South Africa: North West High Court, Mafikeng
You are here:
SAFLII >>
Databases >>
South Africa: North West High Court, Mafikeng >>
2008 >>
[2008] ZANWHC 20
| Noteup
| LawCite
Mahomed and Others v Trustees of the Mohammedan and Others (2443/2007) [2008] ZANWHC 20 (3 July 2008)
Download original files |
PDF format
RTF format
CASE NO: 2443/2007
SHABEER NOOR MAHOMED 1st Applicant
ZAFER SHAIHNAG 2nd Applicant ZAID GULAMMOHMED JOGIAT 3rd Applicant
ABDUL AZIZ MUSSA 4th Applicant
ABDUL AZIZ OMAR 5th Applicant
THE TRUSTEES OF THE MOHAMMEDAN 1st and 2nd
COMMUNITY OF MAFIKENG TRUST RespondentsTHE MAFIKENG MUSLIM ASSOCIATION 3rd Respondent
THE MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE 4th, 5th, 6th
COMMITTEE OF THE MAFIKENG and 7th
MUSLIM ASSOCIATION Respondents
CIVIL MATTER
DATE OF HEARING
:
19 JUNE 2008
DATE OF JUDGMENT
:
03 JULY 2008
COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANTS
:
ADV PISTOR SC
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT
:
ADV BAVA
HENDRICKS J
[A]
Introduction:-
[1]
This is an application for the appointment of administrators in respect of a trust known as the
“Mohammedan Community of Mafikeng Trust” (hereinafter referred to as “the Trust”) with the following powers and duties:-
[i]
to take possession and control of all assets, documents and accounts (including bank accounts) of
the Mohammedan Community of Mafikeng Trust and of the Mafikeng Muslim Association and to collect all debts, monies or income due
to the said Trust and Association and to determine and discharge the liabilities thereof;
[ii]
to institute proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction and to prosecute to completion any action
for the recovery of debts due to the said Trust and Association;
[iii]
to operate for and on behalf of the said trust and the said Association all bank accounts presently in the
name of the said Trust and in the name of the said Association;
[iv]
to pay the liabilities of the said Trust and Association;
[v]
to apply to this Court for special directions if the said Administrators are not satisfied with
the information supplied by either the said Trust or the said Association in the event of encountering any special difficulty
[vi]
to conduct such an investigation that in the opinion of the Administrators might be necessary in order
to enable them to file a report to the registrar of this Honourable Court in terms of the said Court order.
[2]
The circumstances under which these administrators must be appointed are:- where there are no trustees
anymore for the Trust, the management of the Trust was taken over by non-trustees, the assets of the Trust are mismanaged and there
is non-compliance with certain relevant statutory provisions.
[B]
Historical background:-
[3]
Prior to 1919, a voluntary association was formed for the Mohammedan community of Mafikeng. The
Mohammedan community of Mafikeng acquired property in Mafikeng and established a mosque for purposes of practicing their faith, being
Islam.
[4]
On 15 March 1919, a trust deed was drawn up on behalf of the Mohammedan community of Mafikeng in
terms whereof trustees were appointed to maintain the mosque that had been established in Mafikeng for the benefit of the community
and worshippers who attended the mosque.
[5]
On 07 March 1944 the trust deed was amended, which amendment was notarial effected. In terms of
the amendment, trust fund styled “The Mafikeng Indian Mohammedan Community Trust Fund” was established for the purpose,
inter alia of raising funds for the upkeep, maintenance and administration of the mosque.
[6]
In terms of the amendment to the trust deed, a banking account was to be opened in respect of the
newly established trust fund and all books of account, records and papers were to be kept by a treasurer, available for inspection
by the then trustees appointed as contemplated by the trust deed as amended.
[7]
A general meeting of the Mafikeng Muslim community was held on 24 March 1987. The members present
resolved that a constitution for the Association, the Mafikeng Muslim Association (“MMA”) be adopted.
[8.1]
the aims and objectives of the MMA are to maintain the mosque and central madressah (Islamic school) for the
Mafikeng Muslim community;
[8.2]
the MMA would be administered by a board of trustees and executive committee;
[8.4]
an executive committee comprising of 8 elected members would be responsible for transacting all the affairs
of the MMA, except those specifically entrusted to the board of trustees, provided that any decision regarding the extension of leases
and the determination of rentals to be charged on the MMA’s fixed property would be taken jointly by the executive committee
and the board of trustees, or a majority of them, should there be a difference in opinion;
[8.5]
the executive committee would cause to be kept such accounts, entries, registers and records as are necessary
for the proper functioning of the MMA;
[8.6]
the financial statements would be made up at the end of each financial year, being 31 December, in accordance
with accepted accounting practice;
[8.7]
the auditor of the MMA would have access to all books, records and documents of the MMA and would report in
writing on the financial statements in accordance with accepted accounting practice;
[8.8]
the revenue of the MMA would be used, after providing for expenses of administration, only for carrying out
the objects of the MMA;
[8.9]
all monies received on account of the MMA would be paid into a banking account. All expenses of the MMA would
be paid by cheque. All cheques would be signed by two of the following persons: the chairman, the secretary or the treasurer;
[8.10]
an annual general meeting of members would be held not later than 31 March each year to inter alia receive and consider the financial statements for the year ended on the previous 31st day of December together with the report of the auditor thereon;
[8.11]
the Constitution repealed any previous Constitution, deed or other document pertaining to the MMA.
[9]
In terms of the Constitution, the MMA shall consist of “ordinary” and “registered”
members. Every member of the congregation (being in essence all Muslim persons over the age of 16 and who attend all or some of the
daily prayers at the central mosque and/or who regularly attend the Friday prayer at the mosque), irrespective of race or colour
shall have a voice at any general meeting of the MMA.
[10]
This constitution was however never adopted. In the result, no amendment to the trust deed with regard
to the appointment of trustees or to the powers and control of the trustees over trust property could legally be effected. The MMA
continue to operate and took control over the administration of the trust properties.
[11]
Since then, there have been warring factions within the Mafikeng Muslim community seeking to gain control
of the MMA and thereby control over its fixed assets. Those fixed assets, as a matter of interest, include in addition to the mosque,
certain valuable and ideally located properties (which comprises of 5 stores situated at corner Molopo and Carrington Street, Mafikeng
town) that are currently being leased and is thus a substantive source of income for the MMA.
[12]
The financial position of the MMA has been the source of considerable debate between the MMA and some
members of the Mafikeng Muslim community. This debate has spanned for over a decade. Unfortunately, and notwithstanding the various
attempts to amicably find common ground, the financial status of the MMA remains a concern.
[13]
The Applicants represents the group known as the Concerned Muslim Group (“CMG”). Numerous
meetings were held between the MMA and the CMG. By 2002, matters had come to a head, when the respective parties employed legal assistance.
Letters from attorneys were exchanged.
[14]
The involvement of legal representatives on either side ultimately led to negotiations between the parties
in June 2003, when an agreement was reached between both the MMA and the CMG to establish an interim committee. This interim committee
comprised of members from each party and was responsible for ensuring that the books of account of the MMA would be brought up to
date and audited.
[15]
In this regard, the parties went so far as to appoint a mediator, Professor Bootha, to try and amicably
resolve the impasse that had generated such friction and hostility in the past. Various meetings were held under the auspices of
Professor Bootha in order to achieve direction and understanding of the financial status of the MMA.
[16]
Unfortunately, the MMA did not see itself amenable to handing over “executive power to an interest
group”. It proposed instead that the MMA be enhanced by an additional four members, two nominated by either party.
[17]
On 7 July 2003, Professor Bootha advised both the MMA and the CMG in writing that despite negotiations
between the parties, significant progress had not been made, as both sides were bogged down on issues that had no relevance to the
ultimate goals and objectives sought to be achieved. Professor Bootha suggested that an annual general meeting be held where a new
executive be elected and that financial and other records of the MMA be brought up to date before that meeting.
[18]
By July 2003, negotiations and discussions between the two groups failed dismally. On 16 July 2003, Professor
Bootha expressed in writing, his deep disappointment of the conduct of both parties. In a lengthy letter addressed to both, he criticised
the CMG for being unfocussed and inconsistent with what they stood for. He also criticised the MMA for failing to account to the
Mafikeng Muslim community stating that:-
“It is no secret that the current MMA executive has never operated through a Constitution, and over the past few years has been unable
to account to the community. The MMA has also failed to call a general meeting or hold elections for the past four years. Unofficial
reports indicate that the association has accumulated a large debt, which ultimately is the responsibility of the Muslim community.
Despite undertakings given, in all their years in power, they have failed to come up with a Constitution. With some of their members
having personal interests, being landlord and tenants at the same time, they ignored the basic principles of good governance.”
[19]
Professor Bootha in the aforementioned letter also pointed out that the MMA had given an undertaking
that an annual general meeting (of the MMA) would take place on 19 September 2003. It was envisaged that at that meeting, the MMA
and its trustees would be called to account and that proper audited statements of the MMA would be available for consideration and
debate.
[20]
Unfortunately, this annual general meeting did not take place. Neither was financial statements prepared
or made available.
[21]
In the result, the Applicants, as part of the CMG, had no choice but to seek redress from this Court
in the form of an order mandating the Respondents, (as the Executive members of the MMA) to furnish the Applicants with the financial
statements of the MMA for the preceding six financial years (2000 to 2005 both included). An order to that effect was granted on
the 29th March 2006 under case no. 1364/05.
[C]
Points in limine:-
[22]
Certain points in limine were raised at the hearing of the application. I ordered that the points in limine be argued together with the merits of the application because they are so closely related and intertwined with the merits. For the
sake of completeness I will deal with the points raised.
[a]
No cause of action:-
(i)
It was submitted on behalf of the Respondents that the Applicants failed to make out a case in their
founding affidavit for the relief they seek in that:-
“12.1
they fail to indicate why the election of trustees as envisaged in the trust deed is not an option that
should be pursued;
12.2
in fact, the Applicants do not make out a case at all as to why administrators should be appointed instead
of trustees being elected;
12.3
the Applicants do not satisfy the requirements or proving that the election of trustees is not possible;
(ii)
It was contended that the trust deed is prescriptive where there are vacancies in respect of the trustees
of the Trust. It is common cause that there are no trustees and no one who can act as trustee for or on behalf of the Trust. I will
later on in this judgment deal with the MMA. There is no merit in the submission that the Court will not appoint trustees where there
are vacancies “until there is uncontrovertible proof that the beneficiaries have exercised the remedies and procedures prescribed
by the trust deed itself”. Though the trust deed prescribes the procedure for the appointment of trustees when there are vacancies,
there is nobody who can lawfully oversee the process. I am therefore of the view that this point in limine cannot succeed.
[b]
Dispute of fact:-
(i)
It is contended by the Respondents that there are serious disputes of fact on the papers (affidavits
and documents). Reference is made to the founding affidavit of the Applicants which indicate that there exist disputes amongst the
members of the Muslim community with regard to inter alia the financial management of the Trust.
(ii)
It seems to me that the Respondents confuse the dispute that exists in the community with a real dispute
of fact on the papers. There is in my view no serious dispute of fact on the papers that will have the effect that the matter cannot
be resolved on the papers. It will become clearer later on in this judgment when the merits of the application is dealt with, as
to why I am holding this view. However, I am satisfied that there are no real dispute of fact to the extent that I cannot decide
the matter on the papers before me. Hence, I am of the view that this point in limine cannot be upheld.
[c]
Failure to serve on the Master:-
(i)
At first, service of this application was not effected on the Master of the High Court, but it was
done subsequently. Though it is important to effect service on the Master, the failure to do so is not so crucial that subsequent
service cannot be condoned by this court. In fact, as will appear later on in this judgment, there is no proof that the Trust is
registered with the Master of the High Court.
(ii)
In addition thereto, it must also be borne in mind that there are presently no trustees for the Trust.
Service on the Master would not have the effect that trustees (or interim trustees) be appointed or for the Master to comment on
the suitability of nominees for their appointment as trustees. I am of the view that this initial oversight can be condoned and was
in fact rectified by the subsequent service that was effected.
This in itself, is not so crucial that it warrants the dismissal of the application solely on this point which was raised in limine.
[d]
Defective Notice of Motion:-
(i)
It is clear from the notice of motion that the application would have been set down for hearing
on 31 January 2008. The application was filed with the office of the Registrar on 06 December 2007 and served on the Respondents
on 10 December 2007. The notice indicates that an interim order is prayed for. The return date of the rule nisi is also indicated as 31 January 2008. This cannot be correct.
(ii) Though one may think that the intention must have been that the matter be treated as an urgent application, it can never be that
the return date of the rule nisi is the same as the date of issuing of the interim order. This must have been a mistake on the part of the Applicants. Be that as it
may, the notice of motion indicate that the Respondents were afforded the opportunity to notify the Applicant’s attorneys in
writing of their intention to oppose this application on or before 20 December 2007 and to file their answering affidavit within
fifteen days after giving such notice. The Respondents conveyed their intention to oppose this application on 14 December 2007.
(iii)
On the cover of the court file, it is indicated that on 31 January 2008 the matter was postponed sine die (though the date on the order signed by the Registrar is reflected as 17 January 2008 and on the draft order as 29 January 2008).
Be that as it may, in terms of the draft order marked “LGL” attached to the court order, Respondents were given until
15 February 2008 to file their answering affidavits, which they did. The Applicants filed their replying affidavits and the matter
was eventually set down for hearing on 19 June 2008.
(iv)
It is now apparent that the relief which the Applicant seek is final in nature and no longer interim relief. Seeing that the opportunity
was presented to the Respondents to file their answering affidavits, no prejudice was suffered by them as a result of the defect
in the dates mentioned in the notice of motion. This in itself does not warrant the dismissal of the application on this point which
was raised in limine.
(v)
Adv Bava on behalf of the Respondents, also submit that the relief claimed in the first paragraph of the notice of motion is non-sensical.
The paragraph read thus:-
“That, pending the final outcome of this application, the Trustees of the Mohammedan Community of Mafikeng Trust and the Members of the
executive committee of the Mafikeng Muslim Association are interdicted from disposing, alienating or encumbering any of the assets
of the said Trust and of the said association, save in so far as such actions are reasonably necessary for the daily execution of
the business of the said Trust and association.”
(vi)
His submission is that it amounts to a contradiction in terms that on the one hand the trustees of the
Trust and the members of the executive committee of the MMA are interdicted from disposing, alienating or encumbering any of the
assets of the trust and the association, whilst on the other hand they are allowed to do so in so far as such actions are reasonably
necessary for the daily execution of the business of the said Trust and association.
(vi)
This in my view is not a contradiction per se. It seems to me that allowance is made for the daily running of the affairs of the trust or association. Sight should not be lost
of the fact that what was intended to be asked as relief from this Court was supposed to be on an interim basis. Hence it is indicated
that this was supposed to be the situation “pending the final outcome of this application”. Furthermore, it was intended that a rule nisi be granted though there is a mistake with regard to the return date, in that, the same date of the hearing of the application is
given as the return date of the rule nisi (31 January 2008).
(viii)
It became clear during argument that final relief in the form of the appointment of administrators is what is requested.
This means that the interim relief is no longer required. Therefore, paragraph 1 of the notice of motion can for all intends and
purposes be disregarded, if the administrators are appointed. I am of the view that it serves no purpose to be over technical about
an issue such as this one. It does not at all warrants the dismissal of the application as submitted by counsel for the Respondents.
[e]
Improper citation of the trustees and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Respondents:-
(i)
It is submitted on behalf of these Respondents that they were incorrectly cited. They are not cited
in their official capacity as nominii officii of the Trust but in their personal capacity. At first glance, it would seem that there is merit in such a submission but that is not
the case in the present application. As it will emerge later on in this judgment, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Respondents
are not trustees of the Trust.
(ii)
Seeing that the MMA did not adopt their 1987 constitution, these Respondents were not legitimately elected
in terms of that constitution and again, as it will become clear later in this judgment, they are not acting in terms of that constitution.
Even if they were lawfully elected, the constitution (which was in any event never adopted) limits their period as executive members
of the MMA to two (2) years. On their own version, they are way beyond this period. Furthermore, on Respondents own version, there
seems to be confusion as to whether or not they are trustees of the Trust or trustees of the MMA. I will later on deal with this
aspect in more detail in this judgment. Suffice to say at this juncture that it is understandable why they are cited in the manner
in which it appears in the heading of the notice of motion. I find no merit in this point that was raised in limine.
[f]
Administrators did not consent to be appointed as such:-
(i)
The point was taken by the Respondents that the consent letter by the administrators were not properly
signed in that it refers to a firm of accountants and not to the individual himself/herself and furthermore, it was only signed by
one of the identified administrators and not by both.
(ii)
Again, on the face of it, there appears to be some merit in this submission but on its own, it does not
warrant the dismissal of the application on this point. Subsequent to the signing of the initial letter of acceptance, another letter
was signed curing the defect. It is not that a case is made out in reply as suggested by the Respondent’s legal representative.
Mention is made of the names of the administrators in the notice of motion and the founding affidavit. The defect is cured and the
Respondents suffered no prejudice as a result thereof. The crux of the matter still remains that the Applicants are applying for
the appointment of the two persons mentioned in the notice of motion and the founding affidavit as administrators. I am of the view
that one should not be over-technical about this. It is indeed a aspect which this Court can and in fact does condone. The two letters
of consent to act as administrators are accepted by this Court.
Now that the points in limine are disposed of, I will deal with the application.
[D]
The
Application:-
[23]
The Court has the inherent jurisdiction over and a wide range of powers relating to trusts and trustees.
It is empowered to appoint persons to investigate and to report on issues of mal-administration of trust properties and related aspects.
[24]
It is submitted by the Applicants that the Court has the power and should appoint administrators to do
the investigations and report on the Trust administration. However, so it is submitted, if the Court is of the view that interim
trustees be appointed for the task, than the persons who had undertaken to accept appointments as administrators, be appointed as
interim trustees. The words “administrator” and “trustee” are used interchangeably in the book entitled “The Law of Trust 5th Edition” by Honoré. See page108.
[E]
The Trust:-
[25]
As already stated, the Trust was duly formed in 1919 and the trust deed was subsequently amended in 1944.
According to the trust deed there are supposed to be nine (9) trustees. In the case of the death or permanent removal of any or all
of the trustees, the community of worshippers shall be entitled by majority vote to elect a trustee or trustees to fill the vacancy
or vacancies.
[26]
It is common cause that there are no trustees for the Trust, although the Respondents appeared initially
to have claimed that there are at least two trustees.
[F]
The 1987 Constitution:-
[27]
The Respondents claim to be members of the executive committee of an association which they claim to
have been formed in 1987. They rely for their claim in this regard on the constitution of such association. Though there was initially
confusion on the version of the Respondents as to whether or not the constitution of the association was adopted, it became apparent
that it was indeed never adopted.
[28]
The effect of this is that the Respondents are not entitled to act in terms of this constitution that
was never adopted. They are therefore not entitled to take control of the assets of the Trust neither are they allowed to call meetings
or arrange elections in terms of that constitution. They are also not trustees of the Trust.
[29]
Even if the constitution was adopted (which I do not find to be the case) it does not have the effect
that the Trust was terminated or amended by the constitution because the trust deed does not provide for it, neither did all the
beneficiaries or all the trustees agreed thereto.
[30]
Although the pre-amble of this constitution reads “the Constitution of the Mafikeng Muslim Association (established in 1919 as the Mohammedan Community of Mafikeng”) which bears reference to the Trust, it does not state that its objective was to amend, vary of terminate the Trust or trust deed.
[31]
This constitution creates the impression that it was to be a constitution for a voluntary association.
It was intended that twelve trustees be appointed to sign “on behalf of the association all documentation in connection with the acquisition, alienation and hypothecation of landed property”. It seems to me that because of the reference made to trustees in the constitution, there was confusion on the part of the
Respondents who thought that they can act as trustees for the Trust. The result was that they usurp the powers of the trustees of
the Trust and fused the Trust with the association,
[32]
It goes without saying that only a person that has been duly elected or appointed by the Court, can act
as a trustee of the Trust. As a result of the fact that it is now established beyond doubt (as correctly conceded also by the Respondents)
that there are no trustees at the present moment for the Trust, the Respondents cannot perform the duties of trustees nor can they
usurp the powers of trustees and act as such on behalf of the Trust.
[33]
The Trust Property Control Act, Act no. 57 of 1988 came into operation on 31 March 1989. In terms of
this Act, a trustee must register the trust and hand to the Master of the High Court the trust deed of the Trust. The Applicants
maintain that they could not find any proof that the said trust had been registered with the Master of the High Court. That also
explains why they did not initially served this application on the Master. The Respondents does not say that the Trust is registered
with the Master. This leads me to the inevitable conclusion that the trust was never registered with the Master. Even if the Respondents
were entitled to act as trustees for the Trust (which I do not find to be the situation) they failed to comply with the statutory
provisions of registering the Trust with the Master.
[34]
It is also a requirement that immovable trust property be duly registered in the name of the trust in
terms of section 11 of the aforementioned Act. The Respondents conceded that one of the trust properties is not registered in the
name of the Trust. Their explanation of the failure to do so is unacceptable. The only reason in my view why it was not done is because
the Respondents are well aware of the fact that they are not trustees of the Trust.
[35]
It is required of a trustee to see to the proper administration of the trust and to ensure that proper
bookkeeping in respect of the financial affairs of the trust is conducted. It is abundantly clear from the affidavits and supporting
documents that the bookkeeping of the Trust was not properly done. It seems that the financial statements for the years 2000 to 2005
were all done at the same time seeing that they all bears the same date to wit, 12 April 2006. It also bears reference to both the association and the Trust. Furthermore, it seems that these financial statements were only compiled
and prepared after the Applicants approached this Court on a previous occasion for mandatory relief in this regard.
[36]
The auditors indicate that they were advised (without proof to that effect) that the trustees have changed
as from 6 July 2006. The names of the Fourth to Seventh Respondents are listed as being the new trustees (albeit for the MMA).
[37]
The Trust properties are rented out in order to generate an income to inter alia maintain the mosque. This is in compliance with the trust deed. When trust property is so leased, the trustees of the trust must
ensure that the rentals are collected and properly managed and accounted for in the interest of the trust. There is evidence that
the Respondents have written off some of the rentals and reduced others. So, for example in respect of Dullas Fresh Produce was a
substantial amount of R384 907-00 written off. This information is not reflected in the financial statements. The Respondents only
conceded to the writing off of the said amount in their answering affidavits. This is a clear indication of the mismanagement of
the trust properties and inadequate accounting of the financial state of affairs of the Trust.
[38]
It is expected of a trustee to act with due regard to the interest of the beneficiaries of the trust.
A trustee must also make available to the beneficiaries of the trust all the information reasonably required by such beneficiaries
regarding the management and affairs of the trust.
[39]
If the Respondents who acted as trustees for the Trust (though not lawfully so) had properly managed
the affairs of the Trust, and in the interest of the beneficiaries, it would not have been necessary for the Applicants to approach
this Court to order them to supply financial statements for the years 2000 to 2005. As already alluded to earlier on in this judgment,
the financial statements that were eventually provided, all bears the same date (12 April 2006) which means that they were all compiled
at the same time.
[G]
Conclusion:-
[40]
It is abundantly clear that there are no trustees for the Trust, and that the affairs of the Trust are
now being attended to by persons not authorised to do so. There is also proof that the affairs of the Trust are not properly managed
or properly accounted for. This necessitates the appointment of administrators to investigate these matters and report to the Court,
which report must also include the names of suitable persons to be appointed as trustees for the Trust.
[H]
Costs:-
[41]
It is clear that the Respondents (First and Second and Fourth to Seventh) are not trustees of the Trust
and could not have acted in the interest of the Trust or being mandated to do so in opposing the appointment of administrators for
the Trust. Though they alleged that they were duly authorised to act on behalf of the MMA, there is no resolution to back up this
allegation. The result is that they acted in their personal capacities in opposing this application.
[42]
I am of the view that costs should follow the result since I find no reason to order otherwise. Seeing
that the Respondents mentioned acted in their personal capacities they are personally liable to pay the costs of this application.
[43]
Adv Pistor SC on behalf of the Applicants submitted that the costs should include the costs up to the date of this order. He referred the Court
to the case of Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 (2) SA 805 (C) for his submission. I find the said authority quite apposite in this case.
[I]
Order:-
[44]
Consequently, I make the following order:-
[i]
Dawood Coovadia and Moosa Vardalia are appointed as administrators of the Mohammedan Community of
Mafikeng Trust with the powers and duties set out in paragraph [1] of this judgment.
[ii]
The Respondents as members of the executive committee of the MMA and/or self-imposed trustees of the
Trust are suspended from office with immediate effect.
[iii]
The Respondents as members of the executive committee of the MMA and/or self-imposed trustees, and any other
person who may be in possession of any books, records, minutes and documents of whatsoever nature that relate to the affairs of the
Trust and MMA, must hand over within fourteen (14) days from the date of this order all such books, records, minutes and documents
currently in their possession or under their control, to the administrators.
[iv]
The administrators must within three (3) months from the date of this order submit a report to the Registrar
of this court in which they indicate:-
(a)
to what extent, if any, the trust deed, adopted in 1919 and amended in 1944 needs to be amended
to provide for present day circumstances;
(b)
the names, addresses and such further available particulars that might be relevant of all suitable persons
that are willing and able to be appointed as trustees for the Trust,
(c)
all such other matters that they deem necessary and relevant.”
R D HENDRICKS
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR THE APPLICANT: GERHARD MAREE