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[2006] ZAGPHC 30
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National Director of Public Prosecutions v Naidoo and Others (34752/2019) [2006] ZAGPHC 30; 2006 (2) SACR 403 (T) (10 April 2006)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(TRANSVAAL PROVINCIAL DIVISION)
REPORTABLE
CASE NO.: 25395/04
In the matter between:
DATE: 10/4/2006
THE NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Applicant
and
KEVIN NAIDOO
1st Defendant
SELVARANI GOVENDER
2nd Defendant
VIJAYANRAKUMAR NAIDOO 3rd Defendant
RAJAN NAIDOO
4th Defendant
EBRAHIM MAHAMED HOOSAN
5th Defendant
HAWA HOOSAN
6th Defendant
TASNEEM BISMILLA
7th Defendant
ZIYAAD MOOSA BISMILLA
8th Defendant
TERENCE RHYS JAMES
9th Defendant
ANDRE JOHAN WEPENER
10th Defendant
NADINE WEPENER
11th Defendant
SEAN STANFORD
12th Defendant
BRONWYN STANFORD
13th Defendant
WEPELEC TRADING CC 14th Defendant REGAN MARK CARTER 15th Defendant
UTILITY RESOURCES CC
16th Defendant
MICHAEL RICHARD LISTER GLOVER
17th Defendant
DAVID BARRY FINK
18th Defendant
HENDRICK LOURENS JACOB BOEKHOUD
19th Defendant
JUST REFINERS AND TECHNOLOGIES LTD UK
20th Defendant
JUST REFINERS AND TECHNOLOGIES SA (PTY) LTD
21st Defendant
AEROTRADE NO. 62 (PTY) LTD
22nd Defendant
SUBITHRY JACOBA NAIDOO
1st Respondent
DOLLY NAIDOO
2nd Respondent
ZAHEEDA HOOSAN
3rd Respondent
MOHAMED EBRAHIM HOOSAN
4th Respondent
HILLARY YEAMAN JAMES
5th Respondent
ELIZABETH HERMINE CARTER
6th Respondent
NOCOLA DAGMAR GLOVER
7th Respondent
BEVERLY GALE FINK
8th Respondent
BEVERLY YEAMAN BOEKHOUD
9th Respondent
SHAELIN RESOURCES CC
10th Respondent
JUSTSTAT AND PRINTING CC 11th Respondent
TRADE PROPERTY VENTURES NO 9 CC
12th Respondent
ERF TWO NINE SEVEN PAGEVIEW CC 13th Respondent
ARM SYSTEM INVESTMENT CC
14th Respondent
STANMET METAL PROCESSORS CC 15th Respondent
PTN 55 OF ERF 129 ORIEL CC
16th Respondent
STAND 79 BASSONIA CC 17th Respondent
LETAMO LA KGOTSO PROPERTIES CC
18th Respondent
MUTHALL MOTORS CC
19th Respondent
FAMILY CASH AND CARRY CC
20th Respondent
MIDLAND LIVESTOCK SALES CC
21st Respondent
VIJRAND CC
22nd Respondent
THE TRUSTEE(S) OF THE BIG JOHN TRUST NO
(in his/her/their capacity as trustees of the Big John Trust)
23rd Respondent
J U D G M E N T
RABIE J:
This is the extended return day of a rule nisi granted by this Court on 1 October 2004 in terms of section 26(3)(a) of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 121 of 1998 (as amended)
(hereinafter “the Act”). This provisional restraint order was granted ex parte and operated with immediate effect. The order was lengthy and contained detailed provisions which are not necessary to repeat at
this point. Twenty two defendants were cited as persons or entities who stood to be prosecuted and another twenty three respondents
were cited as persons or entities who allegedly hold an interest in or are in possession of realisable property that the applicant
sought to restrain and who may therefore be affected by the restraint order sought. The defendants and the respondents were, in terms
of the provisional order, inter alia, prohibited from disposing or dealing in any manner with any of the realisable property held or controlled by them and two curatores bonis were appointed to take possession of all such property pending the finalization of an application for a confiscation order in terms
of section 18 of the Act.
The Parties Before the Court:
The founding papers filed by the applicant comprise 500 pages. Certain of the defendants
and respondents filed answering papers and some filed substantive applications. Some did not file answering papers. In response the
applicant filed a so-called consolidated reply in respect of some defendants and respondents and in respect of other parties the
applicant filed additional replying papers relating more particularly to such parties. The applicant stressed, however, that there
is in reality one application before the court and that all the documentation should be read in conjunction. The papers mentioned
thus far comprise almost 6 000 pages. Added thereto are two separate applications. The first is the so-called Twoline Trading 87
(Pty)Ltd application which had its origin in the Witwatersrand Local Division and the so-called Govender application. Both these
applications relate to the issues in question and were placed before this court for adjudication.
The Papers Before the Court:
For practical purposes and reasons of convenience the applicant divided the papers
before the Court by grouping certain interest groups together. The founding papers were contained in a bundle marked “Main
Application”. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants were grouped together as group C. This group filed an answering affidavit and also launched a constitutional attack on
the provisions of the Act. The 1st defendant did not, however, file an answering affidavit on the merits of the application. The answering papers of the 4th defendant was regarded as the “A(b) Application”. The answering papers of the 5th to the 8th defendants were grouped together as the “E Application”. The 9th defendant’s papers was contained in a bundle marked “H Application”. The applicant replied to the so-called A(b),
E and H applications in a consolidated reply contained in three files paginated from page 1 to 1260. The 10th to the 14th defendants did not file answering papers. The answering papers of the 15th and the 16th defendants and a reply thereto were contained in a bundle marked “D Application”. The answering papers of the 17th and 18th defendants were contained in a bundle marked “B Application”. The answering papers of the 19th to 22nd defendants and a reply thereto were contained in a bundle marked “F Application”. The 2nd respondent and certain other persons joined in a substantive application in anticipation of the return day in which application,
inter alia, the release of certain restrained property was sought. This application and the answer and reply thereto was contained in a bundle
referred to as the “A Application”.
During the course of the two week-long hearing of this application some of the defendants
and respondents reached settlement agreements with the applicant which settlement agreements were made orders of court. I shall refer
to them in the order that they were made. In terms of the order marked “X1", the rule nisi was confirmed against 10th to 14th defendant and 15th respondent. In terms of the order marked “X2", an order was made in respect of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th defendant and 1st, 3rd, 4th, 10th 13th, 17th, 19th 20th, 21st and 22nd respondent. The order, inter alia, confirmed the rule nisi in certain specific terms. In terms of the order marked “X3", the rule nisi was confirmed against 17th and 18th defendant and 8th respondent subject to certain variations. In terms of the order marked “X4", the rule nisi was extended against 15th and 16th defendant and 6th respondent subject to the said defendants and respondent complying with certain provisions of the order. In terms of the order marked
“X5", the rule nisi was confirmed against 4th defendant and 2nd, 18th and 23rd respondent and certain additional orders were made. The order marked “X6" related to the aforesaid “A Application”
launched by the 2nd Respondent and certain other persons and entities. The order, inter alia, declared certain assets to be subject to the restraint order and others not. The order marked “X7", related to the aforesaid
application by Twoline Trading 87 (Pty)Ltd. The order declared the property of this company to be subject to the restraint order
in terms of the rule nisi and certain additional orders were made. The order marked “X8" also related to the aforesaid “A Application”
launched by the 2nd Respondent and certain other persons and entities. The orders marked “X9" and “X10" related to the Govender
Application and settled that application.
The Remaining Parties:
The effect of the aforesaid orders was that the only remaining parties in respect
of which this court had to adjudicate the application, were the 9th defendant (referred to in the H Application), the 19th to the 22nd defendants (referred to in the F Application), and the 5th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 14th and 16th respondents. These respondents are related to the aforesaid defendants. Although this judgment would, therefore, in reality only
pertain to the aforesaid parties, the totality of the documentation filed in respect of all the parties had to be considered for
purposes thereof.
The Act:
According to its preamble, the Act aims, inter alia, to introduce measures to combat organized crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities; to provide for the recovery of the proceeds
of unlawful activity; and for the civil forfeiture of assets that are the proceeds of unlawful activity. A further aim of the Act
is that no person convicted of an offence should benefit from the fruits of that or any related offence and, in order to achieve
that aim, the Act provides for the restraint, seizure and confiscation of property which forms the benefits derived from such an
offence. In order to achieve this purpose at the conviction stage, the Act provides for a civil remedy for the seizure and forfeiture
of property which is derived from unlawful activities or is concerned in the commission or suspected commission of an offence.
In summarising the salient features of the Act, reference should first be made to
sec 18 which is designed to enable a trial court to deprive a convicted person of the proceeds of crime. The section permits a court
which has convicted a person of an offence, to make a confiscation order which has the effect of a civil judgment. The order made
against a convicted person is for the payment to the State of any amount the court considers appropriate and the court may make any
further orders as it may deem fit to ensure the effectiveness and fairness of that order. The amount relates to the benefit a person
has derived from illegal activities and in terms of sec 12(3) a person has “benefitted from unlawful activities” if “he
or she has at any time, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, received or retained any proceeds of unlawful activities”.
The amount for which a confiscation order may be made may not exceed the lesser of the value of the defendant's proceeds of the offences
or related criminal activities referred to in sec 18(1) or the net value of the sum of the defendant's property and certain defined
gifts made by the defendant. Section 19(1) defines the “value of a defendant's proceeds of unlawful activities” to be
“the sum of the values of the property, services, advantages, benefits or rewards received, retained or derived by him or her
at any time, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, in connection with the unlawful activity carried on by him or
her or any other person”.
Part 3 of Chapter 5 of the Act deals with “restraint orders” which are
designed to ensure that property is preserved so that it can be realised in satisfaction of a confiscation order which the trial
court may make after conviction of the accused. Section 26(1) authorises the National Director of Public Prosecutions to apply to
a High Court on an ex parte basis for an order prohibiting any person from dealing in any manner with any property to which the order relates. Part 3 of Chapter
5 also confers wide powers upon the court as to the terms of any restraint order and, inter alia, provide for the appointment of a curator bonis to take charge of the property that has been placed under restraint, the seizure of property by the police and restrictions to be
placed on the encumbering or transferring of immovable property. The main feature of these provisions is that the Court may make
a provisional restraint order having immediate effect and simultaneously grant a rule nisi calling upon the defendant to show cause on a return day why the order should not be made final. In this regard sec 26 provides as follows:
(1)
The National Director may by way of an ex parte application apply to a competent High Court for an order
prohibiting any person, subject to such conditions and exceptions as may be specified in the order, from dealing in any manner with
any property to which the order relates.
(2)
A restraint order may be made
(a)
in respect of such realisable property as may be specified in the restraint order and which is held by
the person against whom the restraint order is being made;
(b) in respect of all realisable property held by such person, whether it is specified in the restraint order or not; (c) in respect of all property which, if it is transferred to such person after the making of the restraint order, would be realisable property.
(3)
(a)
A court to which an application is made in terms of subsection (1) may make
a provisional restraint order having immediate effect and may simultaneously grant a rule nisi calling upon the defendant upon a
day mentioned in the rule to appear and to show cause why the restraint order should not be made final.
(b)
If the defendant has been absent during a period of 21 days from his or her usual place of residence
and from his or her business, if any, within the Republic, the court may direct that it shall be sufficient service of that rule
if a copy thereof is affixed to or near the outer door of the buildings where the court sits and published in the Gazette, or may
direct some other mode of service.”
Section 25 of the Act provides for the circumstances in which a restraint order may
be made. The relevant portions of section 25 reads as follows:
(1)
A High Court may exercise the powers conferred on it by section 26 (1)
(a)
when
(i)
a prosecution for an offence has been instituted against the defendant concerned;
(ii) either a confiscation order has been made against that defendant or it appears to the court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a confiscation order may be made against that defendant; and
(iii)
the proceedings against that defendant have not been concluded;
or
(b)
when
(i)
that court is satisfied that a person is to be charged with an offence; and
(ii) it appears to the court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a confiscation order may be made against such person.”
The Approach on the Return Day:
This Court must, on the return date of the rule nisi, consider whether the rule should be confirmed or not. In doing so this Court rehears the matter and must be satisfied that the defendants
are to be charged (insofar as it has not been done) and that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a confiscation order
may be made against them (Sec 25(1)(a)(ii) and Sec 25(1)(b)(ii)). In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Basson 2002 (1) SA 419 (SCA) on p 428 paragraph [19] the Honourable Nugent AJA, as he then was, said the following in this regard:
In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Kyriacou 2003 (2) SACR 524 (SCA), the Honourable Mlambo AJA, who wrote the majority judgment of the Court, said the following at p 529 C:
[10] In my view, the learned Judge's approach to the matter was incorrect as was the Court's approach in Mcasa's case. Section 25(1)(a)
confers a discretion upon a court to make a restraint order if, inter alia, 'there are reasonable grounds for believing that a confiscation
order may be made. . .'. While a mere assertion to that effect by the appellant will not suffice (National Director of Public Prosecutions
v Basson 2001 (2) SACR 712 (SCA) (2002 (1) SA 419) para [19] at 428B C (SA)), on the other hand the appellant is not required to prove as a fact that a confiscation order will be
made, and in those circumstances there is no room for determining the existence of reasonable grounds for the application of the
principles and onus that apply in ordinary motion proceedings. What is required is no more than evidence that satisfies a court that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the court that convicts the person concerned may make such an order.”
In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Rautenbach 2005(4)SA 603 (SCA) at 613
H from paragraph [25], the Honourable Nugent JA stated the following:
[26] The Court a quo approached the matter as follows:
‘The Act requires that it must be shown that “grounds” exist which grounds appear to a court to be of such a nature that they would support a future confiscation order. This means that, as a first requirement, the applicant has to prove the existence of such “grounds”. That is a factual question and according to s 13(5) of the Act, the onus of proving such facts must be discharged by the applicant on a balance of probabilities.’
[27] In my view, that is not correct. It is plain from the language of the Act that the court is not required to satisfy itself that
the defendant is probably guilty of an offence, and that he or she has probably benefited from the offence or from other unlawful
activity. What is required is only that it must appear to the Court on reasonable grounds that there might be a conviction and a
confiscation order. While the Court, in order to make that assesment, must be apprised of at least the nature and tenor of the available
evidence, and cannot rely merely upon the appellant’s opinion (National Director of Pblic Prosecutions v Basson 2002 (1) SA 419 (SCA) (2001 (2) SACR 712 in para [19]) it is nevertheless not called upon to decide upon the veracity of the evidence. It need ask only whether there is evidence
that might reasonably support a conviction and a consequent confiscation order (even if all that evidence has not been placed before
it) and whether that evidence might reasonably be believed. Clearly that will not be so where the evidence that is sought to be relied
upon is manifestly false or unreliable and to that extent it requires evaluation, but it could not have been intended that a Court
in such proceedings is required to determine whether the evidence is probably true.”
Consequently the dual process proposed by the court a quo in the Rautenbach matter namely to first establish on a balance of probabilities the existence or otherwise of “grounds”,
and thereafter, secondly, to ask the question whether such grounds as have been found to exist, are such that they might reasonably
support a conviction and a consequent confiscation order, has been found by the Supreme Court of Appeal to be the wrong approach.
The correct approach would seem to be, in summary, to, firstly, rule out evidence which is manifestly false and unreliable and, secondly,
to decide whether there remains evidence that might reasonably be believed and which evidence might reasonably support a conviction
and a consequent confiscation order. The court does not decide upon the veracity of the evidence. Furthermore, in order to make the
assessment as to whether the evidence might reasonably support a conviction and a consequent confiscation order, the court must be
appraised of at least the nature and tenor of the available evidence (although all the evidence need not have been placed before
it) and cannot rely merely upon the appellant’s opinion in regard thereto.
Background of the Present Application:
During 1999 representatives of one of South Africa’s largest Platinum mines
approached the Directorate of Special Operations to investigate the theft of Platinum from the mines. Earlier operations in this
regard had not been particularly successful as only low-level thieves and smugglers could be brought to justice. This new investigation,
later named “Project Yield”, was intended to be of a different nature. The principal objective was to target syndicates
and/or individuals operating as national buyers and exporters of illicit platinum group metals (“PGM”) from South Africa.
The project was planned as a long-term investigation, aimed at securing evidence to support a successful prosecution of identified
suspects involved in the illicit PGM market.
The platinum group metals consist of Platinum, Palladium, Iridium, Tuthenium and
Rhodium and are all precious metals. Gold is also present in mined ores. Platinum has a value of more than double of that of gold.
The legal trading in unwrought precious metals in South Africa is regulated by the Mining Rights Act, 1967. That Act was, except
for certain sections, repealed by the Minerals Act, 1991 which was in turn replaced, also with some exceptions, by the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 which came into operation on 1 May 2004. The provisions of the Mining Rights Act which are still operative relate, inter alia, to offences relating to the dealing in unwrought precious metal. According to the applicable legislation, and in this regard I refer
to the Mining Rights Act, nobody is allowed to trade in or possess any unwrought precious metal otherwise than as prescribed or authorised
by the applicable legislation.
From the moment the mining process starts, the ore becomes “categorised”
as unwrought precious metal as prescribed by the Mining Rights Act. It then goes through a very long process involving various stages
of milling, concentration, extraction, refining and purifying. The end product will be one of the aforesaid PGM in a purified form
or a combination thereof. This end product at the refinery is still in such a form that it falls within the definition of an unwrought
precious metal. Unmanufactured precious metal in the form of bars, ingots, buttons, wire, plate, granules or in solution or in whatsoever
form or any article or substance containing such precious metal which although manufactured is not as such an article of commerce
or a work of art or an article of archaeological interest, is defined in the said legislation as unwrought precious metal. The aforesaid
operations towards purifying the material are undertaken in many different plants and buildings on mine premises. Most of South Africa’s
mining of PGM occur to the west of Pretoria towards Rustenburg and also to the north. It contains the world’s largest reserves
of PGM and chromium.
Security investigations over the years have shown that mined PGM are stolen in any
form in which they are available. This is due to the fact that a great demand exists in the underworld for PGM in any of its forms,
varying from low grade to high grade material. PGM thus became susceptible to theft throughout all the processing stages. Ultra high
security measures are normally in place towards the final stages of processing where smaller volumes of higher value of PGM are produced,
but over the years an increased level of thefts developed of lower grade material which is available in larger volumes but has a
lower value. The value of the product increases as it progresses through the system with a corresponding reduction of the volume
of the product. Many tonnes of original ore may eventually only result in a few grams of purified unwrought precious metal.
The South African mines spend millions of rand annually on security but due to the
nature of the process its is impossible to prevent all thefts from occurring. Theft during the early stages of mining is also profitable
to thieves and criminal syndicates notwithstanding that raw material will need to be purified at a later stage. Apart from the loss
suffered by the mining sector, the government also suffers large revenue losses due to taxes and royalties which are not paid by
criminals in respect of stolen product. Platinum is an extremely valuable commodity as its unique physical and chemical properties
lend themselves to unlimited different applications. Platinum is sought after worldwide. Precious metals are a national asset of
South Africa and earns a large amount of foreign currency and provides substantial employment opportunities.
In terms of the applicable legislation no one may buy, sell, deal in, receive or
dispose, either as principal or agent, any unwrought precious metal unless he is a Banker in terms of sec 148 of the Mining Rights
Act or is a refining business with a Recovery Works Licence issued in terms of the Mining Rights Act or possesses a certificate from
the Mining Commissioner, or, in certain other instances, is in possession of the necessary permit. It is also required that proper
records be kept.
The first level involves the theft which occurs at the source which is mostly the
mines themselves. Mine employees individually or in groups are mostly involved at this level and their activities are facilitated
by huge amounts spent by the syndicates on corruption of officials and the breaching of security systems.
The second level consists of buyers and “runners”. They mostly operate
in specific regions where producers are situated and have permanent networks in place. They communicate with the members of the first
level and remove the product as soon as it becomes available. They are also responsible for the corruption of level one operatives
and establish and maintain corrupt contacts within the SAPS to ensure the smooth running of their operations. These operatives are
also involved in the smelting of stolen product through illegal smelting houses. They also put the product together in larger quantities
and sell same to the different level three operatives or sometimes directly to the level four operatives.
The third level operatives maintain permanent contact with the level two operatives
and turn over stolen product on a daily basis with large amounts of cash resources on hand to facilitate their activities. Millions
of rand are made available by syndicates to obtain the stolen product and also to corrupt and encourage mine employees and others
to assume the risk and participate in the enterprise. The level three operatives are national buyers situated in South Africa and
mainly operate from Gauteng and adjacent areas. They operate at a high level of sophistication and maintain high level contact in
the SAPS and other institutions. They rely on assays of product for business purposes and will often use selected laboratories for
this purpose. They rely on others to do the actual work and to assume the risk and will seldom be in possession of unwrought precious
metal. These operatives build up a substantial asset base and may have overseas bank accounts, often in the name of third parties.
They reap the rewards of large volumes of stolen product and sell to higher levels or even local refineries and jewelers.
Level four operatives are also based in South Africa but they mostly sell their product
on the international market, mostly refineries or level five operatives operating in foreign countries They sometimes use other African
countries as a springboard to export their stolen product to buyers on the European market. They operate at a high level of sophistication
due to the high volume of product they turn over and due to the high prices paid on the international market. These operatives also
enjoy a high standard of living and have a substantial asset base. It is common for these operatives to have both local and overseas
bank accounts and often hold assets in the name of third parties. They use various forms of money-laundering schemes to enable them
to “clean” the proceeds of their illegal business and to maintain their high standard of living in South Africa. Like
level three operatives they only conduct business with selected people and do not commonly participate in that part of the business
that carries a high degree of risk. They also contact and influence law enforcement agencies at high level and this makes it particularly
difficult to investigate level four operatives successfully.
Level five operatives are generally international buyers who are situated abroad
and operate abroad although they may also have a level of operation in South Africa. They are usually foreign citizens or South Africans
who have settled abroad. They purchase mainly from level four, and sometimes level three, operatives in South Africa and usually
sell their product to foreign refineries. They also use the springboard technique and influence high level law enforcement personnel.
They operate on a large scale, purchasing and on-selling high volumes of stolen product and also assist South African level four
suppliers in laundering the proceeds of the transactions through so-called “currency movers”.
The applicant also annexed to its founding affidavit the affidavit of mr Peter Gastrow,
a Director of the Cape Town office of the Institute of Security Studies. Mr Gastrow is an expert in the field of organised crime
both nationally and internationally and has published extensively on this subject. Based on his extensive research and experience
in this field he deposed to the affidavit setting out and explaining the nature of organised crime, that South Africa is regarded
as an attractive location for organised crime groups to operate from, the threat posed by organised crime to South Africa, the international
response to organised crime and organised crime in respect of gold and precious metals. In regard to theft of Platinum, mr Gastrow
stated that the detected thefts alone of Platinum from South Africa’s three key platinum mining companies during 1995 to 1998
was approximately R60 million. During 1998 it amounted to R20,6 million. They value of undetected thefts cannot be estimated. He
confirmed the nature and extent of the illicit PGM syndicate operations and the money laundering operations discussed by van Tonder.
The Investigation and the Charges:
As was stated above, investigations commenced in 1999 into the national and international
smuggling arena and evidence was collected about individuals and criminal syndicates operating and trading in stolen unwrought precious
metal in a organised manner on an international basis. The project was planned as a long-term investigation aimed at securing evidence
to support a successful prosecution against identified suspects involved in the illicit PGM market. On 20 February 2002, the former
Investigating Director of the Director of Special operations directed that a preparatory investigation in terms of sec 28(13) of
the National Prosecuting Authority Act, 1998, (the “NPA Act”), be conducted into the affairs of persons and or entities
who, nationally and internationally, on an organised basis, were involved in the illicit smuggling of PGM. On 30 July 2002 the status
of the investigation was converted to an investigation in terms of sec 28(1)(a) of the NPA Act. On 16 May 2002 authority was granted
by the Director of Public Prosecutions of Pretoria in terms of Sec 252A of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, for the conducting of undercover operations, using undercover agents. On 22 July 2003 the Applicant and the Directors of Public
Prosecution for the Free State, Witwatersrand Local Division, Northwest Province, Kwa Zulu Natal and the Western Cape authorised
the extension of the undercover operations in terms of section 252A of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, within their jurisdictions. The joint venture with the Directorate of Special Operations was thus formed and a formal project (Project
Yield) was registered to investigate the whole matter thoroughly.
Due to the extensive nature of the operations to be investigated, use was made of
forty five investigators. Mr P.H. Bishop, a Senior Special Investigator with 23 years experience and attached to the Directorate
of Special Operations was designated as the project manager of Project Yield. He filed a lengthy supporting affidavit setting out
in detail the nature of the investigation and the results obtained. I shall refer to some of the salient features thereof.
Mr Bishop explained that due to the nature of the illicit PGM trade and more particularly
the complexity of the chain of activity and the secretive nature thereof, extensive use had to be made of undercover agents to infiltrate
the syndicates with a view of gathering evidence for further investigations and to support the arrest and prosecution of those involved.
Some of the individuals used to infiltrate the syndicates had to be individuals with a known record of engaging in criminal activity.
Due to the highly technical nature of the illicit PGM activities and the scale of the project, expert assistance was also obtained
from the platinum mining industry and the auditors KPMG was later also appointed as independent forensic auditors for the project.
The forensic auditors assisted with the accounting functions relating to the project’s expenditure as well as compiling information
and evidence for prosecution and prosecution-related purposes from the vast body of evidence and information collected during the
course of the investigation. KPMG also calculated the benefits received or derived by the various defendants from their known and
identified illicit PGM transactions and related criminal activities. In this regard Me A.L. Wolmarans filed an extensive affidavit
attached to the founding papers and another one as part of the Applicant’s replying papers (under her newly acquired married
name of Jordaan).
Mr Bishop further stated that he was the recipient of all the evidence, intelligence
reports and other relevant information emanating from the project. He kept records in the form of notes, diary entries, activity
sheets, contemporaneous notes, recordings and debriefing notes and collected some 600 pages of statements made by potential witnesses
in the criminal trial against the defendants. The evidence was obtained from various sources which, apart from those instances where
he personally obtained information, included historical information from previous SAPS operations; intelligence sources; the interception
of communications in terms of section 3 of the Interception and Monitoring Act, Act 127 of 1992; assistance from the National Crime
Squad of England and Wales; interviews with and statements from relevant witnesses; summonses issued in terms of section 28(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977; the utilisation of section 252A of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977; surveillance; and assays of illicit PGM in South Africa. Mr Bishop further indicated that it is likely that section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, providing for the use by the prosecution of the evidence of witnesses who might incriminate themselves, will be used.
Mr Bishop stated that the defendants in the present application are the persons and
entities identified as being involved in illicit PGM activities and which would be prosecuted. He submitted that the contemplated
search and seizure operations would yield further evidence to corroborate the evidence and information available at the time and
that further individuals may be arrested.
According to Bishop, and this was supported by the supporting affidavits of other
members of the Applicant’s staff, the defendants will be charged with offences under the Mining Rights Act, offences relating
to contraventions of the Import and Export Control Act, 45 of 1963, contraventions of the Companies Act and of the Exchange Control
Regulations. They will also be charged with offences such as theft, fraud, forgery and uttering, offences relating to the proceeds
of unlawful activities, money laundering and racketeering activities in terms of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998. Altogether some 800 counts are envisaged in certain cases. Most of the defendants have already been charged and it is not necessary
to say more in this regard.
According to the affidavit of Adv J.G. Rabaji, the Head of Operations at the Asset
Forfeiture Unit in the office of the Applicant, and who deposed to the main supporting affidavit on behalf of the Applicant, the
calculated total value of the illicit PGM transactions at the time the interim order was sought, was R199 000 264,77. This
figure did not include the revenue benefits of these transactions. She submitted that the illicit schemes in which the Defendants
were involved were by no means restricted to these identified transactions and that in all likelihood evidence of further illicit
transactions would be found in this ongoing investigation. In her replying affidavit, which was deposed to after the arrests and
seizures following on the interim order, she stated that this was indeed the case and referred in quite some detail thereto.
The Nature of the Evidence:
As a prelude to the evidence presented by mr Bishop in his affidavit, he submitted
that due to the sheer volume of the available evidence it is not possible or practical to cover everything in the papers before the
court. Furthermore, that the investigation was ongoing and that the arrests and seizure operations would uncover further evidence.
In his replying affidavit he did in fact refer to such newly obtained evidence which supported his earlier evidence. He further stated
that due to the extensive and secretive nature of the illicit PGM operations and the fact that use had to be made of agents and other
witnesses to infiltrate the operations, such witnesses cannot be identified at this early stage as their lives would be in danger.
He submitted that even disclosing the contents of their affidavits would cause them to be identified. To support his submissions
in this regard he alluded to persons who have posed a threat to the illicit precious metal market and who had been killed by hit
squads. He also alluded to the fact that corruption of officials and law enforcement agents and the use of intimidation tactics have
in the past caused many investigations to be unsuccessful and that such actions, and the physical danger to the individuals involved
in the present operation, are a real threat to the successful outcome of this operation. Consequently the exposure of evidence in
any other form than has been done in the present matter and any breach of the privileged nature of such evidence at this point, would
seriously jeopardise the successful outcome of the final investigation and prosecutions relating to the present matter as well as
future operations.
The Evidence Relating to the Defendants:
In respect of the evidence against the defendants and the respondents, mr Bishop’s
affidavit and the annexures thereto may be referred to. As the application in respect of most of the defendants has been settled,
only a brief outline of the alleged involvement of certain of the main players in the saga is required. More emphasis shall be placed
on the allegations relating to the defendants with whom there has been no settlement. They are the 9th defendant (James), the 19th defendant (Boekhoud), the 20th defendant (Just Refiners and Technologies Ltd UK) (JRT UK), the 21st defendant (Just Refiners and Technologies Ltd SA (Pty)Ltd) (JRT SA), and the 22nd defendant (Aerotrade No 62 (Pty)Ltd) (Aerotrade). The 5th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 14th and 16th respondents are related to the aforesaid defendants.
The following from mr Bishop’s affidavit may be referred to: The 1st, 3rd and 4th Defendants are brothers and together with 5th Defendant they constituted a syndicate known as the “Mountain Boys” and operated mainly from the Gauteng area. The 9th Defendant, Mr T.R. James (“James”), was an accountant for an entity known as MPT. MPT was involved in illicit PGM activities.
The 10th to 13th Defendants shared a membership interest in the 14th Defendant, Wepelec Trading CC (“Wepelec”), which was also involved in illicit PGM activities. The 15th Defendant was the sole director of the 16th Defendant, Utility Resources CC (“Utility”), which was also involved in illicit PGM activities. The 17th and 18th defendants were involved in an entity ABS Precious Metals (Pty)Ltd (“ABS”) through which illicit activities were conducted.
The 19th defendant, mr H.L.J. Boekhoud (“Boekhoud”), is a South African who resides in the United Kingdom. He conducted his business
through Just Refiners and Technologies Ltd UK (“JRT UK”) which operated a refinery situated in Peterborough in the United
Kingdom. JRT UK is the 20th defendant. Just Refineries and Technologies SA (Pty)Ltd (“JRT SA”), the 21st defendant, is also an entity in which Boekhoud had an interest. Aerotrade No 62 (Pty)Ltd (“Aerotrade”), the 22nd defendant, trades under the name of JRT SA and James has an interest in this entity. James and Boekhoud are married to two sisters.
According to Bishop he has collected reliable evidence that all the aforesaid defendants possessed, purchased and/or received PGM
and/or dealt, directly or through agents, with such PGM.
According to Bishop PGM stolen from the mines, mostly in small quantities but also
in bulk, and PGM stolen through the highjacking of trucks between mines in Zimbabwe to South Africa or from mines in South Africa
to refineries, were eventually sold in larger quantities to exporters such as the Mountain Boys. One method of selling and exporting
the PGM occurred via Zambia to Boekhoud in the United Kingdom or, in some cases, to a company called Metalor in Switzerland. The smuggling to Zambia occurred
in one of two ways. If larger quantities were sent they would be declared, for export purposes, as some or other legitimate product
and not PGM. The PGM would then be concealed in the containers and not be declared with the declared legitimate product. This related
mostly to larger quantities of between five to twenty tons at a time and were mostly lower grade PGM. Where smaller quantities of
higher grade were smuggled out, same were usually hidden, for example, in false compartments in motor vehicles.
From Zambia the exports were destined for JRT UK, the company controlled by Boekhoud,
or to Metalor in Switzerland. The name of a company called Stargem was used to export the product by air. False descriptions of the
product as well as an under-declaration of its value were used for export purposes. At the time of deposing to his first affidavit
Bishop indicated that eight such illegal exports could be identified. He attached a schedule of these exports reflecting the dates
thereof, the precise nature of the cargo, the weight of each shipment, the approximate value thereof, the destination and the exporter.
In each instance the exporter was the 1st defendant or the Mountain Boys.
The second scheme identified by Mr Bishop was the so-called “Independent Security
Scheme”. This scheme entailed the export of illicit PGM by JRT to Boekhoud via Johannesburg International Airport using Cathay Pacific Airlines. These shipments were purportedly made by an entity called “Independent
Security” but the use of this name was done fraudulently. Again the airway bills indicated the shipment to be something else
than PGM and were, as such, substantially undervalued. Invoices were then sent on false Stargem letterheads to JRT who took delivery
thereof as importer. Boekhoud was the importer through JRT. At the time of deposing to his first affidavit Bishop indicated that
thirty eight such illegal exports could be identified. He attached a schedule itemizing these exports and also reflecting the dates
thereof, the name on the exporter invoice, the exporter waybill, the receiver of the shipment, the weight of each shipment, the precise
false description of the cargo and the invoice value thereof. It is not necessary to refer to the detail thereof. According to Bishop
he has the evidence of witnesses who will testify at the criminal trial that in each instance illicit PGM were exported and that
the exporter was the 1st defendant or the Mountain Boys.
The third scheme identified by Bishop was the so-called “Front Company Scheme”.
This scheme entailed the export of illicit PGM by companies who have licences to export for example copper and nickel or scrap material
containing legitimate PGM components such as computers and telephone equipment. The export documentation were falsified to hide the
substantial quantities of illicit PGM actually exported and consequently also undervalued the actual product. Sometimes the values
declared were the actual values but this would be done to have the proceeds seen as legitimately returned to South Africa. The exports
under this scheme were to JRT and were done by Wepelec, Utility and MPT. Mr Bishop identified quite a number of these exports and
supplied the detail in respect thereof. In an attached schedule he also gave the detail of the dates thereof, the airway bill particulars,
the approximate value and the nett mass of each shipment. Some of the schedules also mention the exporter, the precise false description
of the cargo, the receiver of the shipment, the weight of each shipment, and the value thereof in South African Rand and in British
Pound. It is not necessary to refer to the detail thereof. According to Bishop he has documentary evidence as well as the evidence
of witnesses who will testify at the criminal trial that in each instance illicit PGM were exported and that the defendants involved
were the 1st, 5th, 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th defendant as well as James, the 9th defendant. Mr Bishop also stated that Aerotrade exported illicit PGM to JRT in the United Kingdom using the front company scheme.
According to Bishop he has reliable information that ABS also engaged in this illegal scheme but stated that confirmation is hoped
for as a result of the search and seizure operations.
In regard to James, the 9th defendant, Bishop referred to evidence which establishes that James actively participated in a number of illegal activities aimed
at facilitating the export of illicit PGM to Boekhoud, through JRT. James did this through his association with MPT where he was
employed as an accountant. According to the attached schedules, forty nine such illicit PGM transactions from MPT to JRT are identified.
According to Bishop, James was also involved through Wepelec which was used in the front company scheme. In fact, Bishop stated that
he has information which proved James to be the agent and middleman for Boekhoud in South Africa and that his role was to assist
Boekhoud and his suppliers such as 1st defendant and the Mountain Boys. Evidence also shows James and Boekhoud sourcing avenues to deal in illegal PGM in South Africa during
April 2003. Meetings with individuals having access to illicit PGM were held at various venues in South Africa to discuss the pricing
and availability of illicit PGM. As a consequence of one of these meetings an amount of 1,906 kg of high grade PGM with a value of
R69 919,90 was delivered to James personally. The product was exported by James on 3 July 2003 as a copper and nickel sample
with a declared value of only R100,00. The invoice through which this export was conducted identified the exporting entity as “Just
Refiners and Technology SA Prop. of Aerotrade 62 Pty Ltd”. The invoice and relevant airway bill were attached to the papers.
As indicated before, Aerotrade, a company in which James had an interest and was a director of, traded as Just Refiners and Technology
SA (“JRT SA”). The aforesaid export was to Boekhoud in the United Kingdom. According to evidence in Bishop’s possession
the value of this shipment was in reality GBP 5 422,86 and this amount was in fact paid by JRT into a nominated offshore account.
James was also, according to Bishop’s evidence, involved in the Zambian scheme where he assisted in exporting 8 tons through
Zambia in June 2001.
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