---

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, PRETORIA

 

(1)   REPORTABLE: NO

(2)   OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO

(3)   REVISED.

CASE NO: 60395/2017

 

In the matter between:

ADV A J DU TOIT N. O. obo O[….] N[….]                                                            Plaintiff 

 

And

 

ROAD ACCIDENT FUND                                                                                         Defendant

JUDGEMENT

 

ERASMUS AJ

INTRODUCTION

 

1.         The plaintiff sues in his representative capacity, on behalf of the minor child, for damages caused as a result of injuries the minor child sustained when he was involved in a motor vehicle accident. He was a pedestrian at the time of the accident.  The accident occurred on 28 April 2013.

2.         The matter was set down for trial before me.  The merits have been settled earlier.  The Court also during March 2020 awarded an interim payment of R3 000 000.00.  The only outstanding head of damages that this court needs to determine is the loss of earning or earning capacity.  The parties did indicate to me that they have managed to settle the General Damages.  I will later herein deal with the settlement of the General Damages.

3.         The Defendant in this matter terminated the mandate of its attorney of record.  I have allowed the Litigation Claims Officer, Mr Walleed Adams, to address me on the aspects he wanted to address me.  Mr Adams is an admitted attorney.

 

REQUEST FOR POSTPONEMENT

4.         During the oral argument, the Mr Adams, applied for a postponement.  At this juncture I need to mention that I do not necessary think it is a postponement of the trial, but rather only a postponement of the one outstanding aspect, being the biggest portion of the minor child’s claim, being the loss of earnings or earning capacity.

 

5.         Adv Laubsher who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff indicated to me that this was the first time a possible postponement of the matter is raised and it was not discussed with them, but that they will oppose this application for postponement. 

 

6.         I have listened to the argument of both Mr Adams as well as Adv Laubsher.  At the end of the argument, Adv Laubsher asked me whether a substantive application will be provided.  That is the practice in this division.  I have explained same to Mr Adams, and I have requested the parties to agree to timeframes between them and to email me the relevant application and opposing affidavit, if any.  Same was done.  The defendant did not file a replying affidavit. 

 

7.         Generally, if a bona fide reason is furnished for a postponement, and if the other party, in casu the plaintiff, will not be unduly prejudiced by a postponement, such an application is granted, provided of course there is any point in the postponement.

 

8.         In Erasmus, Superior Court Practice, Vol 2, pp D1-552A, the following is said about postponements (footnotes omitted):

“The legal principles applicable to an application for the grant of a postponement by the court are as follows:

(a)    The court has a discretion as to whether an application for a postponement should be granted or refused. Thus, the court has a discretion to refuse a postponement even when wasted costs are tendered or even when the parties have agreed to postpone the matter.

(b)    That discretion must be exercised in a judicial manner. It should not be exercised capriciously or upon any wrong principle, but for substantial reasons. If it appears that a court has not exercised its discretion judicially, or that it has been influenced by wrong principles or a misdirection on the facts, or that it has reached a decision which could not reasonably have been made by a court properly directing itself to all the relevant facts and principles, its decision granting or refusing a postponement may be set aside on appeal.

(c)    An applicant for a postponement seeks an indulgence. The applicant must show good and strong reasons, i e the applicant must furnish a full and satisfactory explanation of the circumstances that give rise to the application. A court should be slow to refuse a postponement where the true reason for a party’s non-preparedness has been fully explained, where his unreadiness to proceed is not due to delaying tactics, and where justice demands that he should have further time for the purpose of presenting his case.

(d)   An application for a postponement must be made timeously, as soon as the circumstances which might justify such an application become known to the applicant. If, however, fundamental fairness and justice justify a postponement, the court may in an appropriate case allow such an application for postponement even if the application was not so timeously made.

(e)    An application for postponement must always be bona fide and not used simply as a tactical manoeuvre for the purpose of obtaining an advantage to which the applicant is not legitimately entitled.

(f)    Considerations of prejudice will ordinarily constitute the dominant component of the total structure in terms of which the discretion of the court will be exercised; the court has to consider whether any prejudice caused by a postponement can fairly be compensated by an appropriate order of costs or any other ancillary mechanism.

(g)    The balance of convenience or inconvenience to both parties should be considered: the court should weigh the prejudice which will be caused to the respondent in such an application if the postponement is granted against the prejudice which will be caused to the applicant if it is not.”

 

9.         In considering this application I bear these principles in mind. Here the accident happened a long time ago, on 28 April 2013, and that could be reason enough to refuse the postponement. And it is a tragic event in the life of this minor.  Not only did he suffer severe injuries as a result of the accident, he also lost his mother who was also a victim of this accident.  [1]  At some point, and sooner rather than later, he needs to close this chapter in his life. 

 

10.      The events that led up to this trial date, as it is summarised in the heads of argument for the postponement prepared and filed by Adv Laubsher, can be summarised as follows:

 

            10.1     On 31 August 2018 the matter was certified as trial ready;

10.2     A trial date was allocated for 11 March 2020 and the Notice of Set Down was served on the defendant’s previous attorney of record on 10 September 2018.  This is approximately 18 months’ notice;

10.3     On 2 April 2019, the plaintiff serves and files an addendum report by their educational psychologist as well as the report by their industrial psychologist;

10.4     On 23 January 2020, and at the pre-trial held on that day, the previous legal representatives indicated that they want to appoint obtain reports of an educational psychologist, as well as an industrial psychologist;

10.5     On 24 January 2020 the relevant notices in terms of Rule 36 (2), as undertaken by the defendant’s attorney of record, was served;

10.6    The minor child attended the industrial psychologist on the 5^th of February 2020 and the educational psychologist on the 7^th day of February 2020;

10.7     On 19 February 2020 a second certificate for trial readiness is issued, and a directive is issued that the reports as aforementioned should be served and filed by 26 February 2020, and the joint minutes should be filed by 4 March 2020;

10.8     On 20 February 2020 the plaintiff served Rule 36 (8) (a), (b) and (c) notices in respect of the educational psychologist and the industrial psychologist who examined the minor child;

10.9     On 11 March 2020, and on the request of the defendant, the matter was postponed to 10 July 2020 to enable the Defendant to obtain and deliver the reports by the experts already mentioned;

10.10  On 10 July 2020 the matter was not on the trial roll due to an administrative error on the side of the registrar.  The trial was then enrolled with the permission of the Acting Deputy Judge President and she allocated this matter to my court. 

 

11.       This timeline seems to be common cause.

 

12.      What is at the heart of this request by the defendant to postpone the loss of earnings or earning capacity is the failure by the defendant to file the aforementioned expert reports.  In terms of the Judicial Pre-trial that was held by my brother Louw J, a directive was issued as to when reports ought to be filed.  This was simply not adhered to.  The defendants were then ordered by my sister De Villiers – Van Nieker AJ to serve and file the outstanding reports.  This was also not done. 

 

13.      I do not want to express any views or opinions regarding the dispute between the defendant and its panel attorneys.  It is not my place to do so, and in my view not the correct forum.  In the last couple of months this Court heard various application, and I think we are all aware of the issues presently plaguing the RAF and its panel of attorneys.  [2]  What is, however, my concern is the fact that is seems as if this dispute is negatively impacting on the plaintiffs right to come to court and the right to have their matters adjudicated.  That, in my view, is simply unacceptable. 

 

14.      The defendant in his application for postponement, and specifically paragraph 16 thereof, states that “[s]ince then, the Applicant/Defendant’s Industrial Psychologist report has become available.  I have obtained a copy thereof from the expert directly and can confirm that to date, neither the Educational Psychologist Report nor the Industrial Psychologist Report has been served on the Plaintiff Attorneys by the Panel Attorneys.”   The dates on which the reports have become available, however, has not been mentioned. 

 

15.      During the argument of the postponement I understood Adv Laubsher to say that the report by the educational psychologist was indeed sent to them via email, but that such email was after the date on which the report had to be filed, and they have not had regard to the email or the report and the contents thereof and that it was simply deleted.  Nowhere in the two affidavits filed by Ms Jeanelle van As, the attorney of the Plaintiff, do I find reference to this.  I also do not find any reference to this email in the affidavit filed by Mr Adams. 

 

16.      If I indeed understood the submission by Adv Laubsher correctly, then I am somewhat puzzled why this is not being dealt with in the affidavits.  This is an important aspect and much turns on it.  If the report by the educational psychologist was indeed sent to the plaintiff’s attorney via email then the correct procedure is not simply to delete an email and totally disregard the contents of the report simply because it is filed outside the timeframes set out in a Court Order.  It is for the Court to decide whether such a report should be allowed or not.  The correct procedure, in my mind, would have been to either evoke the Rules of Court or write a collegial letter advising that an application for condonation out to be brought.  I truly hope that I misunderstood the submission by Adv Laubsher.

 

17.      The basis for the application for the postponement of this specific head of damages is in order to serve and file the expert reports referred to above.

 

18.      The basis for the opposition is, in a nutshell, that the defendant had ample opportunity to file the reports, it did not adhere to the order by my sister De Villiers – Van Niekerk and therefore the door should be closed on them and the matter should be finalised without their reports.

19.      At the outset, I am mindful of the fact that where one deals with State funds (as in the RAF’s case), a measure of caution must always be employed.  And yet, to allow lengthy postponements is also not in the interests of justice – like I have already alluded to – many plaintiffs, including the minor child in this matter, have suffered severe injuries and have been left with their lives shattered. 

 

20.      In the affidavit filed on behalf of the defendant, and save for the reference to the possible email already mentioned above, it is clear that the defendant made a full disclosure as to the reasons why the two reports are outstanding.  As already said, the problems between the defendant and the panel attorneys should not be the problem of the plaintiffs.  In casu we are sitting with a minor child, and I fail to see why the tiff between the defendant and its panel attorneys should become the problem of a minor child.  That being said, the defendant was open and frank in its disclosure as to the reasons why the reports are not filed as per the order of March 2020.  It is clear that it was simply kept in the dark by its attorney of record as to what was done and what was not done. 

 

21.      In my view the indulgence sought by the defendant is not to delay the finalisation of the matter.  On considering all the facts and the events that lead to the trial being allocated to me, it is clear that the defendant tried its best to bring relief, be it on the interim.  I am mindful of the fact that the interim payment has not been made, but the Plaintiff can utilise the Rules of court in order to secure the payment.  It is for the curator ad litem to provide his attorneys of record with the necessary instructions as to the steps they should take in the litigation. 

 

22.      And with this I do not say that the defendant is blameless in the non-payment of the interim payment.  There is an obligation on the defendant to compensate this minor child, there is a Court order in place to which it agreed.  I fail to see why this payment is not being made. 

 

23.      The fact that there is a tender on the general damages, with which I shall deal herein later, was forthcoming.  It is not as if, like thousand of the other matters, where the defendant simply seeks a postponement without making a tender on one or more of the heads of damages.

24.      I am mindful that an application for postponement should be made timeously.  This application was not made timeously.  Not at all.  It was not even made at the eleventh hour.  It was made for the first time after my Court already started.  I am, however, of the view that fundamental fairness and justice justifies a postponement.  I am of the view that this is an appropriate case to allow a postponement even if it was made so late in the day.  This is not, like the normal matters, where the RAF still wants to appoint experts.  This is a matter where the reports already exist.  It is ready to be filed should a next Court grant the defendant condonation for the late filling of the reports. 

 

25.      This brings me to the consideration of prejudice.  This is the dominant component of the total structure in terms of which the discretion of the court will be exercised.  I need to consider whether any prejudice caused by a postponement can fairly be compensated by an appropriate order of costs, or any other ancillary mechanism. 

 

26.      During argument I have raised the fact that there is an order for an interim payment of R3 000 000.00 made during March 2020.  This is a payment she is entitled to.  I have asked Adv Laubsher to indicate to me what possible prejudice can the plaintiff suffer in light of this order.  No prejudice was pointed out to me during the argument.  I am, however, mindful that this amount is still not paid.

 

27.      The defendant in its application for postponement listed why it is of the opinion the minor child will not suffer any prejudice.  The interim payment of R3 000 000.00 is raised, the fact that the general damages has been settled on R1 900 000.00, the fact that provision is made for the future medical expenses by way of a Section 17 (4) (a) undertaking, and that the past medical expenses has been dealt with.

 

28.      In response, the plaintiff’s one main issue is the fact that if the matter is not being dealt with now, or on a preferential date, that the matter will end up on the roll in all likelihood in the 2022.  A second point raised is that the interim payments has not been made yet.  The aspect of costs is also raised. 

 

29.      I cannot find that the prejudice of the plaintiff outweighs that of the defendant.  If it was not for the interim payment, the shoe would have been on the other foot.  I am mindful of the fact that this amount is not being paid yet, but the plaintiff has remedies to his disposal. 

 

30.      I am therefore of the view that the heads of damages in respect of the loss of earnings or earning capacity should be postponed sine die.  I will later herein deal with the request of a special trial date, or postponing the matter to a specific date. 

FAILURE TO CALL EXPERT WITNESSES, FILE AN APPLICATION TO HAVE THE REPORTS ADMITTED IN TERMS OF RULE 38 (2) AND FILE AFFIDAVITS IN TERMS OF RULE 38 (2)

 

31.      In the pre-trial 23 March 2018, the parties agreed as follows:

“5.8      PRODUCTION OF PROOF BY WAY OF AFFIDAVIT IN TERMS OF RULE 38 (2)

            If the Defendant disputes in writing, by no later than 7 (seven) court days before the trial, any evidence of a factual nature referred to in any of the Plaintiff’s rule 36 (9) (a) & (b) notices, then the Plaintiff will be entitled to introduce such evidence by way of affidavit in terms of Rule 38 (2) it should inform the Plaintiff of its objection no less than 7 (seven) court days before the trial.”

 

32.      This was verbatim repeated in the pre—trial minute of 23 January 2020. 

 

33.      This was not done. 

 

34.      The contents of the pre-trial minutes dated June 2020 leaves me none the wiser as to the position of the experts and their evidence.  For the purposes of this judgment I am not going to quote what is stated in the pre-trial as it is not agreed between the parties, and reference is made to the incorrect rules, which therefore does not assist me at all.

 

35.      At the beginning of the hearing I did ask Adv Laubsher if his experts are ready to testify.  He indicated to me that they are not available as they were reserved for the date of the 10^th of July 2020.  I have asked him about the affidavits in terms of Rule 38 (2) and whether that is uploaded on Caselines.  He indicated to me that only two experts deposed to affidavits, but that there is an agreement between the parties that the matter can be argued on the papers as it stands. 

 

36.      At the outset – I do not find this alleged agreement that the matter can be argued on the papers as it stand on the documents before me.

 

37.      Secondly, even if there was such an agreement, I do not think that it does away with the fact that the evidence needs to be under oath.  There is therefore no evidence before me.  On the reading of the first two pre-trial minutes it is in my mind clear that the plaintiff knows the evidence of the experts needs to be under oath. 

 

38.      The practice note dated 8 July 2020 also goes weak on dealing with what evidence can be adduced by way of affidavit.  It simply says that the matter can be determined on the papers. 

 

39.      It unfortunately seems as if the house of the plaintiff is also not in order. 

 

40.      This will have a direct impact on the Cost order I will make herein. 

 

SETTLEMENT ON THE GENERAL DAMAGES

41.      As is mentioned herein above, the parties came to an agreement regarding the amount payable in respect of General Damages. 

 

42.      Before the start of the proceedings I had sight of the report by the curator ad litem.

 

43.      I was not satisfied with certain aspects in the report by the curator ad litem and I have requested him to provide me with a supplementary report, which he did.  I am grateful for the heads as well as the supplementary heads filed. 

 

44.      The General Damages is settled on the amount of R1 900 000.00.  I have considered the case law referred to by the curator ad litem in his report. 

 

45.      I also considered the following judgments in order to consider whether the settled amount is just and reasonable compensation:

45.1     Dlamini v RAF 2015 where the plaintiff suffered a severe brain injury and other facial injuries and was left suffering from ataxia and other neurological and neurocognitive deficits.  He was awarded R1 350 000.00 , with a 2020 value of R1 700 591;

45.2     Adv Du Toit obo Mtshemla v RAF 2015 where the plaintiff suffered a severe closed head injury with skull and facial fracture and to his left optic nerve, left clavicle, left femur fracture, a de-gloving laceration to the face and traumatic amputation of the left leg below the knee.  He suffered cognitive, linguistic, behavioural and personality changes and because of the amputation was functionally impaired.  He was awarded R1 400 000.00 with a monetary value of R1 763 576 in 2020;

45.3     ME v RAF 2018 where the plaintiff suffered severe head injuries leading to neurocognitive and neurobehavioral changes, which also manifested in poor memory and concentration, aggressive behaviour and other injuries which left him disabled and disfigured.  He was awarded R1 900 000.00, with a value in 2020 of R2 051 734.00.

46.      I am therefore satisfied with the settlement amount of the General Damages. 

 

CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT

47.       In his first report, the curator ad litem makes reference to a contingency fee agreement.

 

48.       This agreement was not presented to me, and I have not made sure that this agreement is in line with the relevant Act.  I note in the order by my sister De Viliers Van Niekerk it is noted that the agreement complies. 

 

49.       This agreement should be presented to the judge dealing with the matter on the question of loss of earnings or earning capacity in order for him / her to make a decision on the validity of the agreement. 

 

SPECIAL TRIAL DATE

50.       The plaintiff’s legal team requested me to grant a preferential trial date in this matter.  I am not at liberty to do so.  It is only the Depute Judge President in this division that can grant such a trial date.  The parties can approach the Depute Judge President in the normal course and in line with the requirements as set out in the practice directive.  I do not have to make such an order.

 

51.       I also cannot postpone the matter to a specific trial date.  The application for condonation, if any, should first be dealt with.  I am mindful of the current directives of this Court given the regulations as a result of the worldwide pandemic.  It is therefore impossible to determine date. 

 

COSTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF 10 AND 17 JUNE 2020

52.       There fact that the trial did not proceed on the 10^th day of June 2020 was not as a result of the fault of either party, and there can be no costs involved.  Each party is responsible for his or her own costs for that day.

 

53.       As is set out herein above, the defendant sought and indulgence in order to get its house in order.  It is therefore most definitely not entitled to costs.

 

54.       Further, it is also clear that the plaintiff’s house was not in order.  None of the expert witnesses were available to testify, no affidavits were filed in terms of rule 38 (2).  The only two affidavits I could find in the bundle of documents before me is made in support of the application for the appointment of a curator ad litem.  Those affidavits dates back to 2018, is made for a different purpose and in another jurisdiction.  On the consideration of the pre-trial minutes it is clear that the plaintiff is aware that the evidence should be under oath.  Unfortunately the house of the plaintiff is also not in order.  This, however, was something we could rectify during the course of the day by either the experts being sworn in and testify via videolink, in the alternative by uploading their affidavits unto the caselines system.  The plaintiff, and in line with the practice directive, did seek my directive in this regard.  Such a directive is not necessary in light of the fact that the postponement is granted. 

 

55.       This has an effect on the scale of costs awarded.

 

56.       Regarding the costs of the application for the postponement itself, I am of the view that the opposition of the application was misplaced.  In my view, that plaintiff should not have opposed the application especially in light of the fact that he was not able to during the argument already state to the court what the substantial prejudice will be.  Each party will therefore be liable for the costs in as far as it relates to the application for postponement. 

 

57.       The defendant requested me to reserve the question of costs wasted by the postponement.  There is no reason why the costs should be reserved.  I do not think that another judge ceased with the matter on a later date will be in any better position than myself to deal with the issue of costs.

 

58.       With regard to the costs of the experts, I have already indicated herein above, that neither party can be held responsible for the costs occasioned by the fact that the matter was not properly enrolled for the 10^th of July 2020.  I will not allow any costs for any expert witnesses for the appearance on 17 July 2020.  None of them were available to testify and therefore there can be no costs in involved. 

 

59.       The defendant is seeking a second indulgence from the Court in order to file the very same reports it sought to file during March 2020.  I have understanding of the dilemma the defendant is facing, but I have little sympathy.  There is simply no reason why the minor child should be burdened with the costs of this postponement, or should be out of pocket as a result of the postponement. 

 

ORDER

60.       Thus the order I make is the following:

            60.1        The order marked “SS” is made an order of Court. 

 

 

                                                                                               

                                                                                                N Erasmus AJ

                                                                                                Acting Judge

                                                                                                Date of hearing:  17 July 2020

                                                                                                Date of judgment:  23 July 2020

 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)

 

                                                                      CASE NUMBER:   60395/2017

PRETORIA this 23^rd day of JULY 2020

BEFORE the Honourable Ms Justice ERASMUS AJ

Via Videoconferencing

Order granted electronically in accordance with the directives regarding special arrangements during National State of Disaster

In the matter between:

 

ADV A J DU TOIT N. O. obo O[….] N[….]                                                               Plaintiff 

 

And

 

ROAD ACCIDENT FUND                                                                                          Defendant

 

HAVING HEARD COUNSEL and having read the documents filed of record

 

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1.         The Defendant is to pay to the Plaintiff the amount of R1 900 000.00 (One Million Nine Hundred Thousand) in respect of the General Damages for the Minor Child’s claim for General Damages, which payment shall be made within 14 days of date of this order;

2.         The aforementioned total sum, in paragraph 1, shall be payable by direct transfer into the trust account of Adendorff Inc, details of which are as follows:

Account Holder                      :          ADENDORFF INC

Bank                                        :          FIRST NATIONAL BANK

Branch Name                         :          ADDERLEY STREET

Branch Code                          :          201 – 409

Type Of Account                   :          TRUST ACCOUNT

Account Number                   :          [….]

3.         In the event of default of the above payment, interest shall accrue on the mora rate applicable at the time;

4.         The defendant is to file an application for condonation, if so advised, for the non-compliance with the Court Order dated 11 March 2020 with specific reference to paragraph 3 thereof, which application should be filed by no later than 31 August 2020, whereafter the normal timeframes for applications shall apply;

5.         The loss of earnings or earning capacity is postponed sine die;

6.         Each party shall pay their own costs in respect of the costs occasioned by the application for the postponement, and the opposition thereof;

7.         The defendant shall make payment of the Plaintiff’s taxed or agreed party and party costs occasioned by the postponement, on the High Court scale, including but not limited to same, within the discretion of the Taxing Master, which costs shall include but not be limited to the following:

7.1 the costs of the Plaintiff’s instructing attorneys Adendorff Inc in Cape Town as well as the correspondent attorneys in Pretoria, Savage Jooste and Adams Inc;

7.2 the fees of Senior-Junior Counsel for preparation for trial, attending to pre-trials and drafting the minutes of the pre-trials, preparation, consideration and completion of the joint practice note and heads of argument;

7.3 the day fee of the Senior-Junior Counsel in respect of the appearance and argument presented on 17 July 2020;

7.4 the above costs of consultation between the Plaintiff’s attorneys and the plaintiff to discuss the terms of this order

8.         The defendant shall  pay the costs of the curator ad litem on a party and party scale, on a High Court Scale, which costs shall include but not be limited to the appearance and presentation of his report on 17 July 2020; the consultation with the minor child and the family, the consultation with the experts, the preparation for trial, attending pre-trials and drafting of the report as well as the supplementary report;

9.         The above costs will be paid into the aforementioned trust account;

10.      The following provisions will apply with regards to the determination of the aforementioned taxed or agreed costs:

10.1          The plaintiff shall serve the notice of taxation on the Defendant;

10.2          The plaintiff shall allow the defendant 14 (fourteen) court days to make payment of the taxed costs from date of settlement or taxation thereof;

10.3          Should payment not be affected timeously, the Plaintiff will be entitled to recover interest at the mora rate applicable at the time

11.      The award in respect of the General Damages, as well as the interim payment provided for in the Court Order dated 11 March 2020 shall be protected by means of it being entrusted to a curator bonis;

12.      The plaintiff is to approach the relevant Court who has the necessary jurisdiction for the appointment of such curator bonis by no later than 30 September 2020;

13.      Until such time as the curator bonis is appointed and able to take control of the capital sum and to deal with same in terms of this and any other order made by this Court, the Plaintiff’s attorney of record:

13.1          shall be prohibited from dealing with the capital in any other manner unless specifically authorised thereto by the Court, subject to relevant paragraphs hereunder;

13.2          is authorised to invest the capital amount in an interest-bearing account with a registered banking institution in terms of Section 78 of the Attorneys Act, 53 of 1979, to the benefit of the Plaintiff and will only be allowed to pay such monies over to the curator bonis once the Master of the High Court has issued the curator bonis with the necessary letter of authority;

13.3          the Plaintiff’s attorneys are further authorised and ordered to make any reasonable payments to satisfy any of the minor child’s needs that may arise and that are required in order to satisfy any reasonable need for treatment, care, aid or equipment that may arise in the interim;

13.4          the attorneys are further authorised to make payment of the attorney and own client costs, being fees, disbursements and interest on unpaid disbursements, of the Plaintiff’s attorneys and its correspondent attorneys;

13.5          the attorneys are further authorised to make payment of such amount(s) that may reasonably be indicated and/or required for the wellbeing of the Plaintiff and/or in his interest which a diligent curator bonis would have paid had such curator bonis been appointed;

14.      It is noted that the amount mentioned in paragraph 1, as well as the interim payment already ordered, is to be paid into the trust account of the Plaintiff’s attorney and that after deduction of the attorney and client fees, the balance is to be paid to the curator bonis be appointed.

 

 

BY THE COURT

 

REGISTRAR

 

For the Plaintiff              :      Adv A Laubsher

                                               Instruction of Adendorff Inc – Correspondent Savage Jooste

                                               and Adams Inc

For the Defendant         :       Mr W Adams

                                               Claims Handler at the Road Accident Fund, Cape Town

---