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[1998] ZASCA 7
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Odendaal v Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste (193/96) [1998] ZASCA 7; 1998 (3) SA 318 (SCA); [1998] 2 All SA 461 (A) (13 March 1998)
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REPUBLIEK VAN SUID-AFRIKA
bw/
H J ODENDAAL Appellant
en DIE KOMMISSARIS VAN BINNELANDSE INKOMSTE Respondent
Coram: VAN HEERDEN AHR, HEFER, MARAIS, SCHUTZ ARR en MELUNSKY Wnd AR
Datum van Verhoor: 19 Februarie 1998 Datum gelewer: 13 Maart 1998
Ingevolge artikel 26(1) van die Inkomstebelastingwet 58 van 1962 word die
uit sy boerdery verkry word, ooreenkomstig die bepalings van die Wet, maar met
12(1) van die Bylae word daar, behoudens die bepalings van onder andere sub-
gedurende 'n jaar van aanslag (hierin 'n belastingjaar genoem) opgeloop het, in
sekere gevalle in die geheel of gedeeltelik oorgedra na die volgende
belastingjaar en geag sodanige koste te wees wat hy gedurende laasgenoemde
jaar aangegaan het. Indien die boer gedurende 'n belastingjaar 'n verlies
vanwe sy boerdery gely het (sonder inagneming van ontwikkelingskoste), word
die volle koste aldus oorgedra.
Dit is die praktyk van die respondent om ten opsigte van 'n belastingjaar
van 'n boer 'n kennisgewing van aanslag sowel as 'n IB48 vorm te laat uitreik.
In so 'n vorm word onder die opskrif "Berekening van Belasbare Inkomste uit
Boerderybedrywighede" besonderhede uiteengesit van die boer se
bedryfsinkomste en -uitgawes, en word 'n bedrag vermeld as synde f belasbare
inkomste f'n aangeslane verlies. Daaronder word voorsien ng gemaak vir die
13 daaropvolgende belastingjaar aangegaan is. 14 gespeel het nie. 15 In die alternatief is aangevoer dat die bepaling van ontwikkelingskoste 19 word nie onder 'n "vasgestelde verlies" vir die betrokke jaar binne die 20 gemaak word. 'n Mens is dus weer terug by die omskrywing van die begrip in 21 van 'n verrekenbare verlies.
ook verbeterde vorms vir die 1984 tot 1990 belastingjare uitgereik ten einde die
reedsgenoemde foute reg te stel. Besware van die appellant teen die 1991
aanslag en die verbeterde vorms was nie suksesvol en so ook nie 'n app
l wat
hy daarna na die Spesiale Inkomstebelastinghof (Johannesburg) aangeteken het
nie. Later is egter aan hom verlof verleen om na hierdie hof te appelleer.
By die verhoor in die hof a quo was dit klaarblyklik nie in geskil nie:
(a)
(b)
(a)
8 1984 tot 1991 belastingjare op die appellant bestel is op 'n wyse beoog
in art. 106(2) van die Wet, en
omskryfas:
"die vasstelling deur die Kommissaris, by wyse van 'n kennisgewing van aanslag bestel op 'n wyse beoog in artikel 106(2)—
(a) van 'n bedrag waarop 'n ingevolge hierdie Wet hefbare belasting
(b)
van die bedrag van so 'n belasting; of
(c)
van 'n verlies wat in vergelyking gebring kan word."
art. 26(1) waama reeds verwys is. Dit volg dus dat die belasbare inkomste van
'n boer met inagneming van die aftrekkings waarvoor paragraaf 12(1) van die
Eerste Bylae tot die Wet voorsiening maak, vasgestel moet word.
Ek het reeds kortliks na paragraaf 12(3) van die Eerste Bylae tot die Wet
verwys. Dit lui soos volg:
verkry. Die vernaamste, indien nie die enigste rede waarom paragraaf 12(3) op
die wetboek geplaas
s, was om te verhinder dat ontwikkelingskoste van
inkomste uit sodanige ander bronne aftrekbaar is. Oorskry daardie koste 'n boer
se andersins belasbare inkomste uit sy boerdery, word in effek die omvang van
die oorskryding na die volgende belastingjaar oorgedra: Commissioner fbr
Inland Revenue v D and N Promotions (Pty)Ltd 1995(2) SA 296 (A) 305 D-F,
en Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Zamoyski 1985(3) SA 145(C) 147 H-J.
Indien die boer in 'n belastingjaar sonder inagneming van ontwikkelingskoste
teen 'n verlies geboer het, moet, om redes wat later vermeld word, die totale
bedrag van sy ontwikkelingskost
(plus enige saldo wat van die vorige jaar
oorgedra is) na die volgende jaar oorgedra word. En in beide bogenoemde
gevalle word die oorgedrae bedrag geag ontwikkelingskoste te wees wat in die
In die lig van bogenoemde bepalings van die Wet kan die bevindings van
die verhoorhof soos volg saamgevat word. Die IB48 vorms vir die 1984, 1986
en 1987 belastingjare het nie 'n aanslag soos omskryf in art. 1 van die Wet bevat
nie. Meer bepaald het hulle nie "die vasstelling deur die Kommissaris ... van
'n verlies wat in vergelyking gebring kan word" tot inhoud gehad nie. Die rede
is dat die appellant in geen van die drie belastingjare 'n wins uit sy boerdery
gemaak het nie en dat die ontwikkelingskoste wat hy in elk van daardie jare
opgeloop het dus telkens geag moes word in die daaropvolgende belastingjaar
aangegaan te gewees het. Daarom kon die koste wat in enige van die drie jare
aangegaan is nie 'n verlies in die betrokke jaar meegebring het nie. Voorts was
geen van die IB48 vorms 'n integrale deel van die toepaslike kennisgewing van
aanslag nie, en wel omdat die ontwikkelingskoste geen rol in die aanslag
In hierdie hof het die appellant se advokaat in eerste instansie gesteun op
paragraaf (a) van die woordomskrywing van "aanslag" in art.l van die Wet,
naamlik "die vassteling . . . van 'n bedrag waarop 'n ingevo
ge hierdie Wet
hefbare belasting opgel
kan word." Die betoog was dat 'n IB48 vorm die
berekening van belasbare inkomste uit boerdery bevat en daarom ten minste 'n
integrale deel van die verwante kennisgewing van aanslag is. Die eenvoudige
antwoord hierop is dat 'n mens in die onderhawige geval nie met 'n vasstelling
soos bogenoemde ten doen het nie. In die 1984,1986 en 1987 belastingjare het
die appellant immers telkens 'n verlies gely. Die resultaat was dat in elk van die
betrokke kennisgewings van aanslag 'n verlies vasgestel is binne die raamwerk
van paragraaf (c) van die omskrywing van "aanslag", naamlik 'n verlies wat in
verrekening gebring kan word.
in die drie IB48 beskou moet word as die vasstelling van 'n verdere verl
es wat
die appellant gely het. Die argument het min of meer soos volg verloop.
koste van herhaling moet weereens ges
word dat paragraaf 12(3) in werking
tree slegs indien die ontwikkelingskoste wat in 'n belastingjaar aangegaan
s,
meer is as die boer se belasbare inkomste (sonder inagneming van sodanige
koste) uit sy boerdery. Die koste moet in eerste instansie van daardie inkomste
afgetrek word en die bedrag waarmee die koste die belasbare inkomste te bowe
gaan("die oorskot") moet dan weer bygetel word as deel van die boer se
inkomste ten einde 'n nul resultaat te bereik (D and N Promotions, supra. op
p305 E-F). Dit volg dus dat die onderstreepte woord nie dieselfde betekenis het
as die belasbare inkomste wat inisieel in paragraaf 12(3) vermeld word nie. Na
aftrekking van die ontwikkelingskoste is immers 'n minus posisie bereik en die
oorskot moet dus by daardie syfer getel word.
Soos reeds genoem, word die oorskot dan oorgedra na die volgende
vasgestelde verlies teen inkomste verkry deur die boer ook uit 'n ander bedryf
as boerdery in verrekening gebring kon word. En, soos reeds geblyk het, is
art. 1 van die Wet. Normaalweg sal die vasstelling van 'n verkeerde syfer as 'n
verrekenbare verlies te wyte wees aan die bepaling van 'n eweneens verkeerde
bedrag wat in die proses van aanslag gemaak is. Daardie verkeerde syfer sou
egter slegs die rede wees waarom die aanslag as sulks foutief is en daar
derhalwe suksesvol beswaar daarteen gemaak kon word.
In die onderhawige geval bereik 'n mens egter nie eens bogenoemde
posisie nie. Ek beklemtoon weereens dat in elk van die 1984, 1986 en 1987
belastingjare die ontwikkelingskoste geen rol gespeel het by die uiteindelike
vasstelling van die appellant se verrekenbare verlies nie. Trouens, die omvang
daarvan was vir doeleindes van die vasstelling irrelevant. Ek vind dit dus
moeilik om in te sien hoe 'n beswaar teen die bepaling van die omvang van die
ontwikkelingskoste tuisgebring kon word onder 'n beswaar teen die vasstelling
meen ek egter nie dat dit aldus vatbaar is nie.
Die app
l word met koste afgewys.
REPUBLIEK VAN SUID-AFRIKA
DIE HOOGSTE HOF VAN APP
L VAN SUID-AFRIKA
Saak nommer: 193/96 (SIH) Insake die app
l van
H J ODENDAAL
Appellant
en
DIE KOMMISSARIS VAN BINNELANDSE INKOMSTE Respondent
Coram: VAN HEERDEN AHR, HEFER, MARAIS, SCHUTZ ARR en MELUNSKY Wnd AR
Datum van verhoor:
19 Februarie 1998 Datum gelewer:
13 Maart 1998
HEFER AR
Ek het tot dieselfde slotsom as die Adjunk Hoofregter gekom.
oordragsaldo ten opsigte van ontwikkelingskoste in dieselfde dokument
deel van die aanslag vorm, bly die antwoord myns insiens dieselfde:
hoewel dit fisies deel van dieselfde dokument is, vorm dit hier ook nie
deel van die daadwerklike vasstelling van die bedryfsverlies nie.
Ek stem saam dat die app l afgewys moet word met koste.
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA !
Case No: 193/96
In the matter between
H J ODENDAAL Appellant
and
COMMISSIONER FOR INLAND REVENUE Respondent
CORAM: VAN HEERDEN DCJ, HEFER, MARAIS, SCHUTZ JJA et
MELUNSKY AJA
DATE HEARD: 19 February 1998 DELIVERED: 13 March 1998
JUDGMENT
MARAIS JA
2 MARAIS JA
I have had the advantage of reading the judgments of my brothers Van
Heerden, Hefer and Schutz. I agree with the two former for the reasons given by
them. The reasons for my respectful inability to agree with the latter are these. The
IT 48 form is referred to by him as a prescribed form. If it is indeed such, I do not
think it takes the enquiry any further. There are many forms in use in the office of
the Commissioner and they are not necessarily part of the assessments to which
they relate nor of course are they all assessments in their own right. It is not
entirely clear to me what the significance is of the observation that the initial error
was not "adopted" by the taxpayer until 1991. Perhaps it is to allay any suspicion
of fraud or misrepresentation. Be that as it may, the error certainly was "adopted"
("exploited" would more accurately convey what was done) as soon as it could be
turned to account in any meaningful sense, i.e. in the year when a farming profit
on current account eventuated.
3 I find nothing in the Act which lends any support to the idea that "parts" of
an assessment of the kind here under consideration are to be regarded as if they
are assessments in their own right, amenable to the objection and appeal
procedures and therefore subject to the finality provisions contained in the Act.
Errors of calculation made by an assessor may cancel one another out so that
neither the amount upon which tax is chargeable nor the amount of such tax nor
the loss ranking for set-off is wrong. The effect of the wrongful refusal by the
Commissioner of a deduction of a particular character might be neutralised by an
erroneous calculation by him elsewhere. In a certain sense these errors are no
doubt "parts" of the assessment. However, even if errors such as these were to be
ascertainable ex facie an assessment what is the taxpayer intended to be able to do
about them? The taxable income attributed to him or the loss ranking for set-off
is correct and so is the amount of tax payable. Against what then is he intended
to be able to object? He will be unable to ask the courts to alter either of the
4 determinations. At best he could ask the court to provide more accurate reasons
for reaching the same result. But in the main our law has long set its face against
any such thing. Appeals and objections in our jurisprudence ordinarily lie against
results and not against the reasons for reaching them.
The provisions of sec 77 (2) and (3) seem to me to hinder and not help the
taxpayer. When read with the definition of "assessment" in sec 1 they show that,
subject to the right to issue additional assessments, only one assessment of taxable
income and the tax payable thereon per taxpayer per year is contemplated. No
provision is made for separately and independently existing assessments of income
from different sources and for the tax payable upon each such income to be
separately and independently assessed. Provision is made for the separate
calculation of income from various sources only as steps in the determination of
a taxpayer's total taxable income and the tax payable is only capable of being
calculated upon that total amount. It cannot be calculated piecemeal where income
5 has been derived from more than one income-generating activity. It would result
in the same taxpayer having differing marginal rates of tax in the same tax year
depending upon which income from which activity was being taxed. That would
be of course tax heresy. In any event, even if it be assumed that the expression
"particulars of any assessment" includes the calculations made and other steps
taken by the Commissioner in making the assessment, it would not follow that
each of those "particulars" is amenable to objection and appeal when the
assessment of what the taxpayer's obligations in that tax year are, is not being
challenged.
I do not read my brother Van Heerden's judgment as confining the words
"alter" and "amend" in subsections 81 (4) and 83 (13) to the case where there is
an objection to an assessed loss being set too low. I read it merely as an example
given to counter the suggestion that there is nothing other than the sort of error
under consideration here to which the word "alter" or "amend" could apply.
6 I have difficulty in understanding the example given by my brother Schutz
of the taxpayer who might wish to challenge a closing stock figure decided upon
by the Commissioner. My learned brother acknowledges that he can attack the
figure by objecting to the assessed taxable income and tax payable figures but
objects that he can do so only "by the unnatural means of seeking their increase".
To my mind the taxpayer cannot have it both ways. He cannot demand that the
stock figure be increased but in the same breath insist upon being taxed as if it had
not been increased. Moreover, I find it difficult to comprehend how it would be
possible for the taxpayer to achieve an alteration of the closing stock figure
without that having a consequential effect upon his taxable income for the tax year
in question and the tax payable by him for that year.
I consider that the law does indeed cater for both the fat and the lean years.
In a year so fat that there will be a farming profit even if all the capital expenditure
claimed has been deducted, but the taxpayer considers that some capital
7 expenditure has been wrongly disallowed, he will be able to object because the
assessment of his taxable income and the tax payable for that year will be affected ,
by the disallowance. If, in a year fat enough to entitle capital expenditure to be
brought to account but not fat enough to exhaust it, there is disagreement about the
balance to be carried forward, that disagreement can be placed formally on record
by the taxpayer by writing to the Commissioner and, if and when, in a subsequent
year the correctness of that figure is material to the end result of the assessment of
the taxable income and the tax payable, the opportunity of objecting to the figure
carried forward by the Commissioner will arise because the end result will be open
to objection. In the lean year, where no capital expenditure at all is allowed as a
deduction and there is disagreement as to what amount should be carried forward,
again the taxpayer's protest can be placed on record and, as in the previous
example, when the correctness of the figure does materially affect the taxpayer's
liability for tax in a particular year, he will be able to challenge it.
10 (5) requires a notice of assessment to do, that any objection must be sent within 30 4 prohibits its deduction from other forms of income, either in the year in 6 would rank for deduction in later years. The assessor's error inflated the 7 corrected figure was rejected and his appeal to the Special Income Tax 8 portion already described, under the heading "Verbeterings". The lower 9 of the 1984 year the familiar form IT 34, which is headed "Tax 10 forms part of the "assessment", it is necessary to refer to the definition of 13 seems to indicate that an assessment consists not only of the three results, 14 have a higher taxable income in year one whilst having a correspondingly 15 determination which will bind the Commissioner to an opening stock 16 concerned, the lower part (rating amount) is designed for a calculation 17 existence separate from the upper may be that in some years there can be 18 that I have with the majority view, to the effect that the calculation in the 21 Commissioner records regarding development expenditure involve a 23 Commissioner. Consequently the Commissioner says nothing to the 24 avoid their arising. 25 reason of its being prescribed, an assessment or part of an
if the IT 48 and IT 34 forms are not issued simultaneously, from what date the time
prescribed by sec 81 (1) for the lodging of objections commences to run? (See the
definition of the "date of assessment" in sec 1.) Does it run from the date specified
in the IT 34 form as the due date (or the date of the notice if no due date is
specified) if the capital expenditure has affected the taxpayer's liability for that year
but from the date of the IT 48 form if it has not? The manner in which the period
of 30 days must be determined seems to me to predicate that there will be only one
assessment and one date of issue (apart of course from additional assessments
which the Commissioner may be empowered to make). Moreover, the definition
of the "date of assessment" in sec 1 postulates the existence of a "notice of
assessment" as contemplated in the definition of "assessment" in the same section
of the Act. The IT 48 form does not purport to be a notice of assessment nor does
it reflect a due date. It was not shown to have given the taxpayer notice, as sec 77
days. All this points strongly, in my view, to the conclusion that the mere sending
to the taxpayer of an IT 48 form cannot trigger the running of time against him in
terms of sec 81 (1). That, to my mind, shows that no objection to or appeal against
the calculations which may appear in that document lies unless and until they have
a material bearing upon the notice of assessment contained in the IT 34 form, in
which event the running of time against the taxpayer will be triggered by receipt of
the IT 34 form and not by receipt of an IT 48 form.
It is inherent in the conclusion that a taxpayer may object to a step in the
Commissioner's process of assessment even although it has not resulted in any
erroneous determination of his taxable income, or the tax payable by him, or the
loss ranking for set-off, or any of the other matters to which reference is made in
the definition of "assessment" in sec 1, that the Special Income Tax Court and, on
appeal, another court must entertain objections which may never have any practical
would render other potentially entirely academic disputes amenable to the objection
and appeal procedure for which the Act provides. I too would dismiss the appeal
with costs.
R M MARAIS
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
H J ODENDAAL
APPELLANT
AND
COMMISSIONER FOR INLAND REVENUE RESPONDENT
BEFORE: VAN HEERDEN DCJ, HEFER, MARAIS,
SCHUTZ JJA and MELUNSKY AJA
HEARD:
19 FEBRUARY 1998
DELIVERED: 13 MARCH 1998
SCHUTZ JA:
income in circumstances defined by sections 11 (x) and 26 (1) and
paragraphs 12 (1) and 12 (3) of the First Schedule. This is a concession
to the farming community as the general, if not invariable, policy of the
Act is not to allow the deduction of expenditure of a capital nature.
In the days when a farming loss (I use the expressions "profit" and
"loss" in a loose sense for the sake of simplicity) could be set off without
restriction against profits from other activities, the concession intended to
benefit farmers came to be utilized by prospering professional and other
enterprising men with good tax advisers to avoid payment of tax. They did
this by pouring unconsumed income into the development of their farms.
The result was legislation which permits the deduction of development
expenditure only from income derived from farming operations and
which the development expenditure is incurred or in any subsequent year.
However, if there is no farming profit in a year, or insufficient to consume
development expenditure available for set-off, the balance of such
expenditure may be carried forward from year to year until it has been so
consumed. That is the broad import of the legislation, as explained in CIR
v D & N Promotions (Pty) Ltd [1994] ZASCA 176; 1995 (2) SA 296 (A) at 305. Corbett CJ
described the hinge provision, para 12 (3) of the First Schedule, as
"somewhat convoluted". To my mind that is, with respect, a generously
euphemistic description. Para 12 (3) is practically incomprehensible.
However, for the purposes of this case the complexities of para 12 (3) may
be by-passed. The purport of the legislation, as I have explained it, is not
in dispute.
balance carried forward, which would be to the benefit of the taxpayer if
there were a subsequent farming profit. This error was in no wise caused
by the taxpayer. Nor was it adopted by him. In succeeding years, until
1991, he continued to show correct figures. The 1984 error was carried
forward by the Commissioner. Errors of the same nature as those made
in that year were made again in 1986 and 1987, and also carried forward.
During all these years there was a farming loss. When a profit was made
in 1991, and a set-off of development expenditure became competent, the
Commissioner purported to correct the previous errors in the reflection of
the balance of development expenditure. By then the incorrect balance
had risen to R5 222 246. Devoid of error the balance would have been
R2 094 511. The taxpayer's objection to an assessment based on the
Court (Johannesburg) failed. By leave of that Court the matter is before
us.
As I have said, the part of the form IT 48 giving rise to the dispute
is the middle part. There is also an upper and a lower part. The form is on
one page and is headed "Berekening van Belasbare Inkomste uit
Boerderybedrywighede". In the upper part of the 1984 form the sum of
current farming expenditure and opening stock are deducted from the sum
of gross farming income and closing stock, leading to a net loss of
R675 269. After certain further adjustments which need not be set out,
against the description "Belasbare inkomste / Aangeslane verlies" there
appears a loss of R626 895. No deduction is made for development
expenditure because there is a farming loss. Then follows the middle
part is headed "Berekening Van Tariefbedrag" (calculation of rating
amount). In the 1984 form this section was only partly completed, no
doubt because it is directed towards a calculation of tax payable and, there
being no taxable income from farming, there was to be no such calculation
involving farming income. The 1991 form shows what happens when
there is taxable income from farming. An average farming income over
the last five years is calculated, and after amounts for director's fees and
interest are added a sum of R929 816 is reached. The complexities of the
matter need not be pursued. Suffice it to say that the calculation is
concerned with the application of s 5 (10) of the Act to a farmer's normal
tax once he has made an election in terms of para 19 of the First Schedule.
Apart from the IT 48 there was also issued to the taxpayer in respect
Assessment". Under the heading "Income Assessed" the assessed loss
from farming figure of R626 895, which was calculated in the IT 48 form,
is inserted. After the insertion of two other figures an overall assessed loss
of R880 860 is reached. Accordingly the tax payable for the year is given
as nil.
that term in s 1. "Assessment" means
(a)
(b)
of the amount of any such tax; or
(c)
of any loss ranking for set-off,
approach the definition with any pre-conceptions as to what it defines.
The appropriate description of the word "determination" in the context
used appears to me to be the fifth meaning given in the Shorter OED,
namely "The action of definitely ascertaining the position, nature, amount,
the Commissioner shall give notice of the assessment to the taxpayer . . ."
"Particulars" is a word of wide import. On the face of it it would
include not only the three results (a), (b) and (c) mentioned in the
definition of assessment (taxable income, tax payable and assessed loss)
but also the constituents and calculations going to the making up of these
amounts. The judgment of my brother Van Heerden holds that an
objection can be lodged only against the three results. The constituents
and calculations, so it is held, are merely the reasons for the results and are
thus not open to objection. I can see no reason for such a conclusion. It
gives a narrow meaning to the word "particulars." Moreover it overlooks
the significance of the word "determination" in the definition. That word
but also the process by which they are reached.
Another reason why I consider the majority view to be too confined
is based on subsections 81 (4) and 83 (13). They make it clear that an
objection or appeal can lead not only to a reduction but also to an
"alteration." That also is word of wide import. According to the majority
view it seems that the operation of the alteration provision is to be
confined to the case where there is an objection to an assessed loss being
set too low. There is no reason that I can see why the word should be
subjected to such an artificial containment. Such a restriction would apply
to the following case. The Commissioner inserts a figure for closing stock
in the upper part of the IT 48. Suppose that the taxpayer is of the view
that tax rates will rise in the following year so that it is in his interest to
lower one in year two. He may then wish to object that the figure for
closing stock in year one is too small. If he is entitled to do so and
succeeds in his objection the opening stock in the next year will be larger
and the taxable income from farming and tax payable smaller. Because of
the increase in the tax rate this may suit him, even though the tax payable
in year one (at the lower rate) will be increased. Yet on the majority view
he would be precluded from proving a higher closing stock, even though
that figure would have a direct effect on tax payable in both years. It is no
sufficient answer to say that he can attack the figure indirectly by objecting
to the taxable income and tax payable figures in year one. He could do so
only by the unnatural means of seeking their increase. What he really
wishes to attack is the closing stock figure, in order that he may obtain a
figure in year two. Yet according to the majority view, whatever he does
and whatever he achieves in respect of year one will not avail him in year
two. He will have to wait and take his chance in year two only when an
assessment for that year is issued. That is because the closing stock figure
is said not to be one of the particulars of the assessment and thus to be
devoid of nascent finality. To my mind that is a startling result which can
be avoided by giving words their natural meanings.
I have so far sought to demonstrate that the upper and lower parts of
the IT 48 are capable of forming part of the assessment. The next question
is whether in fact they do. The IT 34 can stand on its own. It is, after all,
all that non-farmers receive. But it is certainly elucidated and made more
comprehensible by reference to the IT 48. As far as the IT 48 itself is
which is to be utilized in the IT 34. The upper part (farming profit or loss)
could stand on its own, but it does not lead to anywhere in particular. It
also is designed to produce a figure to be carried forward into the IT 34, on
which will be calculated the overall taxable income or assessed loss and
the amount of tax payable. Mr Venter conceded, again quite correctly, that
the two documents are intended to be read together. To arrive at the true
effect of the Commissioner's actions they should, in my view, be read
together. This is indeed a case where ex antecedentibus et consequentibus
est optima interpretatio. My conclusion so far is that at least the upper
and lower parts of the IT 48 form part of the IT 34.
Is the middle part, or part of the middle part to be excepted from
such inclusion? I do not think so. A reason why the middle part has an
no deduction of development expenses, even though they have been
incurred. If they could be deducted in full in all years I can see no reason
why they should not have been provided to be entered as a deduction in
the first part, like current expenses. But as deductibility depends both
upon whether there is a profit and the amount of the profit when compared
with the amount of the development expenditure, it may well have
appeared convenient to have a separated calculation. However that may
be, and leaving the calculation placed where it is, the fact is that the
calculation of such expenditure in the middle part will be used in the upper
part as a deduction or part deduction in a profit year. To that extent the
effects of that calculation will also be carried forward into the IT 34 via the
assessed farming profit or the nil balance of farming income. A difficulty
middle part has no effect on the IT 34 in a loss year such as 1984 (so far I
agree), so that the calculation may be ignored entirely, is that that view
produces no general theory which can be applied also in a year of profit.
Surely the law must cater for the fat years as well as the lean. The IT 48
is not part of the assessment in some years but not in others.
To my mind the middle part where it sets out the opening balance
and the costs incurred during the year constitutes a part of the IT 34, albeit
a limping part. It has the potential of making a direct contribution to the
IT 34, but in some years it will and in others it will not. In years of current
profit development expenditure is as much deductible as is current
expenditure. The figure in issue in this case is the closing balance of
development expenditure, but as it is no more than the sum of the opening
determination by him. It is not just a calculation without legal
significance, as is the Commissioner's argument. He argues that the
determination of such expenditure takes place only if and when a profit is
earned. That may be many years after the event. On the other hand, if he
is wrong, then the determination will, after objections and appeals are a
matter of the past, become final under s 81 (5). And he will not be entitled
to issue an additional assessment in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation
or non-disclosure by the taxpayer : s 79(1).
That there should be finality (in terms of the authorities finality
would operate in favour of both the Commissioner and the taxpayer) seems
to me highly desirable. If there will indeed be indefinite uncertainty the
following examples could arise. In the year in which expenditure is
taxpayer. But the taxpayer sedulously preserves records. Fourteen years
later he makes a profit. Now for the first time he presents his claim. The
Commissioner sends out his inspector to view the developments. The
inspector casts his eyes across the face of the land and that which stands
upon it. He asks, "But where are the irrigation works of 14 years ago," to
be told "Oh! They have long been ploughed over." He asks, "But where
is the fence that was erected 14 years ago", to be told "Oh! The wire and
the standards were stolen five years back." In the Special Court the
taxpayer proves to be an impressive witness. He has documents typed on
paper at least 14 years old. And so on.
Examples like these do not determine the appeal. But it is a comfort
that the interpretation of events that I consider to be the correct one would
"assessment'. In so doing I do not necessarily agree with all of the
reasoning by which the majority has reached its conclusion, but I find it
explained.
assessment.
2.
That an IT 48, standing alone, is an assessment.
3.
4.
appellant.