep on the
bus. In its judgment the trial Court found
that the appellant's evidence was
not
truthful /
8.
truthful and that he exaggerated the amount of liguor
he had
consumed. The trial Court accepted that the
appellant may have consumed juba
on the day in question,
and concluded:
"We are of the view that it has not been established on a balance of probability that the accused was intoxicated and that intoxication had a bearing on his state of mind in doing what he did."
With regard to the absence of premeditation,
the
trial Court held that, although the appellant might
not have planned the
attack before he encountered the
deceased, the killing was not a reflex
action committed
on the spur of the moment, but was a deliberate,
cal=
culated act.
Counsel /
9. Counsel for the appellant conceded that the appellant was
an untruthful witness in regard to the quantity of liquor he had consumed
prior
to the murder. He submitted, however, that the trial Court over-emphasised the
fact that the appellant had lied and failed
to make sufficient allowance for the
possibility that the appellant lied because he was illiterate and
unsophisticated. I am unable
to agree that the trial Court placed too much
emphasis on the appellant's untruthfulness. Apart from his own evidence, there
was
no other evidence of any kind before the trial Court on which to base a
finding that the appellant acted under the influence of liquor.
The /
10. The manner in which the appellant killed the deceased and
robbed him of his possessions, certainly did not in any way suggest
that he was
acting under the influence of alcohol. Consequently the appellant's case that he
acted under the influence of alcohol
rested entirely on his own evidence. And
that was so clearly untruthful that it was correctly rejected by the trial
Court.
Counsel for the appellant next submitted that the trial Court
misdirected itself in not regarding the absence of premeditation as
an
extenuating circumstance. As I read the trial Court's judgment on this aspect,
it found that, although the appellant might not
have formed the plan to rob and
kill the deceased before he
encountered /
11.
encountered the deceased, the murder was a calculated, deliberate act,
committed in order to avoid identifi= cation. For this reason
the trial Court
did not regard the fact that the appellant had not planned to kill the deceased
before he encountered the deceased,
as an extenuating circumstance. In my view
the trial Court did not misdirect itself in coming to this conclusion, nor is it
one to
which no reasonable Court could have come.
In my view there are no
grounds for interfering with the finding of the trial Court that there are no
extenuating circumstances. The
appeal is dismissed.
W. VIVIER JA.
HEFER JA ) Concur. SMALBERGER JA)