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[1985] ZASCA 102
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Greeff NO v Registrar of Deeds, Cape Town (160/84) [1985] ZASCA 102; [1986] 1 All SA 352 (A) (26 September 1985)
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114/85
s
160/84/AV
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (APPELLATE DIVISION)
In the matter between:
WESSEL JOHANNES GREEFF N.O. Appellant
THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS,
CAPE TOWN First Respondent
AND
THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND
FISHERIES Second Respondent
CORAM: RABIE, CJ, CORBETT, MILLER, GROSSKOPF, JJA et CILLIé, AJA
HEARD: 2 September 1985
DELIVERED: 26 September 1985
JUDGMENT GROSSKOPF, JA
During his lifetime the late.W.H. Greeff
(the
2
("the deceased") was the owner of three farms in the Somerset East district known as Springvale, Kuikendief-fontein and Noorsdoornkraal. During 1971, as a result of prolonged droughts and depressed agricultural conditions, he found himself in financial difficulties. In August 1971 he applied for financial assistance pursuant to the Agricultural Credit Act, no. 28 of 1966 ("the Act"). The Department of Agriculture and Land Tenure replied to the application on 25 October 1971, intimating that the Agricultural Credit Board ("the Board") had decided to grant financial assistance to the deceased subject to conditions set out in their letter. The deceased duly accepted the offer of assistance and the
conditions
3 conditions subject to which it was made. The assistance
took the form of a loan of R50 000,00 secured by a second bond over the
three
farms. One of the conditions was that endorsements be effected on the title
deeds of the three farms pursuant to section 35
of the Act, stipulating,
inter alia, that the farms should not be alienated separately without the
consent of the Minister of Agriculture. The advance was duly made,
the bond was
registered and the endorsements were affected.
The deceased died in August
1980. By May 1981 the amount owing by the deceased's estate under the bond had
been paid in full, and
the bond
was
4 was cancelled. In terms of the deceased's will each of his three
sons inherited one of the farms. When the appellant, who is the
executor of the
deceased's estate, sought to give effect to these bequests the Registrar of
Deeds (the first respondent) refused
to effect separate registrations of the
farms without the consent of the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (the
second respondent).
In doing so the Registrar relied on the above-mentioned
condition endorsed on the title deeds of the three farms. The second respondent
was approached for his consent, but refused to grant it because, an official in
his department stated, the farms Kuikendieffontein
and Noorsdoornkraal were
not
considered
5 considered viable economic units. In an attempt to resolve
matters the appellant applied to the Eastern Cape Division for an order
declaring that he was entitled to transfer the three farms separately to the
respective legatees and that the said condition was
no longer valid. The
application, which was opposed by the second respondent, was dismissed with
costs. With the leave of the court
a quo (MULLINS J) the appellant now
appeals to this court.
The crisp question for decision is whether the
restriction on separate alienation survived the repayment of the loan to the
State.
The answer to this question depends mainly on the proper interpretation
of
the
6 the Act. It is necessary therefore to consider its relevant
provisions in the context of the Act as a whole. The Act is described
in its
long title as an Act "to provide for assistance to persons carrying on or
undertaking to carry on farming operations, for
the exercise of control in
respect of assistance rendered, and for other incidental matters". Part 1 of the
Act makes provision for
the establishment and functioning of the Board. Part II
defines the nature of the assistance which the Board and the Minister renders
to
farmers and would-be farmers. This assistance rendered by the Board takes three
main forms laid down in section 10; viz., the
granting of loans for any purpose
tending to safeguard or stimulate the farming
industry
7 industry; the selling or letting of immovable property of the
State which in the opinion of the Board is suitable for farming operations;
and
assistance in effecting compromises between applicants and their creditors. The
rendering of assistance in these ways is, in
terms of the section, to be carried
out subject to the other relevant provisions of the Act and the directions of
the Minister and
may be subject to such terms and conditions as the Board may
determine. It is thus apparent from the provisions of section 10 that
the
granting of loans to farmers is by no means the only form of assistance rendered
by the Board. Section 11 deals with assistance
by the Minister. This section
plays no role in the decision of this case and I need not refer to it again.
In
8 In the present case, where the assistance rendered to the deceased required the repayment of money. Part IV of the Act was applicable. This part is headed "Securities and Steps taken in Connecion Therewith. Immovable Property." Its first section (section 34) provides for the manner in which a bond is to be registered whenever such registration is required in terms of a condition imposed under the Act in respect of assistance rendered or any other amount recoverable under the Act. I should emphasize that the "assistance rendered" to which this section refers is not limited to advances to existing farmers. It would cover other forms of assistance falling within the ambit of section 10 such as advances to enable would-be farmers to acquire land, or the granting of credit in respect
of the sale of land by the Board to an applicant.
It
9 It is against this background that sub-sections 35(1) and (2), which are the key provisions for the purposes of this case, fall to be interpreted. I quote them as they were in 1971 when the relevant transactions occurred. These sub-sections then read as follows:
"(1) when any mortgage bond is registered in terms of section 34, the Minister may authorise the registrar of deeds concerned in writing to endorse on the title deeds of the immovable property in question and, in the case of a restriction referred to in paragraph (b) of this subsection, any other immovable property of the mortgagor, any one or more of the following conditions or restrictions, namely, that such property shall not without the consent of the Minister -
(a) be subdivided; (b) be alienated separately; (c) be mortgaged or otherwise encumbered;
(d)
10
(d) be attached or sold in execution, except at the instance of the holder of a mortgage bond on such property; (e) form part of the estate of the owner of such property, but shall, subject to the rights of the holder of the mortgage bond on such property, become the property of the State, if, while there is any amount in respect of assistance owing to the State by the said owner, his estate is sequestrated or is to be dealt with by an executor in terms of section 34 (5) of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act no. 66 of 1965), or
is dealt with in terms of section 28 of this Act, or in the case where the said owner is a company or other juristic person, the company or other juristic person is placed in liquidation.
(2)
11
(2) The said registrar shall give effect to the said authorization in such manner as may to him appear to be most practicable and convenient, and thereupon any such condition or restriction shall be valid and effective against all persons except, in the case of a restriction referred to in subsection (l)(b), against any person (including the State) in whose favour a mortgage bond or other charge was registered against any immovable property prior to the endorsement of the said restriction on the title deeds of such property, but shall, with the exception of the restriction referred to in subsection (l)(a) or (b), lapse on registration of transfer of the property concerned in the name of another owner."
Sub-section (1) commences with the words "(w)hen
any mortgage bond is registered". As I have shown a
mortgage bond could be
registered not only where a loan was
granted
12 granted but also to secure payment of the purchase price (or
part thereof) of land sold by the Board, and in respect of other amounts
recoverable under the Act. But section 35 has still wider application. Section
16 of the Act provided then (and still does) that
if assistance is rendered to
any person by selling immovable property for cash, section 35(1)(a) and (b) and
(2) would mutatis mutandis apply as if a mortgage bond over that property
were to be registered under section 34 and as if the purchaser were the
mortgagor.
To sum up: the Board may grant assistance to farmers and prospective farmers. The assistance may inter alia take the form of loans or of the sale of
land
13 land, either for cash or on credit. Where money is advanced to
an applicant or he is granted credit, a bond may (and probably always
will) be
registered over his property to secure his debt, and the conditions or
restrictions set out in section 35(1) may be endorsed
on the title deeds of his
property at the instance of the Minister. However, endorsement of the
restrictions set out in paras (a)
and (b) of that sub-section may be required by
the Minister even when the Board sells property to the applicant for cash. And
in
terms of section 35(2) these conditions are valid against all persons
(except, as far as the restriction on separate alienation is
concerned, against
a prior mortgagee). With the
exception
14 exception, of the restrictions on sub-division and separate
alienation all conditions and restrictions lapse on registration of
transfer of
the property in the name of another owner.
The first question which arises in
this appeal is whether a restriction on separate alienation could, in terms of
section 35 of the
Act, lawfully be imposed so as to continue in force despite
the extinction of the debt, which gave rise to the imposition of the
restriction. And the second question is whether, on the facts of the present
case, the restriction which was imposed did so continue
in force.
I turn now to the first question. At
the
15 the outset it should be emphasized that section 35(1) deals with
two different juristic acts, viz., on the one hand, a mortgage
bond registered
in favour of the State and, on the other hand, the endorsement on the
applicant's title, deeds of a condition or
restriction imposed by the Minister.
The mortgage bond, with all its terms and conditions, will clearly be liable to
cancellation
when the debt which it secured no longer exists. The endorsement,
on the other hand, is not in terms coupled to the debt or to the
bond. On the
face of it the Act contemplates that the endorsement could continue
indefinitely. The only express provision for its
termination is found in section
35(4) of the Act, which authorizes the Minister to order the
cancellation
16 cancellation of such an endorsement.
The language of
section 35(1) consequently indicates that the duration of an endorsement on the
title deeds of property need not be
linked to the continued existence of a debt
which is secured by a mortgage bond registered in terms of the Act. This
interpretation
is supported by other provisions in the Act. I have already
referred to section 16 of the Act which provides that endorsements in
terms of
section 35(1)(a) and (b) could be authorized where the Board sells land to an
applicant for cash. In such a case the applicant
owes no debt to the State and
the restrictions could accordingly not serve as security for money owing. The
obvious
purpose of
17
purpose of imposing, pursuant to such a sale, the
restric
tions mentioned in section 35(1)(a) and (b) would be to en
sure
that the applicant does not harm the economic value
of his farm, which he
purchased in whole or in part from
the Board, by injudicious sub-division or
alienation of
parts held under separate title. And the same con
sideration
would seem to underlie the power (granted
by section 35(1)) to restrict
separate alienation not
only of mortgaged land but also of any other part of
the
mortgagor's immovable property. If the intention had
been merely to
provide greater security for the State
the obvious course would have been to
register the mort
gage
18 gage bond also against such other immovable
property. What the section seems to contemplate is that a bond over one property
might
provide sufficient security, but that as a part of the quid pro quo
for receiving assistance the applicant should be prevented from reducing the
extent of his landholding without the consent of the
Minister. Once again the
ratio seems to be to ensure the preservation of an economic unit rather than the
securing of a debt.
That an endorsement prohibiting separate alienation may
outlive the debt which led to its imposition, appears also from sections
35(1)(e)
and 35(2) of the Act. The endorsement sanctioned by section
35
19
35(1)(e) deals, broadly speaking, with the insolvency of
an
owner who has received financial assistance in terms
of the Act. In such an
event, "while there is any
amount in respect of assistance owing to the State
by
the said owner" the property in question does not form
part of the
estate of the owner but becomes the property
of the State (subject to the
rights of mortgagees).
This condition serves purely to provide security in
re
spect of money owing to the State. For that reason,
its operation is
limited to the period during which
money is so owing. The omission of
a
similar provision in respect of the restrictions mentioned in paragraphs
(a) and (b) fortifies the conclusion
that
20 that they were not intended necessarily to come to an end when
the owner's debt to the State is extinguished. And the apparent
reason for this
distinction is the one already stated, viz., that they were intended to serve a
purpose other than that of providing
security for the payment of a debt.
I
turn now to section 35(2) which is quoted in full above. When analysed this
sub-section seems to give the following effect to conditions
or restrictions
endorsed pursuant to sub-section (1):
(a) The conditions and restrictions are valid against all persons, with one exception, viz.,
(b) .....
21
(b) a restriction on separate alienation (sub-section 1(b)) is not valid against a person in whose favour a mortgage bond or other charge was registered prior to the endorsement of the restriction against the title deeds of the property concerned; (c) when transfer of the property is registered in the name of another owner:
(i) the restrictions on sub-division and separate alienation (subsections (l)(a) and (b)) remain in force; (ii) all other conditions and restrictions lapse.
The last part of the sub-section, which I have
paraphrased in paragraph (c) above, makes it abundantly
clear that the
restrictions on sub-division and separate
alienation were intended to survive
even the registration
of
22
of transfer of the property to a new owner. Clearly this means
that they would also survive the cancellation of any bond in favour
of the
State, inasmuch as cancellation of a bond is, with immaterial exceptions, a
necessary prerequisite for registration of transfer
of immovable property. See
section 56 of the Deeds Registries Act, no. 47 of 1937.
Interpreting the Act
as it stood in 1971, I therefore conclude that the legislature intended that a
restriction on separate alienation
could outlive the debt (and resultant
mortgage) which led to its imposition. This conclusion would be fortified if
regard were had
to subsequent amendments to the Act, and, in particular, the
introduction of sub-sections 35(3)(b) and (c) by Act
no
23 no. 42 of 1983. However, the question whether and to what extent
subsequent legislation can be invoked as an aid to interpret earlier
legislation
is somewhat controversial. See, for instance, George Divisional Council v
Minister of Labour & Another 1954(3) SA 300(C) at p. 307 G-H; Patel
v. Minister of Interior & Another 1955(2) SA 485(A) at p. 493
A-E; Lymer Investments (Pty) Ltd v. South African Railways & Harbours
1975(3) SA 905 (D) at p. 911; Steyn, Die Uitleg van Wette, 5th
ed., pp. 153 to 154 and Craies on Statute Law, 7th ed., pp. 146 to 149.
Inasmuch as the meaning of the Act as it read in 1971 seems quite clear to me, I
prefer not to place any
reliance on amendments subsequent to that year.
In considering the meaning to be attached to
sec.
24 sec. 35 I have not overlooked the arguments advanced by Mr.
Dison, who appeared for the appellant, in support of the proposition
that the
Minister did not have the power to impose a restriction which would endure after
repayment of the debt to the State. He
first contended that the long title of
the Act, which I have quoted above, provided a strong indication that the Act
was solely concerned
with the granting of financial assistance to farmers, and
that an endorsement in terms of section 35 should therefore be regarded
as a
form of security which would lapse when the farmer's loan is repaid. I do not
agree. The interpretation which I have placed
on section 35 seems to me to be
entirely consonant with the long title, which records that
the
25
the Act is intended to provide for assistance to farmers and prospective farmers; for the exercise of control in respect of assistance rendered; and for other incidental matters. The kind of assistance which may be rendered by the Board is, as I have already stated, defined by section 10. Section 35, on the other hand, is concerned with control in respect of certain types of assistance. More particularly, by making provision for the imposition of a restriction on separate alienation, the Act seeks to ensure that the applicant's property is not reduced to an uneconomic size which might cause the assistance rendered to him to become ineffective. Mr Dison also sought to rely on the heading of part IV of the Act which is quoted above. This heading
is
26 is however too vague to be of any value in interpreting
section 35, particularly since it covers also "steps taken in connection"
with
securities. And I would add that the wording of section 35 read in its context
is in any event so clear that, in my view, neither
the long title nor the
heading could have affected its interpretation.
Mr. Dison further invoked a
number of well-known presumptions in favour of a more restricted interpretation
of the section. In my
view these presumptions cannot play any role when the
meaning of a section is as clear as in the present case.
Finally Mr. Dison
contended that the section, if interpreted as I think it should be, would lead
to
absurdities
27 absurdities. Thus, he contended, an endorsement could be
effected in terms of section 35(1)(c) to prevent an applicant from mortgaging
his property without the consent of the Minister. On the interpretation which I
have placed on the section this restriction could
remain in force even after all
loans to the State have been paid, and would lapse only when the Minister
authorizes its cancellation
(sub-section 4), or when the property is registered
in the name of another owner (sub-section 2). Moreover, Mr. Dison asked, why
should a farmer who borrows from the State be in a worse position than one who
borrows from the bank?
In considering the validity of these argu
ments
28 ments one should
always bear in mind that the restrictions imposed under section 35 are not
absolute ones, but are subject to relaxation
by the Minister. One should not
assume that he would act unreasonably in granting or withholding consent to the
mortgaging or alienation
of the property concerned. Nevertheless, the
restrictions do constitute a real diminution of the owner's common law freedom
to deal
with his property as he pleases. This diminution is, however, a part of
the price he has to pay for State assistance, and it does
not seem anomalous
that the State should seek to ensure that assistance granted to an applicant
would have a lasting beneficial effect.
The restriction on the mortgaging
........
29 gaging of the property was presumably intended to counter
financial irresponsibility on the part of farmers who had already found
it
necessary to approach the State for assistance. This restriction appropriately
lapses when the property passes into other hands.
In view of the nature and
purpose of the legislation I do not consider that these limitations on
ownership, burdensome as they may
be, create any absurdity that would entitle me
to depart
from
29 A from the clear meaning of the section.
To sum up: in my judgment the
Minister was entitled in terms of section 35 of the Act to impose a restriction
on separate alienation
that would remain valid after repayment of the debt to
the State. The next question is whether he in fact did so.
It may be
convenient at this stage to set out the factual background somewhat more fully.
It will be recalled that the Department
of Agriculture and Land Tenure informed
the deceased on 25 October 1971 that his application for assistance had been
granted. The
relevant parts of their letter read as follows:
l
30
"1. Die Landboukredietraad het kragtens ar-tikel 10 van die Wet op Landboukrediet, 1966, besluit om, onderworpe aan die bedinge en voorwaardes hierin uiteenge-sit, aan u bystand van hoogstens R50 000,00 (vyftigduisend rand) aan te bied vir die aflos van die verband ten gunste van S C de Klerk en die balans van die bystand dan nog beskikbaar vir betaling van die rente verskuldig onder die eerste verband. 2. Die aangebode bystand is onderworpe aan die volgende bedinge en voorwaardes, naamlik dat:
(i) die Raad die reg voorbehou om ter enige tyd hierdie aanbod vir enige rede wat hy as voldoende mag ag, in te trek of te wysig; (ii) geen bedrag hoegenaamd uit die by-stand uitbetaal sal word alvorens daar aan al die vereistes van die Raad ter versekering van die terug-betaling van die bedrag van die by-stand soos uiteengesit in paragraaf 3 hiervan, deur u voldoen is nie;
(iii)
31
(iii) indien die eiendomme in paragraaf
3
genoem, aan 'n reg van vruggebruik onderworpe is, daarvan afstand ge-doen moet
word ten gunste van die verband wat ingevolge paragraaf
3 geregistreer moet
word; (iv) u die bystand soos volg terugbe-taal: die kapitaal in 25
(vyf-en-twintig) gelyke paaiemente waarvan
die eerste betaalbaar is op 31 Maart
1973 en daarna jaarliks om 31.Maart. Rente teen 5% per jaar is op die kapitaal,
soos van tyd
tot tyd verskuldig, betaalbaar met ingang van die datum waarop die
eerste uitbetaling onder die by-stand gemaak is en sal jaarliks
op 31 Maart
agteruitbetaalbaar wees; 3. As verdere voorwaarde van die bystand het die Raad
bepaal dat 'n tweede verband as dekkingsverband
vir die bedrag van R50,000,00
deur u ten gunste van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika geregistreer word oor die
onroerende eiendomme
in u aansoek beskryf as:
(i)
32
(i) Die plaas NOORSDOORNKRAAL gelee in die Afdeling Somerset-Oos, groot 1147,0008 morg; (ii) Die plaas SPRINGVALE, gelee in die Afdeling Somerset-Oos, groot 2963,55 morg; en (iii) Die plaas KUIKENDIEFFONTEIN, gelee in die Afdeling Somerset-Oos, groot 1431,4 morg. en dat die volgende voorwaardes kragtens artikel 35 van die Wet op Landboukre-diet, 1966 teen die titelbewyse van die voormelde eiendomme aangeteken word, naamlik dat dit nie sonder toestemming van die Minister of sy gevolmagtigde: (i) afsonderlik van mekaar vervreem mag word nie; (ii) met verband of andersins beswaar mag word nie; (iii) vir beslaglegging vatbaar is of
uitgewin mag word nie, behalwe op aandrang van 'n verbandhouer; (iv) deel van u boedel sal uitmaak nie, indien u boedel gesekwestreer word of asof insolvent beredder word en daar dan nog 'n bedrag ten opsigte van
die
33 die bystand verskuldig is nie."
At the foot of the letter appear the
words "Hierby aanvaar ek die aanbod op die voorwaardes soos hierbo uiteengesit".
This acceptance
was signed by the deceased, witnessed and dated.
Thereafter matters took their course. The
money was advanced and a bond
prepared for registration.
The Minister issued an authorization in terms of
section
35(1) of the Act, which, in so far as it was relevant,
read as
follows:
"MAGTIGING KRAGTENS ARTIKEL 35(1) VAN DIE WET OP LANDBOUKREDIET , 1966. Ek, die ondergetekende, MARTIN CORNELIUS POTGIETER Administratiewe Beheerbeampte in die Departement van Landboukrediet en
Grondbesit
34
Grondbesit, behoorlik daartoe gemagtig deur
die Minister van Landbou MAGTIG die
Registrateur van Aktes te KAAPSTAD kragtens artikel 35 van die Wet op Landboukrediet, 1966, HIERBY OM, gelyktydig met registrasie van Yi verband vir R50 000,00 deur WILLEM HENDRIK GREEFF .... ten gunste van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, oor
(here follow the deeds office descriptions of the three farms)
DIE VOLGENDE VOORWAARDES OF BEPERKINGS op
die titelbewyse van die
voormelde eiendomme
AAN TE TEKEN: naamlik, dat die gemelde
eiendomme nie
sonder die toestemming van die
Minister van Landbou -
(a)
(b) afsonderlik van mekaar vervreem mag word nie;
(c) met verband of andersins beswaar mag word nie;
(d) vir beslaglegging vatbaar is of uitge-win mag word nie, behalwe op aandrang van 'n verbandhouer oor daardie goed;
(e)
35
(e) deel van die boedel van die eienaar
van daardie goed uitmaak nie, maar be-houdens die regte van die houer van 'n verband oor daardie goed, die eiendom van die Staat word, indien, terwyl daar nog 'n bedrag ten opsigte van bystand deur bedoelde eienaar aan die Staat ver-skuldig is, sy boedel gesekwestreer word of daarmee deur 'n eksekuteur ingevolge artikel 34(5) van die Boedelwet, 1965 (Wet No. 66 van 1965), gehandel moet word, of daarmee ingevolge artikel 28 van die Wet op Landboukrediet, 1966, gehandel word, of, in die geval waar bedoelde eienaar 'n maatskappy of ander regsper-soon is, die maatskappy of ander regs-persoon in likwidasie geplaas word."
The bond in favour of the State was duly
registered and, simultaneously
with registration thereof,
the following endorsement was made on the title
deeds:
"Artikel 35 van Wet Nr 28 van 1966 Section 35 of Act No. 28 of 1966
Die
36
Die binnegemelde eiendom is onderhewig aan die beperkings van sub-artikel 1(b) (c) (d) en (e) van bogemelde artikel. Hierdie beperkings met die uitsondering van die beperkings ge-meld in sub-artikel 1(b) verval met registrasie van transport van die bogemelde eiendom op naam van 'n ander eienaar.
The within property is subject to the re- . strictions of sub-sections 1(b) (c) (d) and (e) of the above-mentioned section. These restrictions with the exception of the restrictions referred to in sub-section 1(b) lapse on registration of transfer of the within named property in the name of another owner."
The endorsement concludes by indicating where the Minister's authorization is
filed, and is signed and dated on behalf of the Registrar
of Deeds.
Mr.
Dison's main argument on this part of the case was that, as appears from the
written authorization,
the
37
the Minister authorized the Registrar of Deeds in terms of section 35 to endorse the relevant restrictions "gelyktydig met registrasie van 'n verband". Consequently, he contended, the restrictions were nationally and as a matter of language tied to the continued existence of the bond. I do not agree. Notionally there is a great difference between an endorsement on a title deed and a bond condition, as I have endeavoured to show above. And as a matter of language the "magtiging" authorizes the Registrar of Deeds to endorse ("aan te teken") the restrictions simultaneously with the registration of the bond. The bond and the endorsement were accordingly to come into effect at the same time.
Nothing
38
Nothing was said, however, about their termination. As I have stated above, the Act contemplates that a restriction in terms of section 35(1)(b) could survive the bond which led to its imposition, and, indeed, that the purpose of the restriction is not to increase or improve the security which the bond provides, but to ensure that assistance granted in terms of the Act would not be dissipated by improvident conduct on the part of the applicant or his successors in title. The sequence of events which I have described above, and the terms of the correspondence, the Minister's authorization and the endorsements on the title deeds of the deceased's farms, convince me that the Minister
intended
39 intended no more and no less than to give effect to this purpose.
It
follows that in my view an endorsement pursuant to section 35(1)(b) of the Act
can in law survive the cancellation of the bond
which gave rise to the
endorsement; that in the present case the endorsement did so survive, and that
it is still of full force and
effect.
In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs.
E M GROSSKOPF, JA RABIE, CJ
CILLIe, AJA