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[1994] ZASCA 126
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S v Mbongwa (444/93) [1994] ZASCA 126 (23 September 1994)
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Case No 444/93
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (APPELLATE DIVISION)
In the matter between:
DAVID SIHLANGU MBONGWA Appellant
and
THE STATE Respondent
CORAM : E M GROSSKOPF, KUMLEBEN et HOWIE JJA
DATE OF HEARING
: 8 September 1994 DATE OF JUDGMENT : 23 September 1994
JUDGMENT
HOWIE JA/
2
HOWIE JA :
Appellant was convicted in a regional Court of armed robbery
and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. He appealed to the Natal
Provincial
Division against the conviction and the sentence. The appeal was dismissed but
leave was granted to appeal to this Court
solely against the conviction.
It is common cause that the robbery was committed between midnight and 1 a.m. on 14 March 1991 by two men who held up the two nightwatchmen on duty at an office of the Department of Development Aid at Ntuzuma, near Durban. After the nightwatchmen had been tied up and were being guarded at gunpoint by one of the intruders, the other cut his way with a grinding machine through the strongroom door and then into the two safes installed there. The safes were found empty but a trunk which stood in the strongroom and contained about R264 000,00 in cash was plundered. The bulk of the money was made up of R50 banknotes.
3
The essential issue is whether appellant was proved to have been one of the
robbers.
Four mornings after the robbery, two members of the South African
Police, Lance-Sergeant Crouse and Constable Jonker, acting on information
concerning a firearm, searched a shack at Mfolo in Soweto, Transvaal, occupied
by appellant. They found no firearm but in his presence
they found in various
places in the kitchen section R65 000,00 in R50 notes. R60 000,00 of it was
contained in six packets of R10
000,00 each, stored in a microwave oven.
Appellant was unemployed at the time. Suspecting the money was unlawfully
obtained, the
two policemen detained appellant for questioning.
They took him
to a Captain Calitz of the Soweto Murder and Robbery Squad and sought the
latter's advice. After speaking to appellant
Calitz ordered a further search of
the shack. This revealed that the microwave oven, as well as a TV set and
loudspeakers found there,
had all had their
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serial numbers removed. Appellant was duly arrested on a charge of possession
of suspectedly stolen property.
Information available to Calitz led him to
contact the South African Police criminal investigation head office in Durban.
In that
way he learnt of the robbery at Ntuzuma and not long afterwards
appellant was handed over to the officer investigating this case.
On 23 March
1991 one of the nightwatchmen, Thembinkosi Buthelezi, pointed out appellant as
one of the robbers at an identification
parade at the Kwa Kashu police station.
The other nightwatchman also attended the parade but was unable to identify
anyone.
The main prosecution witnesses were Buthelezi, Calitz, Crouse, Jonker and Detective Constable Ncube. Ncube was in charge of the identification parade.
Buthelezi said in evidence-in-chief that he was at an outside lavatory when he heard his colleague, Biyase, calling nearby. When Buthelezi responded, he found Biyase
5
confronted by the robbers who then proceeded to tie up the two watchmen. According to Buthelezi it was dark at this spot. Once the office had been broken into they were ordered inside. No light was burning in the office but with the aid of lights on the adjoining verandah Buthelezi focused his attention on the man operating the grinder as he went about breaking into the strongroom. The latter, whom Buthelezi subsequently purported to identify at the identification parade and alleged in evidence was appellant, wore a balaclava cap on his head but it was rolled up and merely fulfilled the function of a hat. Accordingly it did not cover his face and the witness was able to see the man's features and in particular that, but for a moustache, he was clean-shaven. He also noticed that the robber, whom he had never seen before, was well built and of medium height.
Under cross-examination Buthelezi said that he did not pay particular attention to the other robber because he
6
assumed that Biyase would do so. Questioned specifically regarding his
observation of the safe-breaker, Buthelezi said that as he
worked away at the
strongroom door the left side of the man's face was in view and now and again he
would look at the watchmen. Buthelezi
said that because the balaclava cap was
rolled up, the man's forehead protruded. The witness noticed that the grinder
caused sparks
to fly but in the context of his evidence this was at a stage when
the offender concerned had already broken into the strongroom,
where it was
completely dark, and he was busy on one of the safes. He did not state that the
sparks had any material effect on the
state of the available illumination within
the office.
To summarise Buthelezi's evidence up to this point, where they
first encountered the robbers outside it was dark and he made no claim
to have
noticed appellant's appearance then. However, he was later able to observe and
take note of appellant's appearance inside.
This was so,
7
despite the balaclava cap, for the reason that it was rolled right up and
light from the verandah shone into the office.
There then occurred a
significant turnabout in Buthelezi's account. He claimed that when they were
first confronted outside, appellant's
balaclava cap was rolled up. Then, after
they had been bound with wire, appellant went off somewhere - apparently to
fetch the grinder
and other equipment. When he returned, the balaclava cap was
rolled down over his face and it stayed that way until the robbers made
their
escape.
It was then pointed out to Buthelezi that the only
time he could
have seen appellant's face when it was not
obscured was outside where they
first met and where, on his
own admission, it had been dark. His evidence
proceeded:
"Yes, but because of the moonlight and the source of light from the verandah you could see a shadow, I mean where I was with the other man. The others were at the garage. You could see a shadow? --- You could see Biyase but
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you couldn't see who the man is.
And these two people were standing with Biyase? ---
Yes, the other man was pointing a gun at Biyase. And if you couldn't see Biyase's face then presumably you couldn't see the face of the people next to him?
--- You couldn't say if it was him if you were still
far but if you were about from here to the microphone stand you could see that it was Mr. Biyase."
The distance indicated by the witness does not appear from the record but the significance of the quoted passage is twofold. Firstly, it indicates a belated attempt by the witness to rely on moonlight, which had not been mentioned before, and to refer to the verandah lights in a context in which they had not been relied on in his earlier evidence. Secondly, even accepting his altered account of the opportunities for identification, it requires little emphasis that however much these various forms of illumination might have assisted him to recognise Biyase, whom he knew (and even that was apparently only at a very short distance) , they would hardly have enabled him to make a reliable identification of a stranger. The point was
9
driven home later in his evidence when he agreed with the
proposition that
"it was so dark there that it was
difficult to recognise faces".
When Buthelezi was asked what portion of appellant's
face was
visible once the balaclava cap was pulled down,
he claimed that the cap was
loose and indicated, so the
record reads -
"right above the eyes, right down the side of the face below the mouth".
Apart from the fact that this description conflicted with his evidence-in-chief, Buthelezi went on to concede that the only opportunity he had to observe the unobscured face of the safe-breaker was outside where they were tied up.
Referred to events at the identification parade,
Buthelezi said
he recognised appellant despite his having
no distinguishing features worth
mention. He added -
"I was able to recognise the accused upon my arrival when I turned towards him. Because when he saw me.
10
he was shocked."
Asked to describe appellant's reaction,
Buthelezi gave a
demonstration which was described by the interpreter for
the record. It reads as follows:
"the witness sort of opened his eyes bigger and sort of taken one step or one pace backwards with his body moving slightly to the back ... (t)urned."
Buthelezi said that appellant also avoided looking at
him. He added subsequently that he did not point appellant out merely because
of
the letter's reaction. It was put to the witness by the attorney defending
appellant that he would deny having reacted in the
manner recorded but although
appellant did testify, the foreshadowed denial was not forthcoming.
As far as
appellant's possession of R65 000,00 is concerned, Jonker, Crouse and Calitz all
testified that the explanation which appellant
offered was that he had earned
the money dealing in mandrax tablets. They denied the
11
allegation put to them in cross-examination to the effect that he had told
them it constituted the proceeds of a stokvel operation.
Their evidence did not
coincide in other respects but in the view 1 take of the matter those
inconsistencies are not significant
and it is unnecessary to detail them.
As
regards Ncube's evidence, he said that Buthelezi walked along the parade line,
retraced his steps and then pointed out appellant.
He was not asked about
appellant's reaction as described by Buthelezi.
In his own evidence appellant
advanced a belated alibi that he was at home in Soweto on the night in
question and he presented a laboured and unconvincing description of the alleged
stokvel
scheme. In my opinion the magistrate was justified in concluding, as he
did, that appellant's evidence was not reasonably possibly
true in these
respects.
The crucial question in this case, however, is whether
12
Buthelezi's identification was beyond reasonable doubt reliable. Germane to
that issue is whether that identification was reinforced
whether by the pointing
out at the identification parade, by appellant's possession of the
extraordinarily large sum of money found
in his shack or by his untruthful
evidence.
As regards the value of Buthelezi's evidence, the magistrate did
not deal with the contradictions and inconsistencies to which I have
referred or
with Buthelezi's concession that the only time he saw appellant's face uncovered
was at the spot outside where the hold-up
occurred and that the darkness there
was such as to make it difficult to recognise someone. He also overlooked the
fact that the
witness recalled the intruder in question as being taller than
himself and of light complexion. Judging by the photographs of the
identification parade neither characteristic fits appellant.
13
The magistrate found also that the illumination which assisted Buthelezi purportedly to recognise appellant inside the office emanated partly from the sparks caused by the grinder while the strongroom door was being cut. This finding was not supported by the evidence. The witness did not allege that the sparks improved visibility. And, as I have already pointed out, the sparks were caused when the robber concerned was already inside the strongroom, where they obviously contrasted very noticeably with the darkness. In these circumstances to regard the sparks as having been any aid to identification at all would be unjustified.
The magistrate also referred to the marked and patent assurance which Buthelezi displayed in testifying. Although the judgment reveals the magistrate's awareness that this feature did not necessarily rule out a mistake on the part of the witness, it was obviously something which made a strong impression on the magistrate for he
14
repeated it twice. Unfortunately the salutary lesson of experience is that
this particular factor can be dangerously misleading especially
when one is
convinced, as the magistrate was, of Buthelezi's honesty.
Two of the other
considerations which weighed with the trial Court were the length of time for
which Buthelezi had the safe-breaker
under observation and the assertion by the
witness that he expected to be asked for a description later and he therefore
did his
best to assemble the necessary mental picture. The ostensible force of
those factors is materially weakened, however, by his inability
to give any
description of the other robber (whose features were not obscured at any stage
and who was very often far closer to him
than the man with the grinder) and his
strange assumption that his colleague would take good note of the second man.
All in all,
because of the state of the light and the inevitable apprehension
which the two victims must have felt - they pleaded for their lives
at one
stage
15
the circumstances were hardly conducive to reliable identification.
As
some corroboration of Buthelezi's evidence the magistrate took into account
appellant's reaction on the identification parade.
I am unable to find that this
aspect warrants an inference adverse to appellant. Although in many, if not
most, criminal cases one
must -before finding guilt - construe an accused's
words and conduct in the light of the reasonable possibility of his being
innocent
of any crime, that precaution can be dispensed with here. In all
probability, but at least as a reasonable possibility, one can infer
that
appellant came by the money in the shack illicitly. The size of the amount, his
proffered explanation to the police, his possession
of suspectedly stolen goods
and his mendacity in Court all warrant such inference. Accordingly one must
proceed on the basis that
he had indeed done something unlawful to acquire the
money. That being so, I consider
16
that he would probably have been just as apprehensive on the identification parade if that unlawful conduct did not comprise the present robbery as he would have been if it did. He would in either event have been susceptible to display the alarm which Buthelezi observed: he might have recoiled from being pointed out whatever his crime. In the circumstances the behaviour seen by Buthelezi does not strengthen the State case. In fact it provides an answer to the State's suggestion that it was a remarkable coincidence that the witness pointed out the very man who had just been found in possession of a very large sum of money. This coincidence argument loses its force if it is reasonably possible, as I think it is, that the pointing out was prompted by appellant's obvious discomfort.
As to the possession of the money as an independent feature in the case, it was not identified as having come from the complainant. It could have emanated from a robbery or other crime perpetrated on the Witwatersrand.
17
It would be taking judicial nescience too far to ignore the occurrence and
frequency of major crimes in that area. And the fact that
the money was all in
R50 notes is not really significant. At the time in question that was the
largest banknote denomination. Any
bank, institution or government department
possessing very large sums of cash would understandably hold much of it in the
largest
denomination simply for convenience of storage.
And the reason which
led to appellant's being handed over to the Kwa Mashu police is obscure. There
was no evidence at that stage
to link him to the present crime as opposed to any
other. Whether this was the only major unsolved crime involving the loss of a
considerable sum of money in the country within the week preceding appellant's
arrest and whether the police draw any realistic inference
or merely acted on a
hunch one does not know. Whatever the reason, it is impossible to conclude that
it assists in drawing an inference
adverse to appellant.
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To sum up. The evidence of the single identifying witness was materially defective and its inadequacies were not cured, either by the pointing out or any other factor, sufficiently for one to conclude that his purported identification of appellant was beyond reasonable doubt reliable.
The appeal must therefore succeed.
The following order is made:
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The conviction and sentence are set aside.
C.T. HOWIE JUDGE OF APPEAL E M GROSSKOPF JA ]
] CONCUR
KUMLEBEN JA ]