South Africa: Limpopo High Court, Thohoyandou

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[2016] ZALMPTHC 4
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Khangale v S (412/2013) [2016] ZALMPTHC 4 (4 February 2016)
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
LIMPOPO LOCAL DIVISION, THOHOYANDOU
CASE NO: 412/2013
DATE: 4 FEBRUARY 2016
In the matter between:
AZWIHANGWISI ROBERT MMBOI......................................................................................Plaintiff
And
MINISTER OF POLICE....................................................................................................1st Defendant
NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS...........................................2nd Defendant
MINISTER OF JUSTICE.................................................................................................3rd Defendant
JUDGEMENT
[1] The plaintiff has instituted an action for damages against the defendants arising out of an incident which happened on the 21st December 2003 at Lwamondo Village in the district of Vuwani. Against the first defendant, the plaintiff is claiming alleged wrongful and unlawful arrest, whilst against the second and third defendants, the plaintiff is claiming alleged wrongful and malicious prosecution. However, the plaintiff does not seek any relief against the third defendant, but has only joined it to the proceedings as an interested party.
[2] With regard to the claim for alleged wrongful and unlawful arrest, the plaintiff is alleging that on the 22nd December 2003, he was unlawfully and wrongfully arrested by the members of the South African Police Services who were acting within the course and scope of their employment. He further alleges that he was arrested without a warrant and without reasonable grounds or suspicion on allegations of committing premeditated murder. He further alleges that he had spent some time in prison from the 22nd December 2003 until the 6th September 2012 for an offence that he did not commit.
[3] The plaintiff contends that as a result of the alleged wrongful and unlawful arrest, he had suffered damages for deprivation of freedom, loss of amenities of life and discomfort, past and future loss of earnings, and legal costs expended in defending the criminal case against him.
[4] With regard to the claim of alleged wrongful and malicious prosecution, the plaintiff alleges that Adv DB Manyuwa acting within the course and scope of his employment with the second defendant, wrongfully and maliciously set the law in motion by instigating, initiating and/or continuing with the charge of premeditated murder against him. The plaintiff further alleges that as a result of the charges he was facing, he was convicted of premeditated murder and sentenced to thirty eight years of imprisonment. The plaintiff contends that Adv DB Manyuwa had no reasonable and probable cause of prosecuting him.
[5] The action is defended by all the three defendants. The first defendant denies that the plaintiff was wrongfully and unlawfully arrested. The first defendant aver that the plaintiff was arrested by members of the South African Police Services acting in terms of section 40(l)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 ("the Act") as they had a reasonable suspicion that the plaintiff has committed an offence referred to in schedule 1 of the Act. The first defendant contends that the members of the South African Police Services were justified in arresting the plaintiff.
[6] The second and third defendants denies that Adv DB Manyuwa has wrongfully and maliciously set the law in motion by instigating, initiating and by continuing with a charge of premeditated murder against the plaintiff. The second and third defendants contend that reasonable and probable cause existed for the second defendant to indict the plaintiff and his co-accused in the High Court, Venda held at Thohoyandou on a charge of murder and robbery with aggravating circumstances.
[7] It is trite that on the claim of alleged wrongful and unlawful arrest, the first defendant bore the onus to show that the arrest was justified and lawful. On a claim of alleged malicious prosecution, the plaintiff bore the onus of prove. In other words the plaintiff had the onus to discharge on the second claim, whilst the first defendant had onus to discharge on the first claim. The court noted that the balance of convenience favours that the plaintiff must begin leading evidence.
[8] The plaintiff was the first witness to testify. He testified that he was arrested on the 22nd December 2003. At the time of his arrest he was 23 years of age. He was detained from the 22nd December 2003 up to 6th September 2012. What led to his arrest was that he was accused of murder.
[9] On the 21st December 2003, he was in the company of Emmanuel and Mudau. They were drinking liquor at a bar lounge. The deceased was also at the bar lounge, but they did not talk to him. It was at night, and when the bar lounge close, he decided to accompany Joshua to his homestead as he wanted to change his clothes.
[10] Whilst standing outside the bar lounge and talking to Joshua, a group of people passed them. Joshua told them to wait for him as he was still going to fetch money. He never told them that he was going to rob and kill the deceased. After Joshua has left, he heard the sound of a bottle been smashed.
[11] After a while Joshua came back and asked for a knife. Leshelabaphi from their group gave him the knife. He took the knife and left them again. He did not know what he intended to do with the knife. He later heard the screaming of a person about 8 metres from where he was standing. He did not participate in the killing of the deceased.
[12] When Joshua came back, he was having canvas shoes and a blood stained knife. They then parted ways. He was surprised when he was arrested by the police for the murder of the deceased.
[13] The following day the police told him that he did not commit any offence, but that he must tell them the names of the two people who were in his company and he will be released. He told them their names and where they stay, but was not released. The two were arrested during January 2004.
[14] He was detained for eight days without appearing in court. He was taken to court after he had complained that the 48 hours has lapsed without him appearing in court.
[15] He was tried in the High Court found guilty and sentenced to a lengthy imprisonment. He appealed successfully to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA). Since his arrest he has been in prison until the SCA set aside his conviction and sentence.
[16] The plaintiff was cross-examined, and he conceded that on the 21st December 2003, he was in the company of Joshua and others for the whole day up until they went to drink at the bar lounge. He did not dispute that Munwana has given the information that the deceased was attacked by the plaintiff's group. The plaintiff further stated that the deceased was attacked by Joshua who was from their group. He also conceded that at the criminal trial Todani who was turned state witness, has testified that they (plaintiff's group) had an agreement at the bar lounge to rob the deceased.
[17] Todani Eric testified for the plaintiff. He testified that initially he was charged together with the plaintiff for murder. On the 21st December 2003, he was at Tshiombe Bar lounge with the plaintiff, Joshua, Rudzani and Mudau. Before they went to the bar lounge, they were drinking sorghum beer at another homestead. They arrived at the bar lounge at about 18h00, and started drinking liquor.
[18] Whilst at the bar lounge, Mudau whispered in his ear and shown him the deceased, saying he (deceased) was drinking expensive beer.
[19] Later, after the bar has closed, they accompanied Joshua to his homestead in order for him to change his trouser as it was dirty. They stood outside the bar lounge talking. As they were standing there, the deceased and a group of boys unknown to him passed them. After that group has passed them, Joshua told them that he wanted to go and collect money. He did not know where he was going to collect money.
[20] They waited for him to come back. Whilst waiting, he heard the sound of a bottle been smashed, and it was the bottle that Joshua was having when he left them. He then heard someone saying I don't have money and you can rather kill me. Joshua came back and asked Mudau to give him a knife. He was given the knife and he went back. They remained standing there together with the plaintiff.
[21] Later Joshua came back holding a blood stained knife. Joshua told them that he will no longer accompany them to where they were going. They did not have a plan to rob the deceased.
[22] He was arrested during January 2004. He was arrested for murder together with the plaintiff and others. He denied having killed the deceased. He told them that it was Joshua who killed the deceased.
[23] When he appeared in the High Court on the 8th November 2004, he was turned state witness. In the holding cells, Adv Ntlakaza told him to tell the court that they have planned to rob the deceased.
[24] The witness was cross-examined, and he conceded that he had testified at the criminal trial. He further conceded that he was promised immunity from prosecution if he tells the truth, and that he was never prosecuted in relation to that murder case. He conceded that he had told the court the truth regarding what he saw and knew. That concluded the evidence of the plaintiff and he closed his case.
[25] The first defendant's first witness to testify was Samuel Shivambu. He testified that he is now a pensioner. He was employed by the SAPS stationed at Vuwani SAPS. He is the one who opened the docket after the case was reported. He was assigned as the investigating officer in that matter.
[26] They have received the information at the police station about the person who was killed. He went to Tshilidzini Hospital where he found that the deceased has already been certified dead. He started his investigations by taking a statement from Ndou, Munwana and others on the 22nd December 2003. Munwana told him that they were attacked by Mmboi's (plaintiff) group. Ndou also confirmed Munwana's version. Based on the information that he had obtained, he arrested the plaintiff during the early hours of the 23rd December 2003.
[27] When he arrested the plaintiff, he told him the reason for his arrest. The plaintiff was giving them his co-operation. The plaintiff was not arrested for the purpose of assisting the police with their investigation, but was arrested for committing a crime.
[28] The witness was cross-examined, and he stated that the docket is now lost. He further testified that the information that was at his disposal that led him to arrest the plaintiff, was that Mmboi's (plaintiff) group had followed the deceased, robbed him of his property and stabbed him with a bottle and knife.
[29] Thomas Raphakali testified as the second witness for the first defendant. He testified that he was requested by inspector Shivambu to assist him in arresting the plaintiff. The plaintiff was arrested at his place of residence at Lwamondo.
[30] He and Captain Tshivulungwe never promised the plaintiff that if he assists them in arresting the two suspects unknown to them, he will be released. His role ended after the arrest of the accused.
[31] The witness was cross-examined and he denied that the following day he told the plaintiff that he did not commit any offence, and that he will be released if the two suspects that were from at Lwamondo were arrested. That concluded the evidence of the first defendant and they closed their case.
[32] Nelson Matheba was the first witness to testify for the 2nd and 3rd defendant. He testified that he is employed by the National Prosecution Authority. During 2003 and 2004 he was placed at Vuwani Magistrate Court as a control prosecutor.
[33] On receipt of the plaintiffs docket, he made summary statement of it. Thereafter, he wrote the recommendations that accused 1, 2 and 3 be charged with murder, whilst accused 4 and 5, be turned state witnesses. The summary of his statement of the docket and recommendations was attached to the docket and sent to office of the Director of Public Prosecutions ("DPP").
[34] Murder and robbery are schedule 1 offences, and he does not decide who should be prosecuted for such offences. It is the DPP who will decide who should be prosecuted. However, he was of the view that the three accused should be charged with murder.
[35] The witness was cross-examined, and he conceded that they may not charge a person with the hope that the person will at a later stage incriminate himself/herself. When asked what convinced him that there were minimum evidence that the plaintiff has committed the crime, he stated that he had taken into consideration that all the accused were together at the waiting place, and left together with the intention to rob. He further stated that the plaintiff was implicated by Munwana.
[36] The second witness to testify for the second and third defendants was Mahlori Ntlakaza. He testified that he is employed by the office of the DPP, and at present he is working at the Johannesburg office. At the time of this incident, he was the senior state advocate at the Thohoyandou Office. At that time Adv Manyuwa was the acting Director of Public Prosecutions.
[37] He was the prosecutor during the trial of the plaintiff's case. His decision to indict the accused was based on the contents of the dockets. In his view, there was a prima facie case against the plaintiff and his co-accused. He relied more on the statement of Munwana.
[38] He withdrew the charges against accused 4 and 5 and turned them state witnesses in terms of section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
[39
] He is Xhosa speaking and not fluent in Venda language. When he consulted with the witnesses he was using the services of an interpreter.[40] When he proceeded with the case against the plaintiff and his co-accused, he was relying on the doctrine of common purpose. There was reasonable and probable cause to charge the accused based on the evidence of Munwana and Ndou.
[41] The witness was cross-examined and he stated that he does not understand Venda language but he can only greet in that language, and no further than that. He confirmed that after going through the docket, he was satisfied that there were minimum evidence to prosecute the plaintiff and his co-accused. He further stated that the evidence at his disposal that linked the plaintiff was that Mmboi group participated in the attack. He denied that he had coached Todani to testify that there was an agreement to rob the deceased.
[42] The third and final witness to testify for the second and third respondents was Bethuef Munyuwa. He testified that he is the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions for the division of Thohoyandou. During 2003 he was the acting director of public prosecutions for Thohoyandou Division.
[43] On receipt of the docket and the summary of the docket, it was allocated to a junior advocate together with Ntlakaza to prepare the indictment. After the indictment was prepared, it was handed over to him for approval. He went through the indictment and satisfied himself whether it was in order. Thereafter he approved and signed it. He took the decision that the plaintiff and his co-accused be charged with murder and robbery, after he has checked all the facts in the docket. After checking the docket, he found that there were enough evidence to charge them, and they had a case to answer.
[44] He was not involved in the prosecution of the plaintiff and his co-accused in the High Court. The case was allocated to Adv Ntlakaza to prosecute them.
[45] The witness was cross-examined, and he stated that the basis to prosecute the plaintiff and his co-accused was that he relied on the statement of Munwana, the fact that there was an agreement before the incident to follow the deceased, the fact that they were walking as a group, they were sitting together when one of them stated that the deceased had a lot of money, and thereafter it was suggested that they should follow the deceased.
[46] That concluded the evidence of the 2nd and 3rd defendants and they closed their case. Both parties submitted their closing arguments.
[47] The plaintiff has combined two claims in his combined summons. In claim A he is claiming for alleged wrongful and unlawful arrest against the first defendant. Against the second defendant and third defendant which is claim B, he is claiming for alleged malicious prosecution. The third defendant is merely cited as an interested party and he is not seeking an order against it. I will first deal with the claim for alleged wrongful and unlawful arrest, and conclude with that of alleged malicious prosecution.
[48] It is common cause that the plaintiff was arrested without a warrant. Since the plaintiff was arrested without a warrant, the onus rest on the first defendant to justify the arrest.
[49] tt is trite that a person's liberty, personality and dignity are usually compromised by a wrongful or malicious arrest. It is also trite that in the absence of a warrant, an arrest is lawful if it is effected in terms of section 40(l)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 ("the Act") provided that the person being arrested, is alleged to have committed a crime listed in schedule 1 of the Act, or someone who is on reasonable grounds suspected of having committed such a crime. (See Duncan v Minister of Law and Order (3) SA 568 (A)).
[50] In Ralekwa v Minister of Safety and Security 2004 (2) SA 342 T at 347 E - G
the Court stated:
"To decide what is a reasonable suspicion there must be evidence that the arresting officer formed a suspicion which is objectively sustainable. It was described thus by Jones J in Mabona and Another v Minister of Law and Order and Others:
"Would a reasonable man in the second defendant's position and possessed of the same information have considered that there were such good and sufficient grounds for suspecting that the plaintiffs were guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery or possession of stolen property knowing it to have been stolen? It seems to me that in evaluating this information a reasonable man would bear in mind that the section authorises drastic police action. It authorises an arrest on the strength of a suspicion and without the need to swear out a warrant, i.e something which otherwise would be an invasion of private rights and ... (t)he reasonable man will therefore analyse and assess the quality of the information at his disposal critically, and he will not accept it lightly or without checking it where it can be checked. It is only after an examination of this kind that he will allow himself to entertain a suspicion which will justify an arrest."
[51] It is common cause that on the day of the incident (21/12/03) the plaintiff has spent the whole day in the company of his co-accused. At about 18h00 they moved to the bar lounge where incident happened. They stayed at the bar lounge until it ciosed. Throughout their stay at the bar lounge the plaintiff was sitting together with his co-accused as a group. It is not surprising that Munwana referred to them as Mmboi's group. They left the bar lounge together as the same group, and stood outside the bar lounge talking. At no stage did they separate before the incident happened. When the deceased and his group passed them, they were all still together. In my view, Munwana cannot be faulted when he referred them as Mmboi's group.
[52] It is common cause that Joshua was from Mmboi's group. The knife that Joshua used to stab the deceased was from Joshua's group. After Joshua has stabbed the deceased and robbed him of his canvas shoes, he returned to his group. His group did not question him about what he did, or disassociated themselves from him. I am mindful of the fact that the SCA has found that the state has failed to proof common purpose against the plaintiff. However, the plaintiff has heard someone saying that he did not have money, and later Joshua returned with a blood stained knife and canvass shoes. The plaintiff and his group did not have an interest to find out what caused the knife to have blood and where he got the canvas shoes. At no stage did Mmboi group report the incident to the poiice or anyone.
[53] Inspector Shivambu received a report that somebody has been killed. He went to Tshilidzini hospital and found that indeed somebody has been killed. On investigation he was informed that the deceased was in the company of Munwana, Ndou and others. On interviewing Munwana and Ndou, they both implicate the plaintiff and his group by referring to them as Mmboi's group. It is common cause that the surname of the plaintiff is Mmboi. In other words, the person whom Munwana and Ndou were able to identify by name was the plaintiff.
[54] At that stage, the only person whom inspector Shivambu could approach first was the plaintiff as he was the only person whom the witnesses were able to identify by name. Inspector Shivambu went to the plaintiff's place and on arrival the plaintiff did not dispute that he was in the company of the group that is accused of having killed the deceased. He also did not seem surprised that somebody has been killed.
[55] It is common cause that the offence that was committed was a schedule 1 offence and that inspector Shivambu was a peace officer. Now, the question which I must determine is whether on the basis of the information that inspector Shivambu has obtained from Munwana and Ndou, was it sufficient for him to form a reasonable suspicion and whether the said suspicion was based on reasonable grounds.
[56] The information which inspector Shivambu has gathered, was that Mmboi's group has killed the deceased, and not someone from Mmboi's group has killed the deceased. There was evidence before inspector Shivambu that someone has been killed. At that stage it was not necessary for Shivambu to proof the elements of common purpose. At that stage what was required of him was a suspicion that the plaintiff has committed an offence referred to in Schedule 1 and the suspicion must have rested on reasonable grounds. In my view, the information at the disposal of Mr Shivambu was not of poor quality. They were implicating Mmboi's group, of which the plaintiff was part of it throughout the day, and up to the time of the incident.
[57] At the time of arrest a suspect can say anything in order to avoid been arrested. With the information that Shivambu has obtained from Munwana and Ndou, it would have been reckless of him to have let the plaintiff go based on what the plaintiff was telling him, moreso, that the plaintiff was the only person who was been identified by Munwana and Ndou
[58] In Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto 2011(5) SA 367 (SCA) at 384 A - Cthe court stated:
"... It seems to me to follow that the inquiry to be made by the peace officer is
not how best to bring the suspect to trial: the inquiry is only whether the case
is one in which that decision ought properiy to be mode by a court (or senior officer). Whether his decision on that question is rational naturaily depends upon the particular facts, but it is clear that in cases of serious crime and those listed in Schedule 1 are serious, not only because the legislature thought so-a peace officer could seldom be criticized for arresting a suspect for that purpose."
[59] In my view, inspector Shivambu had sufficient information at his disposal to arrest the plaintiff. The offence which the plaintiff was alleged to have committed was a serious offence which is listed in schedule 1. His suspicion that the plaintiff was involved in the killing of the deceased rested on reasonable grounds from the information obtained from Munwana and Ndou, also the fact that indeed someone has been killed.
[60] The plaintiff alleges that he was detained for eight days before he appeared in court. The records indicate that he was detained during the early hours of the 23rd December 2003, and that his first appearance in court was on the 29th December 2003.
[61] The days from 25th to the 28th December 2003 were not court days. The 48 hours period within which the plaintiff ought to have been brought before court expired on the days which were not court days. The next first court day was the 29th December 2003, and that is the day on which he appeared in court for the first time after his arrest.
[62] In terms of section 50(l)(i) of the Act, if the period of 48 hours expires outside ordinary court hours or on a day which is not an ordinary court day, the accused shall be brought before a lower Court not later than the end of the first court day. The 29th December 2003 was the first court day, and that is the date on which the plaintiff made his first court appearance. In my view, there was nothing unlawful or wrongful about that.
[63] Under the circumstances, I am satisfied that the first defendant has discharged their onus and that the arrest and detention of the plaintiff was lawful.
[64] I now turn to the plaintiff's claim in relation to alleged malicious prosecution. In order to succeed with a claim for malicious prosecution, a claimant must allege and prove -
(a) that the defendants set the law in motion (instigated or instituted the proceedings);
(b) that the defendants acted without reasonable and probable cause;
(c) that the defendants acted with malice {or animo injuriandi); and
(d) that the prosecution has failed.
(see Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & Another v
Moleko [2008] ZASCA 43 and Magwabeni v Uomba ZASCA117).
[65] On behalf of the second and third defendants Mr Matheba testified that on receipt of the docket from the police, he prepared a summary of the statements from the docket and also made recommendations. In his recommendations he recommended that the plaintiff together with the other two accused be charged with murder, whilst accused 4 and 5 be turned state witnesses. Thereafter, he took the summary of the docket together with the docket and submitted it to the office of the DPP for decision. He did not play any role in deciding whether the plaintiff and other accused should be charged. Ntlakaza testified that he and the junior advocate prepared the indictment and submitted it to Manyuwa for approval. Manyuwa testified that after satisfying himself that the indictment was in order, he approved and signed it. Ntlakaza was assigned to prosecute the plaintiff and his co-accused in court.[66] It is common cause that the docket in this matter has been lost. The parties have relied on the statement of summary of the docket prepared by Matheba. On the summary of the docket, Matheba has summarized the statement of Shivambu, Munwana, Ndou, Mulaudzi, Nemutandani, Nevhunama Ramalivhana and an unidentified person referred to as A8. A8 I take it as the marking of a statement by the police. Thereafter, he recommended that accused l(plaintiff), 2 and 3 be charged with murder whilst accused 4 and 5 be turned state witnesses.
[67] It is trite that the decision to prosecute is the prerogative of the DPP. It is common cause that the DPP has used its discretion by charging, the plaintiff and his two co-accused with one count of murder and one count of robbery.
[68] What must now be determined is whether there was a probable cause to charge the plaintiff together with accused 2 and 3. To determine that, it must be established whether the DPP had an honest belief founded on reasonable grounds that the institution of the proceedings against the plaintiff was justified.
[69] Advocate Ntlakaza who testified for the second and third defendants, testified that when he took the decision to prosecute the plaintiff and his two accused with murder and robbery he took into account that the statement of Munwana and Ndou which stated that the deceased was attacked by the plaintiffs group and that in his view, shows that the plaintiff has participated in the commission of the crime. Based on that, he came to the conclusion that there was a prima facie case against the plaintiff and his co-accused.
[70] Manyuwa testified that on reading the docket and the statement of Munwana he found that there was an agreement to follow the deceased, by the accused who were sitting together all the time at the bar lounge and indeed they followed the deceased. Based on that he came to the conclusion that there were sufficient evidence to charge the plaintiff and his co-accused.
[71] The question is whether based on the information which Ntlakaza and Manyuwa were having at their disposal, was it reasonable for them to conclude that the plaintiff was guilty of the offence he was facing. In their view, they believed that he was guilty. The statement of Munwana and Ndou implicate the plaintiff. He has been with his group throughout the day. They left the bar lounge together, and also stood outside the bar lounge still together. After the group of the deceased has passed, one from the plaintiffs group followed the deceased group. Even though at the SCA counsel for the DPP has conceded that the state has failed to prove common purpose, in my view, it was not unreasonable of Ntlakaza and Manyuwa to charge the plaintiff and his co-accused based on the doctrine of common purpose. The minimum evidence at their disposal at that stage made them to genuinely believe that they can charge the plaintiff and his co-accused based on the doctrine of common purpose.
[72] I am therefore, satisfied that with the information that was at the disposal of Ntlakaza and Manyuwa, they had a reasonable and probable cause to charge the plaintiff and his co-accused with murder and robbery. Ntlakaza and Manyuwa took such reasonable measures as could be expected of someone in their position when they prepared the indictment and charged the plaintiff with murder and robbery.
[73] With regard to malice, in Moaki v Reckitt & Colman (Africa) Ltd & Another 1968 (3) SA 98 (A) at 104 B-C the court stated:
"Where relief is claimed by this action the plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant intended to injure (either dolus directus or indrectus). Save to the extent that it might afford evidence of the defendant's true intention or might possibly be taken into account in fixing the quantum of damages, the motive of the defendant is not of any legal relevance. ”
[74] The plaintiff must proof that the second defendant directed their will in prosecuting him well aware that there were no reasonable grounds for prosecuting him. The second defendant had sufficient information before it, which make it to form a view that there was a prima facie case against the plaintiff. In my view, there is no evidence to suggest or proof that when the second defendant decided to charge the plaintiff, they have acted wrongly or recklessly. They charged the plaintiff based on the information at their disposal, which was implicating the plaintiff and his group. I don't find any reason to criticize them for having charged the plaintiff together with his two co-accused.
[75] It is common cause that the prosecution of the plaintiff failed when the SCA set aside his conviction and sentence.
[76] Under the circumstances, in my view, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has failed to prove his claim for malicious prosecution.
[77] In the result, I make the following order:
77.1 Both plaintiff's claim A and B wrongful and unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution are dismissed with costs.
WFKGANYAGO ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Date of Hearing: 14th - 18th September 2015 and 18th - 20th January 2016
Judgement delivered: 04 FEBRUARY 2016
Appearances:
For the Plaintiff: Mr Ravele Attorney
For the first defendant: Adv JA Motepe SC
Instructed by: State Attorney, Thohoyandou
For the Second & third Defendant: Salie Joubert SC
Instructed by: State Attorney, Thohoyandou