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IN THE NORTH WEST HIGH COURT

MAHIKENG

CASE 1514/2013

In the matter between:

J R PROPERTIES CC                                                                              Plaintiff

and

ESKOM HOLDINGS LIMITED                                                             Defendant

 

CIVIL MATTER

 

KGOELE J

 

DATE OF HEARING                                       :        29/2 – 1/3 & 5,6,7/9/16

                                                                 

DATE OF JUDGMENT        (Absolution)      :        6 SEPTEMBER 2016  

 

DATE REASONS REQUESTED                     :        20 SEPTEMBER 2016

 

DATE REASONS HANDED                            :        28 OCTOBER 2016

FOR THE PLAINTIFF                                     :        Adv. G.V. Maree

 

FOR THE DEFENDANT                                  :        Adv. S. Chitando

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

KGOELE J:

[1] The plaintiff is the owner of Erf. 2936, Golfview, Mahikeng on which it has developed 11 town houses or flats.  The defendant is the sole supplier of electricity to the area in which Erf 2936 is situated.

[2] On or about the 15^th November 2011 the plaintiff applied in writing to the defendant for the supply of a new service to Erf. 2936, Golfview, Mahikeng.  In terms of the said application plaintiff applied for a 100 Kva 3 phase bulk supply for the purposes of distribution to residential flats.

[3] On or about the 9^th January 2012 defendant, acting through its Central Region situated at Dr James Moroka Drive, Mmabatho, furnished the plaintiff with a final written quotation for the installation of a 100 Kva 3 phase supply of electricity as applied for.

[4] On or about 27^th January 2012 the plaintiff accepted the aforesaid  quotation in writing.  The said written application, final quotation and acceptance letter constitutes a written agreement between the plaintiff and defendant in this matter.

[5] The plaintiff alleges that the material, express, alternatively implied, further alternative tacit terms of the aforesaid agreement included inter alia:-

5.1     Defendant would install a 100 Kva electricity supply to stand No. 2936 Apiesdoring Golfview

5.2     The declared voltage for the said supply would be three phase at 400/230 volts

5.3     In order to accomplish this defendant would lay 95 metres of 150mm armoured service cables to the boundary of the plaintiff’s erf.

5.4     Install a 225Kva MCCB at minisubstantion G3

5.5     Terminate with a 100Kva metering unit on the boundary of plaintiff’s erf.

5.6     Defendant would charge the plaintiff “businessrate 3” for the supply of electricity to the plaintiff’s town houses / flats development

5.7     Plaintiff was to pay defendant an upfront connection charge of R117 725.08 (one hundred and seventeen thousand seven hundred and twenty five rand and eighty cents), inclusive of VAT

5.8     Plaintiff was to pay defendant an amount of R15 285.00 (fifteen thousand two hundred and eighty five rand), equivalent to approximately two months usage as security for payment of the electricity consumed on the town house/flat development on the said property

5.9     Defendant was to lay the aforesaid cable, complete the associated works on the mini-sub and install the 100Kva metering unit on the boundary of the plaintiff’s said stand within a reasonable time; and

5.10   Defendant was to connect the said electricity supply to the plaintiff’s town house/flat development within a reasonable time.

[6] Plaintiff’s case is that it had completed the relevant eleven (11) residential units on Erf. 2936, Golfview, Mahikeng before the end of November 2012, and:-

6.1    Save for the defendant’s failure to perform timeously and connect the said eleven residential units to its electricity supply grid in the manner set out above, in all other respects the said eleven (11) residential units were ready for occupation; 

6.2    As a result of the defendant only supplying electricity to Erf. 2936, Golfview, Mahikeng after the 30^th January 2013 the plaintiff was only able to secure tenants for all eleven (11) of the said residential units from the 1^st March 2013;

6.3    In the circumstances the plaintiff suffered a loss of rental income for the months of December 2012, January 2013 and February 2013;

6.4    The monthly rental for the relevant eleven (11) units being R77 000-00 (seventy seven thousand rand), as a result of the defendant’s breach of the agreement as set out above the defendant suffered a cumulative loss of rental income in the amount of R231 000.00 (two hundred and thirty one thousand rand);

6.5    Defendant is liable to compensate the plaintiff in the amount of R231 000.00 (two hundred and thirty one thousand rand).

[7] The matter was heard on the 29^th February – 1^st March 2016 and again on the 5^th,6^th  and 7^th  September 2016 whereafter judgment was reserved.  The parties agreed that they will exchange written submissions and file them with this Court by the 28^th October 2016 where-after judgment can be delivered.  In the meantime on the 20^th September 2016 the defendant filed a Notice requesting reasons for the dismissal of its application for absolution by this Court on the 6^th October 2016.  The reasons thereof follow hereunder.

[8] The plaintiff called two witnesses to testify on its behalf.  The summary of the evidence of Mr Lewis who was the first witness was as follows:-  On or about the 31^st January 2012 plaintiff, after accepting the final quotation, paid defendant the sum of the amount for the up-front connection being R117 725.08 (one hundred and seventeen seven hundred and twenty five rand and eight cents) and the amount for the said security deposit being R15 285.00 (fifteen thousand two hundred and eighty five rand), with the total of the said amounts being R133 010.08 (one hundred and thirty three thousand and ten rand and eight cents).  When plaintiff and defendant entered into the contract set out above the defendant knew that the electricity supply was needed for multiple unit residential purposes on stand 2936 Golfview and further that plaintiff intended to rent out the said residential units.  At that time it was within the contemplation of the defendant that plaintiff would suffer a loss of income if defendant did not perform its obligations timeously.  Mr Lewis testified further that, at that time it was within the contemplation of the defendant that plaintiff could not rent the relevant individual residential units out to tenants without such units being connected to and receiving electricity from the defendant’s electricity supply grid.

[9] According to the evidence of Mr Lewis the plaintiff has performed all its obligations in terms of the said agreement in accordance with the terms of such agreement.  On the other hand defendant only laid the cable, performed the required work on the mini-sub station and installed the meter on the boundary of the plaintiff’s property contemplated by the relevant agreement on or about the 30^th January 2013.  As a result the defendant only connected the plaintiff’s multiple unit residential development to the electricity supply grid after or on the 30^th January 2013.  His contention is that in the prevailing circumstances the defendant did not lay the necessary cable, perform the required work on the mini-sub and install the relevant meter on the boundary of the plaintiff’s property within a reasonable time.  Consequently, in the prevailing circumstances the defendant did not connect the plaintiff’s multi-unit residential property development to the electricity supply grid within a reasonable time.

[10] He further testified about a letter that he wrote on the 8^th January 2013, a year since he had done the application, pleading with the defendant to have a look at why the connection has not been done yet.  He indicated that he also wrote an e-mail to one Anel Vorster that works at the defendant requesting for urgent connection again.  The reply thereto which indicated that the project was delayed by lack of material together with resources that was to be used during the connection was received by him on the 29^th January 2013.  According to him the defendant promised that connection was going to be completed that Friday according to plan.  The defendant only started the work and connected the electricity on the 30^th January 2013.

[11] He also testified about how he computed the damages suffered by the plaintiff which evidence is not relevant for the purposes of this judgment.

[12] It emerged during cross examination that by the 30^th January 2013 the plaintiff had not yet obtained a certificate of occupation nor a certificate of compliance.  Further that the certificate of compliance was only signed on 5 February 2013.  It was put to him that according to the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties the defendant could not connect before the certificate of compliance was received by defendant.  Mr Lewis did not agree with this proposition and gave his own understanding of how the work was to be done which was to the effect that the connection consists of two stages:-

·         Eskom had to lay the cable first on their side which they did not; (the construction work)

·         Then two electricians, that is the one employed by him and the one by the defendant must meet to check the connections at the mini power station;

·         During which time the defendant’s electricity must be connected temporarily so that his electrician can see if everything is working 100% properly;

·         It is only after this has been done that his electrician will then issue a certificate of compliance and then Eskom do the permanent connection.

[13] It was put to him that his understanding of how the connection is supposed to be done is not correct.  Further that he did not suffer any damages because at the time the defendant’s people connected the electricity, he had not had a certificate of occupation, he could not have thus be in the position to lease out the properties in question.  Secondly that, plaintiff was also not in possession of a certificate of compliance as required by paragraph 1.5 found on page 6 of the defendant’s discovery bundles which according to defendants’ Counsel forms the terms and conditions before supply can be connected.  Lastly that, the defendant performed its duties in a reasonable time, whilst on the other hand the plaintiff is the author of its misfortune because it did not perform according to the terms and conditions of the contract at the time the defendant connected the electricity.

[14] The second witness called by the plaintiff was Ms Jacobs who works for Harcourts Mafikeng Real Estate Agency.  She mainly testified about renting and selling property, what they take into consideration in deciding what amounts they can charge for rental in a particular house/flat in a particular year.  Her evidence did not take the main issue before Court any further especially because she indicated that she did not inspect these particular flats in 2012.  Her evidence is most relevant for the determination of the quantum of damages which will be considered in the main judgment of the action which is still pending as indicated in paragraph 7 of this judgment.

[15] Plaintiff closed its case and the defendant elected to apply for absolution from the instance in terms of Rule 39 (b) of the Uniform Rules of Court (The Rules).  Defendant’s Counsel submitted that the evidence of the two witnesses called by the plaintiff does not make out a prima facie case for the damages caused by the alleged defendant’s breach of contract.

[16] To bolster his argument he submitted that plaintiff has bound itself to the terms and conditions of the defendant’s electrical supply agreement.  The plaintiff therefore cannot subsequently go back and say that the terms in the agreement are inconsistent with the procedure he described for the connection of the electrical supply from the defendant after conceding that Page 6 of the defendant’s discovery contains the terms and conditions for electrical supply they had agreed to.  He admitted that paragraph 1.5 of the terms and conditions states that:-

“a certificate of compliance signed duly and completed by the Electrical Contractor must be submitted to Eskom and the installation approved by an accredited person before supply may be connected”.

[17] According to the defendant’s Counsel plaintiff shot himself on the foot because Mr Lewis admitted that he only obtained his certificate of compliance on 5 February 2013 for the properties.  When explaining why the plaintiff had no certificate of compliance he said:-

“How can I test drive a vehicle without fuel?  That goes the same for the certificate of compliance, how can we test the building without electricity….. You need electricity and then the certificate of compliance will be signed off”

When told that Eskom’s terms and conditions don’t provide for temporary and permanent connections Mr Lewis said:-

“My Lady, that is correct but that is not how it works”.

[18]   He referred this Court to the case of Industrial and Mercantile Corporation v Anastassiov Brothers 1973 (2) SA 601 (WLD) at 605  where Davidson J confirmed the principle of law set out by Innes CJ in Burger v Central South African Railways 1903 T.S. 571.  Davidson J decided that the principle of law governing the liability of a party who signed a document which contains printed terms and conditions over his signature is as follows:-

“It is a sound principle of law that a man when he signs a contract is taken to be bound by the ordinary meaning and effect of the words which appear over his signature….”

[19] Defendant’s Counsel maintained that it is a “sound principle” of the law of contract that the plaintiff in this matter is bound by the terms and conditions of the defendant’s electrical supply agreement.  It is not open, in South African Law of contract, for the plaintiff to argue that he required electrical connection before a certificate of compliance, when he bound himself to an agreement that states that electrical supply will be provided after the plaintiff provided a certificate of compliance.

[20] He concluded by submitting that the plaintiff, on its own version, did not fulfil its own obligations in terms of the agreement when it claimed damages.  The plaintiff’s own expert witness, Ms Jacobs, gave evidence that she does not lease out property without an electricity compliance certificate.  Mr Lewis admitted as indicated above that he only obtained his certificate of compliance on the 5 February 2013 for the properties. The plaintiff has given evidence that he did not fulfil his obligations in terms of the agreement, which are Eskom’s terms and conditions.  His reasons for not doing so are irrelevant.  According to him it does not end here because the South African law of contract is clear that a plaintiff must comply with all its terms of agreement, before it can claim damages.

[21] Accordingly, he argued, the plaintiff in its evidence at the close of its case has simply failed to provide evidence that any Court applying its mind could possibly find for the plaintiff.  The defendant should be absolved from the instance.

[22] The plaintiff’s Counsel opposed this application.  In his submissions that the application should be dismissed he argued that the plaintiff's version of the facts that the electricity connection comprised of two different parts (the physical work and the electricity supply) was not denied, nor a different version in respect thereof put to the plaintiff.  The plaintiff's version that the physical work had to be done within a reasonable time was not denied. No different version was put to the plaintiff in respect thereof. The plaintiff's evidence that the delay was unreasonable (being one year from application to construction) was not tested, nor did any version for justification for such long delay been put to the plaintiff;

[23] In my analysis I took into consideration the case of Gordon Lloyd Page and Associates v Rivera and Another 2001 (1) SA 88 wherein  Harms J succinctly set the test for obsolution at paragraph 2 as follows:-

The test for absolution to be applied by a trial court at the end of a plaintiff's case was formulated in Claude Neon Lights (SA) Ltd v Daniel 1976 (4) SA 403 (A) at 409G - H in these terms:

“…. (W)hen absolution from the instance is sought at the close of plaintiff's case, the test to be applied is not whether the evidence led by plaintiff establishes what would finally be required to be established, but whether there is evidence upon which a Court, applying its mind reasonably to such evidence, could or might (not should, nor ought to) find for the plaintiff. (Gascoyne v Paul and Hunter 1917 TPD 170 at 173; Ruto Flour Mills (Pty) Ltd v Adelson (2)1958 (4) SA 307 (T).)” 

This implies that a plaintiff has to make out a prima facie case - in the sense that there is evidence relating to all the elements of the claim - to survive absolution because without such evidence no court could find for the plaintiff (Marine & Trade Insurance Co Ltd v Van der Schyff 1972 (1) SA 26 (A) at 37G - 38A; Schmidt Bewysreg 4th ed at 91 - 2). As far as inferences from the evidence are concerned, the inference relied upon by the plaintiff must be a reasonable one, not the only reasonable one (Schmidt at 93). The test has from time to time been formulated in different terms, especially it has been said that the court must consider whether there is 'evidence upon which a reasonable man might find for the plaintiff' (Gascoyne (loc cit)) - a test which had its origin in jury trials when the 'reasonable man' was a reasonable member of the jury (Ruto Flour Mills). Such a formulation tends to cloud the issue. The court ought not to be concerned with what someone else might think; it should rather be concerned with its own judgment and not that of another 'reasonable' person or court. Having said this, absolution at the end of a plaintiff's case, in the ordinary course of events, will nevertheless be granted sparingly but when the occasion arises, a court should order it in the interests of justice.

[24] The issue before this Court revolves around the following questions:  Whether or not the plaintiff performed its obligations in terms of the agreement and furthermore, whether or not the defendant laid the necessary cable, performed the required work on the mini sub-station and installed the relevant meter on the boundary of the plaintiff’s property within a reasonable time.

[25] It should be noted that the defendant in its plea relied on the following grounds as its defence for its failure to act timeously:-

11.2   that, based on annexure "A" to the particulars of claim, there is no manner in which it could have been ascertained by the Defendant that the supply of electricity was for a multi unit residence.

11.3   the Defendant denies that it could foresee that the Plaintiff's intention was to rent out such units.

11.4   it was only during October 2012 that the employees of the   Defendant noticed that the property was in fact multi units and for residential purposes.

11.5   that the Defendant performed prematurely in that it was never provided with certificates of compliance; that a certificate of compliance is a necessity for the electricity to be connected.

13.2     that the reason the construction work was only done on 30 January 2013 was    as a result of the employees of the defendant (suppose plaintiff) not allowing   the defendant (suppose Plaintiff) not allowing the Defendant to enter the premises to do the necessary work

15.2   that the Plaintiff was not in a position to receive such electricity and the fact that it was still busy with construction up to January 2013 that the Defendant was unable to lay the necessary cables and perform the necessary works.

17.     Defendant states that it cannot admit or deny paragraphs 18 – 20 of the particulars of claim and therefore put the Plaintiff to the proof thereof.

[26] From the evidence before Court and the pleadings it is clear that the plaintiff’s claim is based on the failure by the defendant to lay the cable, perform the required work on the mini-sub station and install the meter on the boundary of the plaintiff's property within a reasonable time (being the construction work or physical work) and subsequently to that failure by the defendant, to connect the plaintiff's multi unit residential development to the electricity supply grid within a reasonable time.

[27] It is furthermore clear from the documents filed of record supported by the viva voce evidence of Mr Lewis that the application for the new electricity services was already made on 15 November 2011. On the application form it was indicated that the services is required ASAP and that it is required for flats; a final quotation was handed to the plaintiff on 9 January 2012; the final quotation was accepted on 27 January 2012; the amount payable in respect thereof was done on 31 January 2012.

[28] Simply put, the case for the plaintiff is that the defendant’s delay in performing the construction / physical work resulted therein in that the supply of electricity was also delayed.  Further that, the delay by the defendant caused the plaintiff damages. To this end, no version was put to the witness for the plaintiff regarding the delay as alleged or otherwise stated in the plea.  The application for absolution from the instance is seemingly premised only on the incorrect assumption by the defendant that the plaintiff's claim is based on the supply or connection of electricity per se.

[29] The only version that we have so far of the defendant in defence to the case of the plaintiff is seen in their answer to paragraph 16 of the particulars of claim where plaintiff alleges that they failed to perform the physical work within a reasonable time and it pleaded as follows:-

·          The plaintiff was not in a position to receive such electricity in that it was still busy with construction up until January 2013 and therefore the defendant was unable to lay the necessary cables and perform the necessary works.  Unfortunately this flies against their e-mail which they wrote in January 2013 wherein they indicated that they are still waiting for material.

·          On or about January 2013 an employee of defendant was chased away by the plaintiff as a result of construction being done on plaintiff’s premises.  This loses sight of the fact that by 31^st January 2012, payment was already made.  It begs to question how long is reasonable according to them.

[30] In the affidavit resisting summary judgment the duly authorised representative of the defendant, Margaret Ntuli, inter alia stated that:-

29.1   (with reference to the physical work to be done) it is accordingly clear that all the processes that are required to take place would have to be affected after proof of payment has been produced by the customer; the acceptance letter did not have proof of payment annexed to it and accordingly the construction (physical work) could not have been initiated”

The version of the plaintiff in respect of these two aspects of the work to be done (the physical work and the supply of electricity) was not contradicted in cross examination. This version is similar in some respect (pertaining to the different work to be done) to that of Margaret Ntuli in her affidavit resisting summary judgment as quoted above.  But above all, there is no evidence before this Court up to this far to countenance the evidence of the plaintiff on this aspect. No justification grounds or reasons were put to the plaintiff in respect of the non-performance by the defendant of the said physical work.

[31] The only defence which the defendant in cross examination mainly concentrated on was to the effect that the plaintiff did not provide the defendant with a certificate of compliance and subsequent thereto the plaintiff did not have a certificate of occupation prior to January 2013. The plea, however, does not make any mention of a defence of "no certificate of occupation".

[32] As already indicated above, the plaintiff's case is not only premised on a delay of the physical construction, it is on the other hand also premised on the fact that due to unreasonable delay it was not in a position to obtain the relevant certificates in order to rent out its property from the end of November 2012 hence its claim for loss of rental only from December 2012 to February 2013. Yet again no version to contradict this evidence was put to the witness for the plaintiff.

[33] No version or cogent reasons were put to the plaintiff during cross examination that the flats were not ready for occupation during December 2012 to February 2013; no version was put to the plaintiff that he could not have obtained rental income for the period December 2012 to February 2013; no version was put to the plaintiff that he did not pay the total amount payable and/or that it was not located to his account; no defence was raised in the plea that the plaintiff could not or was not allowed to rent out its flats due to it not having a certificate occupation.

[34] I find the following remarks made in the case of President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) apposite in our matter: -

“The institution of cross examination not only constitutes a right, it also imposes certain obligations. As a general rule it is essential when it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct the witness's attention to the fact by questions put in cross examination showing that the imputation is intended to be made and to afford the witness an opportunity, while still in the witness-box, of giving any explanation open to the witness and of defending his or her character. If a point in dispute if left unchallenged in cross examination, the party calling the witness is entitled to assume that the unchallenged witness's testimony is accepted as correct...

This rule... is not merely one of professional practice but is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses...

It should be made clear not only that the evidence is to be challenged but also how it is to be challenged. This is so because the witness must be given an opportunity to deny the challenge, to call corroborative evidence, to qualify the evidence given by the witness or others and to explain contradictions on which reliance is to be placed...

These rules relating to the duty to cross examine must obviously not be applied in a mechanical way, but always with due regard to all the facts and circumstances of each case. But their object must not be lost sight of. Its proper observance is owed to pauper and price alike.

[35] The following remarks sound in the case of Small v The remarks in the case of Smith 1954 (3) SA 434 (S.W.A) at 438 E-F are worth quoting in the circumstances of our matter:-

“It is in my opinion elementary and standard practice for a party to put to each opposing witness so much of his own case or defence as concerns that witness and if need be to inform him, if he has not been given notice thereof, that other witnesses will contradict him, so as to give him fair warning and an opportunity of explaining the contradiction and defending his own character. It is grossly unfair and improper to let a witness's evidence go unchallenged in cross examination and afterwards argue that he must be disbelieved. Once a witness's evidence on a point in dispute has been deliberately left unchallenged in cross examination and particular by a legal practitioner, the party calling that witness is normally entitled to assume in the absence of notice to the contrary that the witness's testimony is accepted as correct.

[36] I can do no better than to quote the case of Hanger v Regal and Another 2015 (3) SA 115 (FS) at 118D where it was held:-

“It is trite that, once the pleadings have been filed, the parties are bound by them.  If the pleadings raise certain issues and evidence adduced at trial does not substantiate them, the action [the defence also] will fail unless amendments have been granted” [My own insertion].

[37] In the application for absolution the defendant also attempts to rely on a further defence that the plaintiff was in mora.  The defendant is attempting to rely on non-compliance by the plaintiff in circumstances wherein the defendant itself failed to comply with the agreement. The defendant in effect attempts to take advantage of its own wrongs.  The answer to this submission can be found in the remarks made in the case of  Comwezi Security Services (Pty) Ltd and Another v Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd (182/13) [2014] ZASCA 22 (28 March 2014) where the following was stated at paragraph 12:-

“...A party to a contract should not by its own unlawful conduct be allowed to obtain an advantage for himself to the disadvantage of his counterpart. 'it is a fundamental principle of our law that no man can take advantage of his own wrong' and 'to permit the repudiating party to take advantage of the other side's failure to do something, when that failure is attributable to his own repudiation, is to reward him for his repudiation.”

[38] As far as the costs of the 5^th September 2016 which was occasioned by the postponement of the matter to the 6^th up to the time of judgment, this Court is of the view that the conduct of the defendant solely led to the cause for the postponement.

[39] I fully agree with the submissions by the plaintiff’s Counsel in this regard that no indication was given to the plaintiff that an application for absolution from the instance will be made. When the matter was postponed on a previous occasion the defendant indicated that it intends calling three witnesses. Had the defendant indicated their intention to apply for absolution from the instance at that time one Court day would have been sufficient to deal with such an application on the 5^th.

[40] Furthermore, according to the plaintiff, a letter was sent to the attorneys of record of the defendant on 24 August 2016 confirming the date of the hearing of the matter in September. No reply was received in respect of the said letter. The defendant could have at the very least at that time informed the plaintiff's attorney of record of its intention to apply for absolution from the instance limiting any possible postponement application by the plaintiff due to the fact that they will be caught unprepared. This it failed to do.

[41] The application for absolution was only handed to the legal representatives of the plaintiff according to him at approximately 12h00 on 5 September 2016. The application was accompanied by heads of argument. This could have been forwarded or e-mailed to the attorneys for the plaintiff to have regard thereto and to deal with long before the 5th. This was also not done by the defendant.

[42] When the Court postponed the matter on the 3^rd May 2016 the plaintiff had already closed its case.  The defendant in fact informed the Court that it want “to arrange its ducks in a row” giving the plaintiff and the Court an impression that it is going to proceed with the defendant’s case.  It is indeed true that the prerogative of changing its stance rest on it, but it is also prudent and a matter of courtesy, fair-play and professional practice that in case of a change of heart, the other party should be informed timeously.

[43] The conclusion that I reached was that at the close of the plaintiff’s case there was evidence upon which a reasonable man might find for the plaintiff.  The above sums up the reasons for the order that I granted dismissing the defendant’s application for absolution with costs and such costs to include the costs occasioned by the postponement of the 5^th.

________________

A M KGOELE

JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

ATTORNEYS:

 

FOR THE PLAINTIFF           :         Smit Stanton Inc.

                                                                        29 Warren Street

                                                                        MAHIKENG

 

FOR THE DEFENDANT      :           Ngeno & Mteto Inc.

                                                                        C/O Van Rooyen Tlhapi Wessels Inc.

                                                                        9 Proctor Avenue

                                                                        MAHIKENG

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