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IN THE: HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA

CASE NO: 55832/16

NOT REPORTABLE

NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES

31 AUGUST 2018

In the matter between:

CHRIITIAAN SCHOISMAN                                                         Applicant

and

KENNETH NKOSANA MAKATE                                               First Respondent

ADVOCATE MH MABENA SC    

CHAIRPERSON OF THE PRETORIA BAR COUNCIL           Third Respondent

RAINING MEN TRADEI:(PTY)                                                 Fourth Respondent

UMIKA GOPICHUNO ATTORNEYS                                        Fifth Respondent

MOGOBOYA DOOLING ASSOCIATES                                  Sixth Respondent

NYIKA WALTER BOLOYI                                                       Seventh Respondent

STEMELA & LUBBE INC                                                        Eighth Respondent

JUDGMENT

Tuchten J:

1     On 14 June 2016 I granted an order (the earlier order) by consent in the urgent motion court of this Division in case no. 42533/16 (the urgent application). That was the case of Raining Men Trade (Pty) Limited ("Raining Men") and Mr Schoeman v Mr Makate, the present first respondent and the seventh respondent in the earlier case, and several other respondents.

2. Th order which I granted by consent was contained in a draft.[1] I must give background which will show why the earlier order was sought.

3    Mr Makate used to work for Vodacom. While working for Vodacom he developed a product called "Please call me" (PCM) which is widely believed to have earned Vodacom large sums of money. Mr Makate believed that Vodacom had to pay him for his invention. In 2008, he sued Vodacom, which defended the action. Mr Makate lost the case in the trial court and was refused leave to appeal, first by the trial court and then by the SCA He was eventually granted leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court. On 20 April 2016, the Constitutional Court found that Mr Makate was indeed the inventor of PCM and ordered Vodacom to negotiate with Mr Makate in good faith toward determining a fair remuneration for his work and ingenuity.

4     Mr Makate could not himself fund the very expensive litigation that was required to prove his case. He entered into a funding agreement with Mr Schoeman.   There was an   addendum to the funding agreement. Mr Schoeman did not conclude the funding agreement simply in .his own name but as an "authorized representative of a Company to be nominated". There are presently disputes about the identity of the company which Mr Schoeman says he nominated and about the terms of the addendum. Mr Schoeman has put up what he says is the true addendum. Mr Makate says that the document soput up has his initials forged on some of its pages. The significance of the forgery alle9ation is that if it Is true, It will cast considerable doubt on· Mr Schoeman's version of the nomination .

5     Mr Schoeman used to be an advocate but was struck off the roll by order of the then Natal Provincial Division on 20 October 1999 under case no. 1300/99. when he concluded the funding agreement, he was unable to meet the obligations imposed upon the company to be nominated out of his own means. He was obliged to offer some of the equity in the venture he had sounder taken to Errol Elsdon and Tracey Roscher as well as his ex-wife and a Mr Jenkins, possibly among others.

6     Considerable sums were advanced for the benefit of Mr Makate at the behest of Mr Schoeman. I was told that these sums exceeded R2 million. But the case was expensive and the money advanced did not cover the costs of petitioning the SCA after leave to appeal had been refused by the trial judge. On 15 December 2014, Mr Schoeman wrote a lengthy email to Elsdon and Roscher. He explained the need for a total of R165 000 which had to be paid to Mr Makate's attorney, Ms Lubbe, a member of the present eighth respondent. The money had to be paid urgently because Ms Lubbe had warned that she would not brief counsel to do any of the petition work unless she was placed in funds.

7    Mr Schoeman went on in the email to say that Raining Men was at that date the "beneficiary and holder of the assets and liabilities" ofthe funding agreement. He listed what he called the problems with Raining Men in even paragraphs in section [B] of the email. He said no shares in Raining Men had b tm issued, that he, Mr Schoeman, was nota director of Raining Menand that Raining Menwas insolvent and could not pay Ms Lubbe's account. He recorded that Mr Makate had not accepted the nomination and that Mr Makate's refusal to do so had been reasonable.

8.    Mr Schoeman then proceeded in section [CJ of the email to outline the

three options he thought were open to the  the three of them: firstly, that Raining Men find enough money to meet its commitments before 22 December 2015 and be brought into a solvent position; secondly, that Raining Men cede its rights to Mr Schoeman, after which Mr Schoeman would go back into the market to find funding; or, thirdly, that ''we simply allow Makate to cancel the funding   agreement."

9.   Mr Schoeman observed that the third option implied that the three of them as the "old funders''[2] would lose everything and recommended option [C]2;

10  In the result neither option [c]1 nor option [C]2 was selected. On 22 December 2014 Mr Schoeman wrote by email to Ms Lubbe. In paragraph 4 of that email he said:

My position is clear, at present there is no agreement between Makate and Raining Men an(i they are not entitled to any rights under the Funding Agreement ... . I am the only person who holds those rights, until I nominate a company in my place ... .

11    Mr Makate then retained a new attorney, Mr Williams of the firm Hahn & Hahn. On 7 January 2015, Mr Williams sent an email to the lawyers for Mr Schoeman and raining Men, cancelling the funding agreement.

12     The validity of the cancellation is however now in dispute although at the time it was purportedly made, it suited Mr Schoeman, Elsdon and Roscher for the funding agreement to be cancelled. This is because, to their knowledge, Vodacom was threatening proceedings to render them personally liable for the costs of the action and there seemed but a slender prospect that Mr Makate would win his case.

13   However, on 1 September 2015, Mr Makate's case was argued in the Constitutional Court c;1nd on 26 April 2016 judgment was given sub nom. Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd [2016] ZACC 13. The prospect existed that Mr Makate would be paid a large sum of money by Vodacom. The interest of Mr Set1oeman and Raining Men in Mr Makate's litigation awoke afresh after the case was argued in the Constitutional Court.

14     They declared a dispute with Mr Makate under clause 11 of the funding agreement, which reads:

In the event of there being any dispute or difference between the Parties arising out of this Agreement, the said dispute or difference shall on written demand by any Party be submitted to informal arbitration in Pretoria . which needs to be finalised within one month of date of declaration of dispute.

The parties shall decide on an Arbitrator with no less than 10 years standing as Arbitrator. The decision shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute. The person so appointed shall be the duly appointed arbitrator in respect of the dispute. In the event of the attorneys of the parties failing

to agree on my matter relating to the administration of the arbitration, such matter shall be referred to and decided by the arbitrator whose decision shall be final and binding on the parties to the dispute.

An arbitration In terms of this clause 11 shall b conducted

in camera and the Parties shall treat as confidential details of the dispute submitted to arbitration, the conduct of the arbitration proceedings and the outcome of the arbitration.

This clause 11 will continue to be binding on the Parties notwithstanding any termination or cancellation of the Agreement.

15     The third respondent, the then chairperson of the Pretoria Bar Council, was approached by the parties and duly nominated Adv Mabena SC, the present second respondent, as arbitrator. Mr Schoeman and Raining Men, employing the same counsel and attorney, submitted a statement of claim dated 2 December 2015 which of course described the dispute the arbitrator had been asked to determine.

16     The claim was brought against Mr Makate. The relief sought by way of arbitral award was, firstly, that either Raining Men or Mr Schoeman was a party to the funding agreement and to Mr Schoeman's version of the addendum and as such, such claimant had acquired the rights and obligations in relation to Mr Makte as provided in these agreements; and, secondly, that the funding agreement was "extant and binding on the parties thereto".[3]

17     The statement of defence was dated 17 December 2015. In it, Mr Makate put the nomination relied upon by claimants Raining Men and Schoeman in issue and asserted that he had validly cancelled the funding agreement. Mr Makate also lodged a counter claim forawards declaring that the funding agreement had been duly cancelled and for payment of amounts which Mr Makate said were owed by one or other of the claimants if they proved the nomination.

18     One might ask how Mr Schoeman came to allege that he had duly nominated Raining Men or that the funding agreement had not been validly cancelled in the light of the correspondence upon which I have touched.[4] The answer, according to Mr Schoeman, is that at the instigation of Ms Lubbe he became party to a fraudulent scheme to it. exclude Elsdon and Roscher from participation in the proceeds of the case. Mr Schoeman says that the conspiracy in this regard commenced a few days after 20 November 2014. According to Mr Schoeman, if I understand correctly, the conspiracy required Mr Schoeman to acquiesGe in, or at least remain supine towards, the cancellation of thefunding agreement which Ms Lubbe is said to have decided to procure. Ms Lubbe is said to have told Mr Schoeman that she would look after Mr Schoeman and Mr Jenkins.

19     In open court during argument before me, counsel for Mr Schoeman confirmed that co.-conspirators according to Mr Schoeman included Ms Lubbe and the new attorney, Mr Williams. I put it to counsel that in his affidavit before me Mr Schoeman had also named Adv R Michau SC as a co-conspirator. I asked counsel whether Mr Schoeman still alleged Mr Michau was a co-conspirator. Mr Schoeman then confirmed in open court that he asserted that Michau SC was a co-conspirator. I asked counsel to ask Mr Schoeman whether he alleged that there were any additional co-conspirators and, if so, to name them. Counsel declined to put these questions to Mr Schoeman.

20     The existence of the alleged conspiracy is denied by Mr Makate and Ms Lubbe.

21    The urgent application was brought by Raining Men and Mr Schoeman jointly, employing the same attorney and counsel. It was launched by notice of motion dated 26 May 2016. The urgent application sought, as a matter of urgency, the following relief: firstly, interdicting a number of lawyers from representing Mr Makate in negotiations with Vodacom and receiving any payment pursuant to the Constitutional Court order; secondly, interdicting Mr Makate from appointing any legal representative in the case against Vodacom without the consent of Raining Men and Mr Schoeman; thirdly, interdicting Mr Makate from paying out any the proceeds received pursuant to the Constitutional Court order without the consent of Raining Men and Mr Schoeman "alternatively 50% of such amount".

22       These interdicts were sought pending the outcome of an action to be instituted by Raining Men and Mr Schoeman within 30 days for orders identical to those I have described in the arbitration pending before Adv Mabena SC.

23      As I have said the urgent application came before me on 14 June 2016. By then several of the respondents had delivered answering affidavits. I have been given a paginated and Indexed bundle of

papers in the urgent application. I do not know whether the bundle represents the complete record before me on that date. There are however no replying affidavits in the bundle given to me.

24      I have no independent recollection of the proceedings in the urgent application but the papers show that I made the earlier order. The papers also reflect that I was asked to rule on a specific issue reflected in the draft of the earlier order and that I refused to do so on the ground that the draft reflected a settlement agreement between the parties. The proceedings in my urgent court were mechanically recorded and what I said should appear from the transcript.

25     The earlier order reads:[5]

1       The application is postponed sine die for the limited purpose of determining a just and equitable costs order.

2        [Mr Makate] has exclusive rights to choose any person or persons to represent or assist him in negotiations with [Vodacom.]

3        Pending the final outcome of the arbitration proceedings therefore Advocate Mabena SC 50% of any payment made to [Mr Makate] by [Vodacom] pursuant to a negotiation mandated by the Constitutional Court in its order dated 26 April 2016 will be held in the trust account of Umika Gopichund Attorneys.[6]

4       No further papers are to be delivered in this application save only the arbitration award if any at any stage at the conclusion of the arbitration or any interim awards made during the arbitration.

5        Costs are reserved for further consideration once the final arbitration award has been handed down.

26       The scheme of the settlement agreement which Raining Men, Mr Schoeman and Mr Makate chose to embody in a draft order is clear: Raining Men and Mr Schoeman abandoned both the final relief they had sought and the interim relief of interdicts pending an action. By consent, interim relief would issue pending the final outcome of the arbitration proceedings already instituted and pending before Mabena SC.[7] That interim relief would require Mr Makate to cause 50% of any money he received from Vodacom to be deposited in the trusted account of Uma Gopichund Attorneys and to remain there until the final outcome of the arbitration before Mabena SC.

27      Uma Gopiohund is a sole practitioner. At the time the affidavits were delivered in the applications before me, she and Mr Makate both worked for the South African Local Government (SALGA). Ms Gopichund had been given permission by SALGA to start her own attorney's practice . She worked from home and kept her overheads down by using her home telephone for her practice. She is registered with the applicable Law Society and is in good standing. She has a small practice and possibly only a few clients.

28      Having duly settled the urgent application on the terms I have described, Mr Schoeman alone, ie without Raining Men joining as an applicant but featuring as the fourth respondent, brought the present application by notice of motion dated 13 July 2016. The present application is an attempt to achieve Mr Schoeman's (and Raining Men's) release from the very settlement agreement which they had concluded a month earlier and had bound themselves to in the earlier order.

29    This is what Mr Schoeman sought in his notice of motion in the present case: firstly, that the arbitration agreement (to which Raining Men and Mr Schoeman had given effect by launching the arbitration before Mabena SC) be set aside; or that the ''dispute between the parties shall not be referred to arbitration"; or that the arbitration ''cease to have effect between the parties".

30      All this, Mr Schoeman sought to achieve by recourse to s 3(2) of the Arbitration Act, 42 of 1965, which reads:

The court may at any time on the application of any party to an arbitration agreement, on good cause shown·

(a)        set aside the arbitration agreement; or

(b)        order that any particular dispute referred to in the arbitration agreement shall not be referred to arbitration; or

(c)         order that the arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect with reference to any dispute referred.

31       Secondly, in the alternative to the first prayer, Mr Schoeman asked that the appointment of Mabena SC be set aside. Thirdly, Mr Schoeman asked that paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the earlier order be set aside and replaced by the following:

3 Pending the final outcome of any litigation of the resolution of the dispute between [Mr Schoeman] or [Raining Men], on the one side and [Mr Makate], on the other 50% of any payment made to [Mr Makate] by the eighth respondent, pursuant to negotiation mandated by the Constitutional Court, in its order dated the 26th April 2016, will be held in the trust account of a firm of attorneys, which will be nominated by the Secretary of the Law Society of the Northern Provinces and which firm will have cover Insurance and indemnity of no less than R500 ... Million ... .

4      No further papers are to be delivered in this application save and only the judgment or settlement agreement in respect of the dispute between the parties.

5       That [Mr Schoeman] or [Raining Men] be ordered to deliver his Particulars of Claim within 30 days from the dataof this order failing which the order will lapse.

6       Costs of this application will be reserved for determination by the court hearing the dispute between the parties.

32     Only Mr Schoeman1 Mr Makate and Ms Lubbe's firm were represented in the present case. The other respondents abided.

33     Mr Schoeman hoped to achieve the removal of Mabena SC by bringing up serious unprofessional conduct of Mabena SC which had culminated in his suspension from practice for a period. That period had long since expired. Mabena returned to practice, was forgiven by the Pretoria Society of Advocates and so rehabilitated himself that he was recommended for and then awarded silk. Mr Schoeman did not say when he learnt of the circumstances of the suspension. The full circumstances of the misconduct and the suspension were set out in answering affidavits, one of which was by the chair of the Pretoria Bar Council at the time the answering affidavits in the present application were delivered.

34      In his replying affidavit, Mr Schoeman abandoned the relief he sought in relation to the removal of the arbitrator.

35      The basis for the s 3(2) relief expressed in the founding affidavit was, firstly, that the description of the arbitration as informal rendered arbitration inappropriate; secondly, that the conduct of "senior members of the legal team" would be in issue, for which it was undesirable that a colleague be the arbitrator and that this task should be undertaken by a judge; thirdly, that the period of one month for finalisation of the arbitration had already elapsed; fourthly, that the resolution of the disputes raised in the arbitration before Mabena SC required the determination of the validity of a fee agreement concluded between Mr Makate and attorney Lubbe which involved "not only the taxed costs but also an amount in the region of R150 million" ... .

36    Or-) these grounds, the prayer for s 3(2) relief was at best naive and at worst cynical or downright abusive of the court's proceedings. Mr Makate produced evidence to the effect that Mr Schoeman was stringing out his legal wrangle with Mr Makate in order to keep Mr Makate from enjoying the benefit of his Constitutional Court victory. The issue between the parties in this regard before me is attended by so many disputes of fact that I cannot decide how finally to characterise Mr Schoeman's s 3(2) claims on this spectrum; I can only say that they were doomed to failure in the present application. It came as no surprise that senior counsel, whom Mr Schoeman retained late in the day to argue the application before me,[8] abandoned the s 3(2) relief and sought relief only in relation to the substitution of paragraph 3 of the earlier order by the new material which I quoted in paragraph 31 above.

37      But one of the problems which face Mr Schoeman is that the imposition of the new material on Mr Makate would constitute a variation by the court of the settlement agreement concluded between the parties. I accept, of course, that an interim order can.be varied by the court for good cause shown.[9] Courts will not lightly vary their own orders, even though they may be of a merely interlocutory nature. And the cases in which such orders will be altered in the absence of fresh facts cannot be numerous.[10]

38      I accept too, that if an attorney appointed as in this case to hold money is suspected of being corrupt or perhaps even merely negligent, in the administration of her trust account, the court would have the power to remove the attorney in question from her administration in terms of the court order. But nothing of the kind has been suggested in the case of Ms Gopichund. The worst that can be said of her is that she has a small practice. Why should an attorney with a small practice be less trustworthy than an attorney with a large practice? I cannot see that it follows. Then it is said that she and Mr Makate are connected through their employer, SALGA. I cannot imagine why that would predispose Ms Gopichund toward dealing inappropriately with the funds she is to hold under the earlier order.

39     The wish of Mr Schoeman to have the attorney who holds the money hold the large amount of indemnity insurance identified in paragraph 3 of prayer 3 is not something that appears from the earlier order. Why should Mr Schoeman now be allowed to impose that restriction? I can think of no good reason to allow him to do so.

40       I therefore decline to vary the earlier order in relation to the appointment of Ms Gopichund.

41      The other basis upon which I am asked to vary paragraph 3 of the earlier order is that, broadly, Mr Schoeman wants me to refashion clause 3 to make it interim to an action as opposed to the pending arbitration. He tries to do this by praying in aid at an interim level the principle of the s 3(2) relief he cannot achieve under the first category of relief in the present application.

42       Mr Schoeman cannot be allowed to achieve under the guise of interim relief the very final relief to which he concedes, by abandoning the first category of relief, he has not made out a case. And even were I to consider granting him his paragraph 3 relief, the approach would have to be that such relief would be final in substance, if not in form. And then paragraph 3 relief would have to be refused for the same reason that the first category of relief was abandoned: the grounds on which the first category of relief was sought lack substance. There is simply nothing in the character of the disputes that renders arbitration inappropriate and Plascon Evans cannot be surmounted.

43       And finally, at this level: paragraph 3 of the earlier order was designed by the parties to the settlement to cater for the situation pending the arbitration. Now Mr Schoeman wants the court to impose interim relief on Mr Makate pending an action. I do not believe that the court has the power to make a new settlement agreement for the parties. Mr Schoeman's remedy is to launch his proposed action and then apply for Interim relief pending that action.

44       Counsel for Mr Schoeman sought to substitute for the paragraph 3 relief sought by Mr Schoeman in the notice of motion in the present application the terms of a draft which counsel addressed for the first time and put to paper during an adjournment granted while counsel was addressing the court in reply. The new draft would substitute for paragraph 3 In prayer 3 of the notice of motion the following:

Pending the final outcome of the issue nomination of Raining Men ... and the cancellation of the funding agreement as formulated in the pending arbitral process before Mabena SC In an action to be instituted by [Mr Schoeman], as contemplated in paragraph 5 below, 50% of any payment made to [Mr Makate] by [Vodacom], pursuant to negotiations mandated by the Constitutional Court, in its order dated 26 April 2016, will be held in trust account of a firm of attorneys, which will be nominated by the secretary of the Law Society ... and which firm will have cover insurance and indemnity of not less than [R500 million].

45       The new draft is just a reformulation of the old paragraph 3 but highlights a specific difficulty facing Mr Schoeman: it leaves the arbitration simply hanging in the air. Nothing prevents Mr Schoeman from bringing an action in court. He does not need the leave of the court to do so. He would then be confronted, probably, by a defence that there is not merely an arbitration agreement but a pending arbitration brought pursuant to that very arbitration agreement. One of the reasons he wants this relief is, I should imagine, that he wants the court to sanction what he is at present not disposed forthrightly to confront: that although in possession of the relevant facts, he chose to arbitrate rather than to institute action; but now, for reasons which sound unconvincing, Mr Schoeman has changed his mind and wants to go to court.

46    Counsel for Mr Schoeman submitted that it is legally impossible for a claimant in an arbitration to withdraw his claim. I cannot think why that should be so. But in any event, s 15(1) of the Arbitration Act empowers an arbitrator to proceed in the absence of a party. Mr Schoeman can achieve the termination of the arbitration by simply failing to attend it on the date he was told it would be heard. Or he could attend and state that he would not offer any evidence or argument.

47    To summarise: The court does not have the power to impose upon Mr Makate a variation of his settlement with Raining Men and Mr Schoeman. It would be a wrong exercise of my discretion to substitute for interim relief designed and agreed to specifically to operate pending the arbitration, relief designed for a different purpose to which Mr Makate has not agreed. No good cause has been shown for the removal of Ms Gopichund from the administration she has undertaken pursuant to the earlier order. No good cause has been shown for relief pending an action in this court.

48     The main application before me must fail. Regrettably that is not the end of the case. There remains for adjudication a counter-application by Mr Makate to declare Mr Schoeman a vexatious litigant and an application by Mr Schoeman to strike out material put up by Mr Makate in both his answering affidavit in the present main application and in the counter..application. Although a great deal of material is Identified in Mr Schoeman's notice of motion to strike out, the common thread of the materialis that it shows that Mr Schoeman was struck off the roll of advocates rather than, as he says in one of his affidavits, merely removed from the roll upon his own motion

49     First the counter-application. Section 2(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act[11] empowers the court to grant relief in relation to a person who

... has persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted any leg I proceedings in any court[12]  or inferior court ...

50      The insurmountable difficulty facing Mr Makate in the counter­ application is that the only proceeding instituted by Mr Schoeman which is relevant for present purposes is the urgent application. And far from there being no reasonable ground, the urgent application was settled by the grant by consent of interim relief. Wisely, counsel for Mr Makate did not seek to press the counter-claim. It must be dismissed.

51   The evidence directed at showing that Mr Schoeman was struck off the roll of advocates was in my judgment obviously relevant to the main application. Mr Schoeman had firstly, and untruthfully, stated under oath that he had been removed from the roll of his own motion; and had, secondly, made the credibility of witnesses likely to be supportive of Mr Makate central to his dispute with Mr Makate. Mr Makate was therefore entitled to adduce evidence to attack the credibility of Mr Schoeman, Additionally, the evidence was relevant to show, as counsel for Mr Makate said they would try to do, that Mr Schoeman had a propensity for egregious wrong-doing,followed by a recantation and a false attempt to blame those he claimed had incited him to do wrong. Whether a court or arbitrator will agree with counsel is something else and what weight Is to be given to Mr Schoeman's wrong-doing so many years ago is for the appropriate tribunal to determine in due course.

52    Counsel for Mr Schoeman sought to argue that the nature of Mr Schoeman's wrong-doing in context was similar to that of Mabena SC. But in the former case, Mabena's wrong.-doing was placed in context by cogent evidence and submissions in the papers. It was not suggested that the evidence be ignored; rather that it should carry no weight. I shall merely say that Mr Schoeman did not follow that wise path in relation to his own wrong-doing.

53    I therefore find that the application to $trike out must fail on its merits.

54    Mr Schoeman asked for punitive costs order consequent upon the dismissal of the counter-application. I have decided not to grant such an order for the following reasons. Firstly, the conduct of Mr Schoeman may be vexatious, depending on the resolution of the disputes of fact. The sense of frustration which propelled Mr Makate to bring the counter-claim may therefore be justified, to the limited extent relevant at this level. Secondly, Mr Schoeman showed himself to be untruthful in relation to how he came to be removed from the roll of advocates.

55    I was referred to two reserved costs orders. These were dealt with informally as is the practice generally in this Division. I cannot from what was told to me determine how those costs should be awarded.

So I shall make no order in relation to the reserved costs. A decision on the costs reserved in the urgent application must await the outcome of the arbitration.

56      I make the following order:

1        The main application, ie the applicant's application brought by notice of motion dated 13 July 2016, is dismissed with costs including the costs consequent upon the employment of two counsel.

2       The applicant's application to strike out is dismissed with costs, including the costs consequent upon the employment of two counsel.

3        The first respondent 's counter-application is dismissed with costs.

4       No order Is made in regard to the costs reserved on 13 February 2017 and 23 October 2017.

NB Tuchten

Judge of the High Court

31 August 2018

For the applicant:

Adv JG Wasserman SC

Instructed by Booysen & Co

Umhlanga Rocks

For the first respondent:

Adv CE Puckrin SC and Adv A Mare

Instructed by

Crouse Incorporated

Pretoria

For the eighth respondent:

Adv AF Arnoldi SC

Instructed by

Stemela & Lubbe Attorneys

Pretoria

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