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[2007] ZAGPHC 229
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Pascal v Pascal (11967/07, 11968/07) [2007] ZAGPHC 229 (5 October 2007)
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(TRANSVAAL PROVINCIAL DIVISION)
CASE
NO: 11967/07 NOT
REPORTABLE DATE: 5/10/2007
In the matter between
PASCAL, MONKAM (JNR) APPLICANT
AND PASCAL,
MONKAM (SNR) RESPONDENT
.
In re: PASCAL,
MONKAM (SNR) SUSIE
MONKAM AND PASCAL,
MONKAM (JNR) TULAH
TRADING (PTY) LTD HOOPSTRAAT BELEGGINGS (Pty) LTD MADELENE
PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD ABSA BANK STANDARD
BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA
First Second
APPLICANT APPLICANT
First RESPONDENT
Second RESPONDENT
Third
RESPONDENT
Fourth
RESPONDENT
Fifth
RESPONDENT
Sixth
RESPONDENT
AND
CASE
NUMBER 11968/07
In re:
PASCAL, MONKAM (SNR)
APPLICANT
AND
PASCAL, MONKAM (JNR)
RESPONDENT
1
JUDGMENT MAVUNDLA
J., [1]
This is a classical, case of a father and son relationship having
gone sour.
If it was possible, one or the other
would have filed a divorce against the other claiming that their
relationship has irretrievably
broken down. However, even if that
were possible, they shall remain bound to each other to eternity
through their blood and flesh
affinity. I assume that it was the
desire and wish of the father, when his son was born, that the son
must later in life, carry
the family mantle. I say so because both
the father and son share the same names, save that the father is
also referred to, understandably,
as senior while the son is
referred to as junior. The cause of the dispute is nothing else but
power, money and control thereof,
as it will be apparent herein
below.
[3]
In both matter under case number
11967/07 and case number 11968/07 the son, who I shall henceforth
refer to as Junior, is seeking
in terms of Rule 47 an order against
the father to furnish security for costs on the
ground that the father, the
respondent, is not of this part of this world but a perigrinus in
the Republic of South Africa, and
a resident and a citizen of
Cameroon where he has aplenty and is one of the richest.
AD CASE NUMBER 11967
[4] In
this matter, Junior, who is the first respondent in the main
application, seeks an order in terms of rule 47 against senior,
directing the latter to furnish security in the amount of R150, 000,
00. Senior is countering and seeking an order against junior
in
terms of Rule 35(13) to discover.
BACKGROUND
FACTS
2
[6]
[5] In
the main case Senior is the first applicant, while the second
applicant is his daughter. The applicants in the main action brought
an application to have junior, as the first respondent and ABSA Bank
Limited as the 5th respondent ordered to restore to the applicants
their signing powers on the following accounts of the 3rd respondent
with 5th respondent: cheque account number 404886165 and Money
Market account number 9077405642;They further seek an order
directing the 5th respondent to remove signing powers of Junior from
the aforesaid money market account;
and interdicting Junior from revoking the 1 st
and 2nd
applicants' signing
powers on the 2nd respondent's cheque account number 011244283 held
with the 6th respondent; and interdicting the 6th respondent
from removing the signing powers of the 1 st
and 2nd
applicants in
respect of the cheque accounts referred to herein above; and
interdicting the 1st respondent from revoking the signing powers
of
the 1st and 2nd applicants on the 2nd respondent's cheque account
number 018339972 and
from removing the signing powers of the 1st
and 2nd applicants
from the aforesaid account number 018339972.
The
main application was initiated on urgent basis on the 28 March 2007,
shortly after an order was granted by my brother Mr. Justice
Claassen on the
28 February 2007 under case number 3085/07 involving substantially
the same parties, save ABSA Bank Limited and Standard Bank
of South
Africa, but including other parties. The battle is essentially over
the directorship and ownership and control over the
legal entities
Tulah, Trading (Pty) Ltd, Hoopstraat Beleggings (Pty) Ltd, Madeleine
Properties (Pty) Ltd, Monkam Holdings (Pty)
Ltd. All these entities
belong to the family. The order of the 28 March 2007 directed that
the matter before that Court be postponed
sine die pending the
finalization of arbitration or litigation proceedings to be
instituted by Senior against Junior regarding
the directorship and
ownership in the entities that I have listed herein above. There are
also other ancillary orders granted by
Mr. Justice
3
[8]
Claassen which I deem not necessary
to state for purposes of this judgment.
[7] Senior
and his daughter in their notice objecting to the Rule 47 (1)
application stated that:
7.1 both applicants (in the main
application, sic) both
have resident status in the Republic of South Africa and are
therefore not peregrine;
7.2 senior has substantial assets in
South Africa being the sole
shareholder of legal entities which
own considerable immovable
property.
7.3 Junior has admitted under oath in
recent previous litigation under case number 3085/07 that senior is
an extremely wealthy individual
and therefore will definitely be in
a position to pay any cost order against him;
7.4 The request for security of costs
is vexatious in the circumstances which is highlighted by the fact
that junior has been involved
in litigation with senior recently
under case number 3085/07 without requesting such security.
AD CASE NUMBER 11697/07 The
main application under this case number has been brought by Senior
against Junior on the 28 March 2007. The order sought is,
inter
alia, that the chairman of the Pretoria Bar Council be authorised to
appoint an arbitrator to determine through arbitration
proceedings
the dispute between the parties in respect of the directorship and
ownership in the following entities, namely Hoopstraat
Beleggings
(Pty) Ltd; Madeleine Properties; Monkam Holdings (Pty) Ltd and
Monkam Investment Properties (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation).
The matter
came before my brother, Mr. Justice Botha who granted an order in
terms of which the matter is postponed
4
[9]
[10] sine
die and that the first respondent (ie Junior) to the fourth
respondents are ordered to deliver their answering affidavit by
not
later than 8 May 2007. The first respondent (that is Junior) was
ordered to "initially sign ten (10) blank cheques on
the
current account to third the third respondent, which cheques wii be
left in custody of the applicant's attorney of record to
be issued
as and when and if need upon the written notification to the
attorney of the first and fourth respondents..." together
with
further ancillary orders.
Although a notice of intention to
oppose was filed on the 5 April 2007, there has as yet been no
answering affidavit filed by or
on behalf of Junior. On 19 April
2007 Junior served a notice in terms of rule 47(1) calling for
Senior to furnish security for
costs. Senior in his notice objecting
to this rule 47(1) has stated that: 9.1
he has permanent residence status in the Republic of South Africa;
9.2
he has substantial assets in South Africa being the sole
shareholder of legal entities which
own considerable immovable
9.3
property.
Junior has admitted under oath in
recent previous litigation under case number 3085/07 that applicant
(Senior) is an extremely wealthy
individual and therefore will
definitely be in a position to pay any costs order found against him The
request for security for costs is vexatious in the circumstances
which are highlighted by the fact that the respondent (Junior)
has
been involved in litigation with applicant (Senior) recently under
case number 308507 without the of the and the and a requesting
for
security for costs. The
request has not been brought "within a reasonable time."
9.4
9.5 In
the objection to the notice in terms of Rule 47(1) Senior and his
daughter, Ms Sisie Monkam who is the second applicant in the
main
5
[10]
[11]
[12] application,
disclosed the grounds of their objection to the application for
security for costs as being that they both have permanent
resident
status in the Republic of South Africa and are therefore not
perigrini, and that the respondent has admitted under oath
in case
number 3085/07 that Senior is an extremely wealthy individual, and
therefore will be in a position to pay any costs order
made against
him.
Junior then served on 19 June 2007 a
formal notice for the application for security for costs in the
amount of R150,000,00. In his
affidavit Junior states that the mere
fact that Senior might have permanent resident status in the
Republic of South Africa, if
true, but cannot be admitted, is
insufficient, since that status does not render him an incola.
He says that in truth
Senior is an occasional visitor in the Republic of South Africa. He
denies that Senior is the owner of the
shareholding he lays claim
to. He further states that there is pending litigation in respect of
ownership over the said entities
claimed by Senior. He says that
Senior does not have substantial assets in South Africa. He says
further that the mere fact that
Senior is a multi-millionaire in
Cameroon does not mean that he will pay his legal costs in the
Republic of South Africa.
An opposing affidavit was filed on
behalf of Senior by his attorney of record
Mr. Tarn Finck. Mr. Finck states inter alia, that the main
application was served on 28 March 2007. On 5 April 2007 Junior
gave
his notice of his intention to oppose. On 9 May 2007 the main
application was set down for hearing on the opposed roll for
1
August 2007 Junior served his application for security for cost on
the 19 June 2007, such application to be made on 8 August
2007.
Attached further to Mr. Finck's
affidavit is annexure "TF2", which is a copy of the
identity document of Senior. This
document reflects that Senior is a
South African citizen and that he was born in Cameroon. Further
attached
6
[13]
[14]
as annexure "TFa" is a
letter from Attorneys Grove, Deysel & Partners,
dated 20 March 2007 and addressed to
the High Commissioner of Cameroon in South Africa, wherein it is
inquired whether the Minister
of Economics is aware that Mr. Pascal
Monkam (Snr) is now a South African resident and taxpayer. Mr. Finck
further referred to
case number 3085/2007 and pointed out that
Junior in that matter had admitted that Senior is a wealthy man
Cameroon.
It is important to point out that in
the matter under case number 3085/2007 Junior denies that Senior is
the owner of the legal
entities which I have referred to in
paragraph 8 herein above. But what is more important is that at
paginated page 233 he says
that Senior "wanted to invest in the
Republic of South Africa. He and I travelled to this country in
1998. He liked what he saw. He
signed two purchase agreements, one in respect of the Third
Applicant and the other in respect of Cresta
Hotel." The Third
Applicant he refers to is Hoopstraat Bellegings (Pty) Ltd in that
matter and sixth respondent in the main
application in casu. He
further states that he has "never denied that Senior put up the
money to purchase the companies. That
was always the intention".
The
onus to convince the Court that Senior must be ordered to furnish
security for costs rest on Junior, as the applicant1
who must provide credible evidence on affidavit that such order must
be granted. It is trite that a peregrinus2
plaintiff
may be ordered to furnish security for costs in respect of his
claim, either in convention3
or reconvention4,
vide Erasmus'. 1
Firstrand Bank Ltd v Pather 2005 (4) SA 429 NPD
at 432 C-G 2
Protea Assurance Co Ltd v Januszkiewics 1989 (4)
SA 292 (W); Toumbis v Antoniou 1999 (1) SA 6363 (W) at 641. 3
Lowndes v Rothschild 1908 TH 49; Brearley v Faure, Van Eyk and Moore
(1905) 22 SC 2; Ka1chelnik v Afrimeric Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1948
(4) SA 279 (C). 4
Thomson, Watson & Co v Poverty Bay Framers
Meat Supply Co 1924 CPD 23; Banks v Henshaw 1962 (3) SA 464 (D);
Africair (Rhodesia) Ltd v Interocean Airways SA 1964 (3) SA 114
(SA); Sandock Austral Ltd v Exploitation lndutrielle et
Commerciale-Bretic 1974 (2) SAS 280 (D) AT 284-5
7
[15]
Work Superior Court Practice, at
B1-340A Service 26, 2006 in
fine. It is also so that
the perigrinus may be ordered to give security for
costs in respect of the
incola defendant's reconvention claim, or security for
the amount of the judgment
that may be given against him. It must also be borne in mind that
the court has a discretion to or not
to order that security be
given5.
In the exercise pf its discretion the Court must have all the
relevant circumstances, inter alia, as well as consideration of
fairness6.
I must bear in mind that Junior, is not entitled as of right to the
order of security. Junior
in his application for security for costs, alleges that Senior does
not own the entities which Senior lays claim to, he failed
to take
this Court to its Confidence and deal with the source and means that
made it possible for the acquisition of the relevant
entities. Since
in case number 3085/2007 he admits that Senior provided money for
the acquisition of the entities which Junior
alleges that he is the
sole director of, it was necessary, in my view, that he should have
disclosed the golden-Iaying-egg
goose that made it possible for
him to have such entities forming the dispute between the parties.
His failure to make such disclosure
in this application, entitles me
to make an adverse inference against him. It would seem that Senior
is economically active7
directly or indirectly through Junior who has been made director of
various legal entities created by funds provided by Senior.
This is
so because at paginated page 234 paragraph 10.5 of case number
3085/2007, Junior says that: "At
time, the First Respondent had no
interest in actually running any of the businesses personally. He
would solely provide the finance.
In time he would realize his
investment. I was in charge." I do accept, therefore, that Senior
does have assets or means within the Republic of South Africa, which
Junior is a privy to and can attach to recover his legal
costs from. 5
Sitecki v Sitecki 1917 TPD 165 at 169; Vanda v
Mbuqe & Mbuqe 1993 (4) SA 93 (TK GD) at 95F-G 6
Resamus' Superior Court Practice [Service 27, 2007] at BI-341. 7
Magida v Minister of Police 1987(l) SA 1 (A) at
14E, 15D.
8
[16]
The Court has a discretion to or not
to order that security be furnished.8
In the exercise of my discretion, I shall have to bear in mind that
section 34 of the Constitution of the RSA, Act 108 of 1996
provides
that: "Everyone
has the right to have any dispute
that can be resolved by application of law
decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum."
A liberal approach with regard to rights enshrined in the
Constitution is required. Besides, the dictates of fairness, having
regard to the fact that in casu we are dealing with a dispute over
ownership between a father and a son, with the son who admits
that
the father has provided the money through which the entities the son
claims to be the sole director of, and that the father
has no assets
in the Republic of South Africa, demand, in my view that the door
must not be shut in the face of the father, who wants to lay claim
of what his money, on admission by the son, has made it
possible for
the son to procure the entities the son alleges to be his own. This
must be so even if Senior is a perigrinus of the
Republic of South
Africa, assuming that he is indeed such. However, there is evidence
that Senior has been granted citizen status
of this Country. He has
provided documentary proof to that effect, in the form of a South
African identity document and such cannot
be ignored.
[17]
Rule 47(1) demands that as soon as
practicable after the commencement of the proceedings, the party who
wants the other to furnish
security, must demand that security
should be filed. The main application was initiated on urgent bases
on the 28 March 2007, calling
for a Rule Nisi to be issued upon
Junior and others to show cause on 24 April 2007, why the relief
sought in that application should
not be made an
2.
8
Sitecki v Sitecki 1917
TPD 165 at 169; Vanda v Mbuqe
& Mbuqe 1993 (4) SA 93
(TK GD) at 95F-G; Magida v Minister of Police 1987
(1) SA 1 (AO at 14E and 15D.
9
[18]
[19]
[20]
order of the Court. On the very date
of 28 March 2007 the
parties agreed to the order that was made by the honourable Mr.
Justice Botha, which order I have referred to herein above9.
Junior waited until June 2007 before bringing his application for
security for costs. He says that he did not delay in bringing
the
Rule 47 application. I am of the view that two months' is a delay
sufficient enough for this Court to take into consideration
in
consideration of the exercise of its discretion against the
applicant1O.
If indeed Junior was apprehensive that his father, because of the
enmity and hostility between themselves, which I assume that
it must
have been there already on 28 March 2007, would simply refuse to pay
the legal costs, I would have accepted Junior to approach
this Court
with his application for security for costs much earlier than he
did.
Taking all the above factors, I am of
the view that the application for security for costs, should not be
granted at all under the
circumstances.
Senior has also made a counter
application. He says that the purpose of such counter application
"is to obtain this honourable
court's sanction to supplement
the applicant's founding affidavit in the main application and also
to obtain the direction of this
honourable court in compelling
Junior to make discovery of the documentation listed In annexure A
and B in the notice of counter-application
that is in his possession
or under his control, which documentation is required to protect
Senior's and Susie Monkam's rights relating
to the main
application." The relevant documents are fully set out in
annexure A and B that are attached to the relevant counter
application.
He
further seeks this Court's leave to supplement their supplementary
affidavit in the main application with the facts deposed to
in the
affidavits 9
Para.8 supra. 10 H.R.
Holfeld (Africa)
Limited v Karl Walter & Co. GmbH and Another (2) 1987(4) SA 861
at 865E
10
[21]
[22]
[23]
filed in opposing the application for
security for
costs and the affidavits
filed in support of the counter-application and to further
supplement the founding papers in the main application.
Junior has also served a rule 47(1)
notice, calling upon the Senior to furnish security for
costs, which notice he
served on 3 August 2007. The grounds for
calling for
security reflected are
that the plaintiff is a limited company and that it has no assets.
Junior
has stated in his affidavit 11
that "first
applicant is a very wealthy man in Cameroon. However, same does not
apply here. In fact the First Applicant found
he was unable even to
pay for his
own medical treatment in this country. ...I have admitted that the
First Applicant by reason of the millions of Rands invested
in the
Republic of South Africa is more than
able to pay legal costs in the
Republic of South Africa. On the contrary, I have every reason to
believe that he will not be in
a position to do so. It goes without
saying that he will undoubtedly be unwilling to pay my legal costs
given the present relationship
between us."
I
am conscious of the further points raised by Junior, for
instance
that the counter-application involves other respondents in
reconvention and that none of them are involved in the
counter-application.
It however needs to be borne in mind that, save
for the firth respondent which is ABSA Limited, and the sixth
respondent which
is Standard Bank of South Africa, all the other
respondents are the very entities whose soul the parties are
fighting for.
Junior
claims that he is the sole director of such companies. This
particular dispute over ownership of these entities has since
been
referred to arbitration. It is proposed by Junior that the main
application should not be considered until such time that
the
application for
costs
has been disposed of. Such cause, in the light of my earlier
decision that security for
11
Paginated page 226 paragraph 7 (Ad
paragraph 10)
11
[24]
[25]
costs should not be furnished by
Senior, would frustrate the dictates of fairness
and justice, and result in slamming the door in the face of Senior,
who seeks redress to what seems to be a "daylight
highway
robbery" of an old man, by a son too impatient to await his
inheritance at the unknown date of the eventual demise
of his
father. For the very reasons I have advanced earlier, I am of the
view that there is no reason to order Senior to furnish
security for
costs even in respect of the counter-application.
In respect of the application for
security for costs under case number 11968/2007, it needs mention
that on 16 August 2007, the
main application served before the
honourable Mr. Justice Rabie who granted an order authorising the
chairman of the Pretoria Bar
Council to appoint an arbitrator to
determine through arbitration proceedings the dispute between Senior
and Junior in respect
of the directorship and ownership in
the following entities: Hoopstraat
Beleggings (Pty) Ltd; Tulah Trading (Pty) Ltd; Madeleine Properties
(Pty) Ltd and Monkam Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Monkam
Investment
Properties (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation).
It must be borne in mind that the
main application was initiated on 28 March 2007. The relief sought
therein is precisely what was
ordered by the honourable Mr. Justice
Rabie on the 16 August 2007. Therefore there is no pending action
before this Court in respect
of the lis
pertaining to what was
sought initially. That order of the 16 August 2007 is final, since
there is no pending appeal against it.
In this regard vide H.R.
Holfeld (Africa) Limited v Karl Walter & Co. GmbH and Another
(2) 12
Kirk-Cohen
J said:
"The
word 'proceedings' refers to the pending action or motion
proceedings
and, possibly, to an appeal. It does not refer to a
judgement
which is not subject to a pending appeal. In order to see
12
1987 (4) SA 861
(W) at 865C-D
12
[26]
[27]
[28]
how the courts have in the past
interpreted the word 'proceedings', I refer no further than to the
definition thereof contained
in Claassen's Dictionery of Words
Judicially Defined, Vol 3 at 201 sv 'proceedings'. Therefore for
this reason, this application
for security must fail.
Whereas the main application was
initiated on 28 March 2007, Junior only served his notice of
application for security for costs
on 19 June 2007, almost
2½ months later. The honourable Mr. Justice Kirk-Cohen13
said:
"The Afrikaans text of Rule 47
is equally clear; it does not use only one word for the word
'proceedings'. Rule 47(1) refers
to the claim being made 'so gou
moontlik na die aanvang van 'n geding'. Rule 47(3) states that, if
security be not given an application
can be made to Court for such
security 'en dat die verrigtinge opgeskort word totdat aan die bevel
voldoen is'."
In casu, it cannot be said that 2½
months is as soon as possible as envisaged by Rule 47(1). I am of
the view that Junior was dilatory
in bringing this application for
security. I am of the view that he is not bona
fide in bringing this
application. He brings it with a singular purpose of impeding Senior
in his quest for justice and getting to the
truth of this fiasco
over the soul of the assets in issue between the parties. I am of
the view that for all the above mentioned
reasons all the
application for security for costs must fail.
This
then brings me to the application for discovery brought by Senior.
Rule 35 provides that:
"(1)
Any party to any action may require any other party thereto, by
notice in writing to make discovery on oath within twenty
days of
all documents and tape recordings relating to any matter in question
in such action (whether such matter is one arising
between the party
requiring
13
H.R.
Holfeld (Africa) Limited v Karl Walter & Co. GmbH and Another
(2) (supra) at 865E
13
[29]
[30]
[31]
discovery and the party required to
make discovery or not) which are or have at any time been in the
possession or control of such
other party. Such notice shall not,
save with the leave of a judge, be given before the close of
pleadings."
Section
1 of the Supreme Court Act defines:
'civil
summons' as meaning "any summons whereby civil proceedings are
commenced, includes any rule nisi,
notice
of motion or petition the object of which is to require the
appearance before the court out of which it is issued of any
person
who is interested in resisting the grant of such relief",,14
, "defendant"
as including "any respondent or other party against relief is
sought
in civil proceedings;
In
the Supreme Court Practice15
Under
Uniform Rules of the High Court, "'action'
is defined as: 'shall mean a proceeding commenced by
summons...' and 'is used in its
narrow sense, denoting 'a proceeding commenced by summons... ",16,
vide also one of the cases cited by the learned authors under
footnote 9 therein namely Joh-Air (Pty) Ltd v Rudman. 17
From
the above it is clear that any party, which Senior is, to any
action, which includes a notice of motion, may require any other
party thereto, like Junior is such party, by notice in writing to
make discovery on oath within twenty days of all documents and
tape
recordings relating to any matter in question in such action
(whether such matter is one arising between the party requiring
discovery and the party required to make discovery or not) which are
or have at any time been in the possession or control of such
14 Act 59 of
1959; Superior Court PracticeA1-2, [Service27,2007];BI-8A [Service
19, 2003]
15 B1-6 [Service 28.2007] B1-8
[Service 24,2005] and the footnotes 8 and 9 thereof.
16 B1-8 [Service 24, 2005]
17 1980 (2) SA 420 at 427E-G.
14
[32]
[33]
[34]
other party. However, the inclusion
of the word "may" in subrule 1 indicates that there is no
automatic right.
The honourable Botha J said that:
"D. The Court has a discretion
in relation to orders to be granted, pertaining to discovery, as
appears from the case referred
to by counsel for the respondents,
Continental Ore Construction v Highveld Steel & Vanadium
Corporation Ltd 1971 (4)
SA 589 (W). In application proceedings we know that discovery is a
very, very rare and unusual procedure to be used and I have no doubt
that that is a sound practice and it is only in exceptional
circumstances,
E in my view, that discovery should
be ordered in application
proceedings."
18 The
point made herein above is re-emphasised in subrule 13.19.
The discovery under applications must
be at the direction of the Court. Further, there must be special
circumstances present which
warrant that such discovery be directed,
by the Court in the exercise of the its discretion.
In the Supreme Court Practice20
the learned authors, in discussing Rule
35 under general state as follows:
"The object of discovery was
stated in Durbach v Fairway Hotel Ltd21
to be 'to ensure that before trial both parties are made aware of
all the documentary evidence that is available. By this means
the
issues are narrowed and the debate of points which are
incontrovertible is eliminated... .But it must not be abused or
called
in lightly in situations for which it was not designed or it
will lose its 18
Moulder Components v Courakis and Another
1979 (2) SA 457 at 470C-D. 19
Rule 35(13) provides
that:
"
The provisions of this rule relating to discovery shall mutatis
mutandis apply,
in so far as the court may direct, to applications." 20
Bl-250 21
1949 (3) SA 1081 (SR) at 1083
15
[35]
edge and become debased.'22The
employment of discovery should be confined to case where parties are
before the court and are litigating 'at full stretch'.23
Discovery is not intended to be used as snipping weapon preliminary
skirmishes."
The main application under case
number 11967/07 is still alive since it was postponed sine die;24
The purpose of the main application is essentially to interdict
Junior from revoking the signing powers of Senior and Ms Susie
Monham in certain current accounts relating to the entities whose
directorship and ownership is the cause of the battle between
these
parties. The documents which it is sought that Junior must discover
relate to the various accounts pertaining to these entities.
Senior
has also made serious allegations against Junior. It is stated that
divested the assets of one of the entities, namely Monkam
Investment
Properties (Pty) Ltd and transferred some of these assets into
another entity Madeline Properties (Pty) Ltd and thereafter
caused
Monkam Investment Properties (Pty) Ltd to be wound up.25
The liquidator in the
company successfully brought an application to set aside such
disposition, under case number 5180/2006. It
is further stated that
it has since come to the knowledge of the applicants that on the 27
March 2007, unbeknown to the applicants
and the presiding judge on
the 28 March 2007, Junior a cheque in the amount of R674, 845,25 on
money market account number 9077405642
held in the name of
Hoopstraat to issued. Junior failed to disclose this fact on the 28
March 2007. Senior avers that he would
want to supplement his papers
once discovery has been made. 22
The MV Urgup: Owners of the MV Urgup v Western Bulk Carriers
(Australia) Pty 1999 (3) SA 500 (C) at
513G-1 23
At 513I (supra) 24
vide para [8] supra 25
Paginated page 34 para9.15 in fin.
16
[36]
[37]
As I have indicated herein above the
main application has been postponed
sine die. "In Saunders Valve Co Ltd v Insamcor (Pty) Ltd. 26
it
was held that the fact
that a permanent interdict was being sought on motion constituted
exceptional circumstances justifying an
order obliging the applicant
to make discovery prior to filing affidavits by the respondent.,,27
In casu, when regard to all the circumstances of this case, the
allegations of disposal of the assets of the entities concerned
in
this matter, the huge amounts of investment by Senior, a fact that
is not disputed by Junior, I am of the view that, in the
exercise of
my discretion, I should grant the order sought under counterclaim. I
also take into consideration the fact that in
the main application,
the other respondents mentioned therein, 2nd respondent to 4th
respondents are essentially the entities whose
soul the parties are
fighting for. There would be no prejudice in the circumstances to
grant the order sought, with some alterations,
particularly having
regard to the fact that the documents sought to be discovered by
Junior, have a bearing to the said respondents28.
The alteration is in regard to the seventh respondent, Snyman Venter
Incorporated. There is not much said about this respondent
on the
papers, to justify my having to grant an order against it.
In
so far as condonation brought by Junior for the late filing of his
documents, I am of the view that such condonation, should
be
granted. In fact it was not argued that I must reject such
application. In respect of the costs in all these Rule 47
applications
under both cases under case number 11967/07 including
the counter-application under this case number, and case number
11968/07
it stands to follow that Senior and Sussie Monkam as the
1st applicant and or 1st respondent and 2nd applicant and or 2nd
respondent
respectively wherever same applies, are entitled to the
costs of these actions. The question of attorney and client 26
1985 (1) SA 146 (T) 27
Supre Court Practice B1-262A [Service 21, 2004]
28 Annexure A and B at
paginated pages 152-157.
17
costs, just like a costs order is a
matter of the discretion of the Court. Although I am tempted to
grant a punitive costs order
against Junior, I shall refrain from
doing so, but order that he pays all the costs in these matters, as
I have indicated herein
above. The amounts involved in the
circumstances of these matters, the interwoven relationship of the
partied, including the entities
pertaining to the belly causal, as I
perceive the matter,
and the concomitant intricacies herein, justifies the employment of
2 counsel, one of whom is senior. Both parties have
engaged such
team of counsel. The successful parties are entitled to such costs
of employing two counsel, including a senior counsel. 38.
In the premises I make the following orders:
UNDER
CASE NUMBER 11967/07
1. That both applications in terms
of Rule 47 in the counter-application, are
dismissed with costs, which costs shall include costs of two
counsel, one of whom is senior
counsel.
2. That Pascal Monkam Junior as the
first respondent in the counterclaim, is directed to make
discovery of the documents listed
in annexure "A" within
the period of 15 days (fifteen) days of this order, and to make
available for inspection and copying
such documents discovered
within 5 (five) days from the date of the said discovery;
3. That permission be and is granted
to the applicants to supplement their founding affidavit in the main
application with the facts
deposed to in the affidavits n filed in
opposing the application for security for costs and the affidavits
filed in support of
the counter-application, and further supplement
the founding papers in the main application within a period of 15
(fifteen) court
days from the date on which inspection has been
obtained as referred to in prayer 2 above;
18
4. Directing that the First to Sixth
respondent are to file their answering affidavits in the main
application, if any, within 10
(ten) court days after the expiry of
the date upon which the applicants are allowed to supplement the
founding affidavits as per
prayer 3 above;
5. That the First Respondent (Pascal
Monkam Junior) to pay the costs of this counter-application, which
costs shall include the
costs of two counsel, one of whom is senior
counsel. UNDER
CASE NUMBER 11968/07 It
is hereby ordered: 1.
That the Rule 47 application is dismissed with costs which costs
shall include the costs of 2 (two)
counsel, one of whom is senior
counsel.
HEARD ON THE : 18 / 09/2007
DATE OF JUDGMENT : 05/10/2007 APPLICANT'S
[JNR'S] ATT : Mr. GROOVE B. APPLICANT'S
[JNR'S] ADV : Mr. GEACH, SC
WITH ADV : GEYLING PJ RESPONDENTS'
[SNR'S] ATT : Mr FINK T
RESPONDETS' ADV : Mr. MARITZ SJ, SC.
WITH ADV : LOUW N J
19